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Foreword
The motivation for writing this book began with my, one might say, naïve belief 
that critical thinking could have avoided the rise of the Third Reich and the 
Shoah in World War II. The main culprits were put on trial in Nuremberg, and 
then came the Eichmann trial in Jerusalem and the Auschwitz trials in Germany. 
Later on, the compliancy of Heidegger, Gadamer, and others with the Nazi regime 
was exposed by prominent scholars.1 Thus, the personal and public reputations 
of Heidegger, Jünger, Schmitt, Gadamer and others were destroyed and then 
partly rehabilitated. Their teaching, which was essential in consolidating and 
promulgating the Nazi world-view and in creating and designing the atmosphere 
of support for the Nazi movement, has, however, mostly remained untouched 
and continues to be uncritically studied and referred to. As Alain Finkielkraut 
writes: 
As Jankélévitch has rightly noted, the extermination of the Jews “was doctrinally 
founded, philosophically explained, methodically prepared by the most pedantic doctri-
narians ever to have existed.” The Nazis were not, in effect, brutes, but theorists. It was 
not because of blood-thirsty instincts, economic or political interests, or even because 
of prejudice that they sacrificed all scruples. On the contrary, it could be said that the 
objections and scruples of interest, of instinctive pity, and of prejudice were sacrificed on 
the altar of their philosophy of history. “It is thus an erroneous and stupid conception,” 
Theodore Fritsch commented as early as 1910 in his Anti-Semite’s Catechism, “to explain 
the opposition to Judaism as an outgrowth of a stupid racial and religious hatred, whereas 
in fact it is a disinterested battle animated by the most noble ideas, against an enemy of 
humanity, morality and culture” (Finkielkraut 1992: 29–30).2
Studies that focus on biography crumble and wind up with the banality of evil 
of a mass murderer, the weakness of the human will, rumors of a love affair 
between Heidegger and Arendt, the tensed relationship between Heidegger and 
Löwith, Gadamer’s alleged collaboration with the Nazis, etc. On the contrary, 
provided that Fenkielkraut and Jankélévitch are correct, then understanding the 
Third Reich and the crimes perpetrated in its name entails dealing critically with 
the philosophy that shaped and justified Nazism. 
Heidegger is the most famous and most studied philosopher related to 
Nazism. As Domenico Losurdo (2001) and Hans Sluga (1993) show, Heidegger’s 
work survived due to its quality and originality. He was, however, part of an 
1 See for example Farías (1989), Orozco (1995), Lilla (2003), Wolin (2001, 2004), and Faye (2009). 
2 See also the forgotten work by Max Weinreich (1999).
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expansive intellectual milieu whose members shared similar ideas and support 
of Nazism. My study starts with Heidegger because he is the most remembered 
and the most currently influential. The first chapter focuses mainly on the Letter 
on Humanism. The title suggests an apologetic tone. The content, however, 
reveals parallels to his work from the time in which he supported Nazism. The 
excursus of the chapter focuses on two approaches to Heidegger—one of approval 
by Hannah Arendt, and one of disapproval by Emmanuel Lévinas.
The second chapter focuses on Carl Schmitt’s teaching, which was supposed 
to give Nazism its moral and political foundation. His teaching is seen as a blue-
print whose possible translation into reality is unfolded in a short text, which is 
provided in the excursus in a new English translation.
The third chapter focuses on Ernst Jünger, who was not a supporter of the 
Nazi movement and regime, but whose teaching created the model for the Nazi 
warrior and Nazi warfare.3 The trend of Jünger’s philosophy is developed in the 
excursus, in a new English translation. 
The fourth chapter focuses on Karl Löwith, who points at the relation 
between Nazi ideology and German philosophy, especially Heidegger’s. Löwith’s 
critique tends sometimes to be personal and not objective, and this tension is 
shown and discussed.
The fifth chapter focuses on Hannah Arendt. It considers the flaws in her 
historical report in Eichmann in Jerusalem. It shows that these flaws are irrel-
evant to Arendt because her aim in dealing with the case was in fact a philo-
sophical one.
The sixth chapter focuses on Gadamer’s striving to rehabilitate the humani-
ties in reaction to the inhuman phenomenon of Nazism and on his use of 
hermeneutics and phenomenology to neutralize detrimental components in the 
German language that might lead to catastrophic consequences. It turns out that 
despite his ambition, Gadamer falls prey to the philosophy of Heidegger and 
Nazism.
The seventh chapter focuses on Jean Améry, who applies terms coined 
mostly by Heidegger to his experience as an inmate in the death camps. The 
effect of this strategy is a shock that is directed above all at the intellectuals who 
continue to maintain the old terminology and philosophy of the Nazi era as if 
nothing has changed. 
The eighth chapter focuses on Jan Assmann, who claims to have found the 
origin of anti-Semitism and annihilation of the Jews in the “Mosaic Distinction.” 
Assmann thinks that the Jewish religion introduced into human history the reli-
gious violence that finally led also to the annihilation of the Jews in the Shoah. 
3 See Bartov (2000), Vondung (1988).
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The chapter surveys his manipulative reading of texts from the Jewish tradi-
tion and his conspicuous omission of important details in order to maintain his 
theory about the responsibility of the Jews for their own annihilation. 
The selection of subjects dealt with in a book is arbitrary, and influential 
authors and important texts are left out or referred to only in the footnotes. One 
usually resorts to the cliché about the limited scope of the book. Likewise, it 
is impossible to mention all the people who assisted and supported. Special 
thanks are due to Jeffrey Herf and Alexander Orbach. I am grateful to Michiel 
Klein-Swormink, the chief editor at Walter de Gruyter, and his wonderful team 
for their support, confidence, and professional work. 
The manuscript of this book has gone through numerous iterations, each 
different from the previous version due to fruiteful encounters, comments, 
advices and disagreements with scholars, students and friends that led me to 
re-thinking and re-formulating my theses: Richard Wolin, Mitchell Cohen, Klaus 
Vondung, Franz Navon, Reiner Wiehl, Hans-Friedrich Fulda, Mark Lilla, Omer 
Bartov, Goerge Heffernan, David Graizbrod, Thomas Sheehan, Robert Dostal, 
Peter Kopf, Alexander Dubrau, Jay Ticker, Thomas Meyer, and colleagues and 
students at Heidelberg, Cologne, The University of Pennsylvania, The University 
of Illinois Springfield, and Fordham University.
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Introduction
Nazism and the genocide of the Jews are arguably among the most studied, ana-
lyzed, and debated subjects in modern history. Even when one disregards the 
question of whether these are unique or rather potentially repeatable events, 
they remain a reference point in dealing with any other mass killings. It is 
common to ask, for example, whether Stalin’s mass executions or the genocide 
in Darfur exceeds the Holocaust in number of causalities, cruelty, or thorough-
ness of the perpetrators carrying out the annihilation. In posing the question 
regarding the Holocaust in that way, one tends to utilize a quantitative analy-
sis, or to view it as an unexplainable phenomenon without antecedents (or some 
combination of the two). 
Despite all of its scholarly merits and insights, it was Hannah Arendt’s most 
influential study, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1966), which started a trend 
of claiming that mass killing is connected to mass production and territorial 
expansion; both are characteristic of modern societies.1 In this framework, the 
distinctive traits and motivations of Stalin’s mass executions and deportations 
versus Hitler’s persecution and murder of the Jews get lost. The outcome, mil-
lions of displaced and murdered people, is indeed similar, but the motivation, 
the ideology, and the peculiar mindset behind these phenomena do not comport 
with what Arendt’s general theory says about the relation between mass produc-
tion and mass killing. 
Related to that claim is the philosophical–theological account according to 
which the Third Reich and the genocide of the Jews are outcomes of destiny, of 
the peculiar fate of the German and the Jewish peoples to become murderers and 
murdered. An illustrative example is Günther Anders’ statement that we are all 
Eichmann’s sons in that we risk falling victim as human beings in the modern 
society to the same fate of the destructive potential of technology, leading to 
mass destruction and killing (Anders 1988). To reduce everything to destiny is to 
beg the question and again to ignore the peculiar traits and philosophy which 
stood behind the Third Reich. At this point, we can already sense the method-
ological obstacles which stand in the way of the study at hand. 
The present volume aims to address the philosophy related to the genocide of 
the Jews and to the Third Reich by looking at the works of eight German think-
ers, some of whom will be more familiar than others to the reader. By treating 
1 The relationship between mass killing, mass production and mass consumption is also the 
theme of Horkheimer and Adorno (1981). 
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unknown texts and translating completely forgotten texts, this study sheds new 
light on the “canonical texts,” providing a critical supplement to the literature 
that currently exists on post-Holocaust thinking. The eight German thinkers 
considered here refer individually to the genocide of the Jews, anti-Semitism, the 
Third Reich, and other related issues in their own works. Some of them helped to 
formulate and promulgate the Nazi world-view—often under the guise of objec-
tive philosophy and metaphysics—while others tried to account for the rise of the 
Third Reich and the genocide of the Jews.2
The methodological problems related to this study are indicated by the fol-
lowing questions: Why, of all the many German thinkers, these eight? Does it not 
beg the question to first choose a topic and formulate a general claim, and then 
pick the best candidates to support the main thesis? Which criteria were used 
to choose German thinkers—is he or she somebody who published in German 
or lived in Germany? Hannah Arendt, to whom the fifth chapter of this study 
is dedicated, wrote and published mostly in English and lived most of her life 
in the USA. Similarly, Jean Améry, to whom the seventh chapter of this study 
is dedicated, was an Austrian who lived in Belgium. Furthermore, does it still 
count as philosophical research to focus on particular figures mostly in their 
relation to particular places, politics, and historical eras? The first question, 
however, is ostensibly the easiest to reply to: every investigation has a limited 
scope which it must outline beforehand by making some painful and arbitrary 
decisions regarding the depth and breadth of the study. The question of the 
criteria for selection is more complicated. Two comprehensive studies, one by 
Hermann Lübbe (1963) and one by Hans Sluga (1993), on German philosophy 
before, during, and to some extent after World War II, clearly manage to point to 
distinctive characteristics of German philosophy, such as its ambition to iden-
tify itself as German, related to the German nation, language, and even race.3 
2 The first group includes Ernst Jünger, Martin Heidegger, and Carl Schmitt. The second in-
cludes Hannah Arendt, Karl Löwith, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Jean Améry, and Jan Assmann. 
This classification is by no means a clear-cut one. Rather, the two groups intersect, for we 
cannot distinguish sharply someone’s world-view from his way of accounting for phenomena 
and his reason for supporting a particular ideology, etc. Enzo Traverso (2000) classifies these 
particular intellectuals into four streams: (1) the collaborator (Heidegger, Jünger, and Schmitt), 
(2) the survivor (Primo Levi and Jean Améry), (3) the prophet (Walter Benjamin, who, according 
to Traverso, foresaw the Nazi catastrophe), and (4) people who wrote about it (Arendt, Anders, 
and Adorno). This classification is pointless; it makes no more sense to identify Améry’s or 
Levi’s work with their being survivors than with their being Jews or human beings. It is like-
wise pointless to identify Heidegger’s and Jünger’s works solely according to their relationship 
with Nazism. 
3 In this respect, other important works are to be mentioned: Adorno (2003), Marcuse (1998), 
and Strauss (1995 and 1999).
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Thus, it could become a tool for achieving and promoting political goals.4 A 
study by Klaus Vondung (1988) focuses on the apocalyptic motif as peculiar to 
German thought. A volume edited by Theodor Haering (1942), Das Deutsche in 
der deutschen Philosophie (“The German in German Philosophy”), undertakes 
to show the special traits of German philosophy which distinguish it from any 
other philosophy.5 Other representatives are Alfred Baeumler’s essay (1937) 
Hellas und Germanien (“Greece and Germany”), Werner Sombart’s (1915) Händler 
und Helden (“Merchants and Heroes”), and Oswlad Spengler’s (1920) Preussen-
tum und Sozialismus (“Prussianism and Socialism”). Herbert Marcuse’s (1998) 
Feindanalysen (“Studies on the Enemy”) is a refined and meticulous analysis of 
the dominant traits of German philosophy such as anti-liberalism, anti-rational-
ism, heroism, racism, etc.
Thus, we have here themes that are common to many German thinkers. In 
the present study we will encounter them either as the core ingredients of a given 
teaching or as the focus of critical reflection on that teaching. This complex of 
common subjects treated by German thinkers will also serve as our reference 
point in regard to which we can speak about thinkers who used this  terminology 
4 “Überblickt man das politische Denken der deutschen Philosophie von Hegels Tod bis zum 
Ersten Weltkrieg, so würde man selbst verständlich der Philosophie dieses Krieges am ehes-
ten ideologischen Charakter zusprechen. In der Formulierung der ‘ldeen von 1914‚’ wie sie im 
vierten Teil dieser Arbeit dargestellt ist, unternimmt es die deutsche Philosophie, den Gegen-
satz Deutschlands zu seinen Feinden als einen in letzter Instanz weltanschaulich bestimmten 
Gegensatz darzutun. In dieser Tendenz erklärt sie die geschichtlich bedingten Nationaleigen-
tümlichkeiten Deutschlands in politischer und gesellschaftlich-kultureller Hinsicht, indem 
sie sie zugleich übertreibt, zu Ausdrucksphänomenen eines quasi-metaphysischen ‘Wesens’ 
und läßt den Krieg einen Krieg um Selbstbehauptung und Welt-Sieg dieses Wesens sein. Dabei 
wagt sie Thesen, die nicht mehr aus rationalem Ursprung, sondern einzig ideologisch aus der 
Absicht zu verstehen sind, dem Krieg jene höhere Rechtfertigung zugeben, die keine etwaigen 
Zweifel an seinem Sinn aufkommen läßt.” (Lübbe 1963: 21–22)
Sluga emphasizes the utmost importance of Fichte—who related philosophy to the Ger-
man language and nation—for the philosophers who supported the Nazi movement. “Only one 
other language could be compared to German and that was Greek, which was ‘of equal rank, 
a language equally primordial.’ Other Germanic people, such as the French, had abandoned 
their original tongue and adopted a foreign, dead language. Their language had ‘movement 
only at the surface’ but was ‘dead at the root.’ The French had Latinized themselves in lan-
guage and Romanized themselves in culture, whereas the Germans like the Greeks had main-
tained a primordial language and culture. In terms of this contrast between the primordial, 
on the one hand, and the derived and dead, on the other, Fichte stylized the political conflict 
between Napoleon and the German princes. The military confrontation became nothing less 
than a metaphysical difference. Since the Germans had a primordial language, Fichte also 
said, they were qualified to engage in a primordial thinking.” (Sluga 1993: 37)
5 See Haering’s contribution in that volume, which is called Albert der Deutsche—who is 
known in any other context as Albertus Magnus. 
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before and during the Nazi era (Heidegger, Schmitt, and Jünger); thinkers who 
consciously distanced themselves from this philosophy and criticized it (Adorno, 
Löwith, and Améry); and thinkers who continued to use it after the end of World 
War II and the collapse of Nazi ideology and philosophy (late Heidegger and 
Jünger, Arendt, and Gadamer). 
We pointed to some themes that are common to many German thinkers. 
The relationship between truth and power is specific for different cultures in 
different eras in their history and it plays different role in different contexts. 
It should thus be studied in the particular context in which it was realized. A 
general theory of the relationship between truth and power—e.g. Nietzsche’s 
and Foucault’s—seems, accordingly, to be too general. Yet, philosophy and criti-
cal thinking would become redundant without the attempt to go beyond the par-
ticular context, politics, and personal interests. As Sluga succinctly puts it:
Insofar as philosophy has any task to perform in politics, it is to map out new possibili-
ties. By confronting actual political conditions with alternatives, it can help to undermine 
the belief that these conditions are inevitable. If the German philosophers of the 1930s 
had engaged in such reflection, they would not have surrendered so readily to the false 
certainties of Nazism (Sluga 1993: x).
The aim of critically philosophizing with the works of these eight German think-
ers is to examine to what extent they yielded to political situation, ideology, and 
world-view and to what extent they truly tried to go beyond them. The present 
study assumes that—if at all, then only—by means of philosophizing can we 
succeed in penetrating through the cover of words and rhetoric to the philo-
sophical intention of the thinkers. We can, for example, examine whether the 
assessment that Heidegger and Jünger changed their political posture after the 
war is correct or not. Likewise, does Gadamer really mean to neutralize language 
from detrimental components that might lead to horrible consequences and to 
rehabilitate humanities, as he claims—or is it only lip service?
Numerous philosophical studies examine Heidegger’s, Schmitt’s, Jünger’s, 
and recently also Gadamer’s (Oroszco 1995) alleged relationship to Nazism.6 In 
dealing with a thinker, biographical and historical attitudes are indispensable 
6 As far as the personal aspects are concerned, Farías’s study of Heidegger and his relation to 
Nazism is the most famous one. Regarding Heidegger, see also Taureck (2008) as well as Em-
manuel Faye (2009). Morat (2007) focuses on Heidegger and the Jünger brothers. Gross (2000) 
does the same with Carl Schmitt. Wolin (2003) explores the personal relationship between Hei-
degger and his Jewish disciples. As for the philosophical aspects of these thinkers and their 
relation to Nazi ideology, see for example Löwith (chapter 4 in the present study), and von 
Krockow (1958). Zehnpfennig (2002) is a unique attempt to introduce Hitler’s Mein Kampf as a 
philosophical work comparable with Hobbes’s Leviathan. 
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for bringing him or her, and the intellectual context in which they worked, closer 
to the reader. They cannot, however, fulfill the task of critically dealing with the 
philosophy of a given thinker. 
There are two other prevalent “philosophical” attitudes. The first approach 
uncritically adopts and utilizes the same terminology used by the thinker who 
is the subject of the research. This is the approach adopted by Hannah Arendt7 
and Slavoj Žižek.8 The second approach subsumes the thinker or the philosophy 
that it studies into another system, as Georg Lukács, for example, does in tracing 
philosophy back to economic principles. Lukács’s approach brings him to ridicu-
lous conclusions, such as when he tries to measure the achievements of Henri 
Bergson and Marcel Proust according to economic criteria. This is not to say that 
social-economic context is inherently superfluous in approaching intellectual 
content. Moreover, not everything on the social-economic level is relevant to the 
philosophical level, and vice versa. Measuring Marcel Proust’s literacy achieve-
ment according to that yardstick and hence underscoring it as bad is, therefore, 
ridiculous.
Bergsonian intuition was projected outwards as a tendency to destroy the objectivity 
and truth of natural science knowledge; and it was directed inward as the introspection 
of an isolated parasitic individual divorced from the life of society during the imperial-
ist period. (It is no accident that the greatest literary influence Bergson exerted was on 
Proust.) (Lukács 1981: 24–25 / 1955: 27).
Because the world-view and terminology used by German thinkers are so pecu-
liar to the era and are wholly idiosyncratic, especially when it comes to Hei-
degger, of great importance to this study is the consideration of linguistic and 
sociological aspects.9 Many central concepts used by these eight thinkers are 
borrowed from mystical, religious, and apocalyptical literature. There are no 
parallels in contemporaneous English and French philosophy to the massive use 
of religious terms by German thinkers and their recurrent reference to apoca-
7 See chapters 1 and 5 in this book.
8 Žižek employs Heideggerian terminology in accounting for Heidegger’s support of Nazism: 
Žižek (2008), especially part 1, chapter 3, “Radical Intellectuals, or, Why Heidegger Took the 
Right Step (Albeit in the Wrong Direction) in 1933.” 
9 Important sociological and economic works on Germany are Neumann (1944), Löwenthal 
(1990), and Rauschning (1938). Spengler (1920) attempts to draw the line between the so-called 
Prussian type versus the English type. Bourdieu (1991) is a provocative and too often inaccu-
rate sociological study of the social background of Heidegger’s work. An excellent sociological 
study is Marcuse (1998). Herf (1984) explores the intellectual mood in the time before, during, 
and after World War II in its reaction to technological progress. Adorno (2003) combines socio-
logical and linguistic attitudes.
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lypse. For example, Ereignis is a key term in Heidegger’s philosophy. It relates to 
the apocalyptic event—Heidegger’s rendition of the Greek καιρός in its religious 
use—and to the authentic experience of time as finite. It also implies special 
insight which is gained in the καιρός: Eräugnis alludes to Auge, the German 
word for “eye.” There is no English translation that conveys the full meaning and 
connotation of this term. This is also the case with the key term “crisis” as it is 
used in this particular context. As Sluga writes on the German thinkers between 
the wars: “They believed themselves to be living at a moment of world-historical 
crisis, and this profound conviction motivated their political activism” (Sluga 
1993: viii). The term “crisis,” as Sluga shows, is intimately related to “nation” 
or “race,” “leadership,” and “order” (Ibid: 23). Likewise, Carl Schmitt stipulates 
that all political terms must be understood as translations of religious terms. For 
modern English and French readers, who are accustomed to thinking of Church 
and State as two different institutions, this claim must be elucidated and put in 
the right cultural and intellectual context. 
At this point, linguistic studies become an indispensable tool for access-
ing the peculiar terminology.10 An illustrative example for the need also to 
rely on the linguistic approach is apparent in the case of Heidegger. It became 
a popular strategy of Heidegger’s advocates to claim that we can separate the 
private person Heidegger, who allegedly supported Nazism, from Heidegger the 
great philosopher. The linguistic approach can point to parallels between Hei-
degger’s use of language and fascistic jargon. This linguistic approach toward 
Heidegger probably started with Adorno’s Jargon (1964). Meticulous and thor-
ough treatments of the linguistic aspects of German thinking are carried out by 
Klaus Vondung (1988), Victor Klemperer (2007), Robert Minder (1977), and Pierre 
Faye (1977). The same holds regarding the claim of Heidegger and his support-
ers concerning the “turn,” the Kehre, as an example of a significant change in 
his philosophical thinking and political view. The linguistic apparatus helps us 
to assess the validity of these two statements. It was a prevalent belief among 
German thinkers that philosophy can be meaningfully carried out only in Greek, 
German, or a Hellenic-German cross-breeding, as we shall later see in Heidegger, 
Gadamer, and Löwith, who criticize this tendency, and to some extent also in 
Arendt. Using idiosyncratic terminology already points to a possible tendency to 
adhere to a distinct world-view, and a philosophical agenda can bear meaning 
only when stated in that particular terminology to people who are familiar with 
it. As Losurdo explains it:
10 The idiosyncrasy and particularity of these thinkers gets lost in the psychological or psy-
choanalytical attitude. See for example Reich (1946). Fromm (1941) is an important work in that 
field. See the pertinent work by Mitscherlich (1967). See also Dessuant and Grunberger (2000).
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The pathos of the Western world is strictly linked, in Heidegger, with that of “German 
essence” and “German destiny.” Clearly, Germany has a role, a unique mission to accom-
plish. The opposition between the East and the West, and the appeal for a renewed salva-
tion of the West founded upon the example given by the Greeks in ancient times, con-
stitute a central theme in Heidegger’s works at this time. The reference to Hellenism is 
not, and cannot be, a unifying element for all of humanity, but it serves to define the 
fighting parties: “Heraclitus’s name” is not “the formula for the concept of a humanity 
which encompasses the entire world in its embrace (Allerweltmenschheit an sich). It is, 
rather, the name for a primal power of Western-Germanic historical existence, in its first 
confrontation with the Asian element.” (Losurdo 2001: 103–104)
In fact, as scholars we cannot imagine the inception of Postmodern thought 
without the terminology coined by Heidegger. The approach of the present 
study relies on linguistic and historical studies as an indispensable precondi-
tion for understanding modern German philosophy after Heidegger. It employs, 
however, a critical and philosophical approach, which means that it does not 
stop at the linguistic description of terminology, but instead continues to explore 
its philosophical use. It does not search for smoking guns and does not hunt 
down Nazis and collaborators, as has become popular in research on modern 
German thinkers. It rather utilizes philosophical and critical procedures in order 
to find out to what extent these thinkers strive for truth and, on the other hand, 
succumb to political agendas and a particular world-view.
Chapter One
Martin Heidegger on Humanism
It is natural to start with Heidegger, to whom Continental philosophy owes its 
philosophical jargon and themes. As Sluga and Losurdo show in their historical 
studies, Heidegger did not invent the vocabulary he used ex nihilo. It was the 
common jargon used by academics and at that time also by politicians, such 
as crisis, the call for sacrifice and warfare, brave decision, courage in the face 
of death, as opposed to the bourgeois craving for security, and the praise of 
German philosophy contrary to English and French thought.
On the one hand, the shallow “rationalism” and the even shallower “empiricism” (Latin 
and Anglo-Saxon, respectively) of the countries to the west of Germany is still denounced. 
On the other hand, however, there now emerges the pathos of the unity of the West, 
regarded in its authenticity and defined by its opposition to the threat from the East. 
There is sometimes an attempt to solve this contradiction by distinguishing, on a linguis-
tic level, between the “liberal Western world [West],” that is, the “Roman/Anglo Saxon” 
world, and the Abendland, the authentic West, which, far from excluding Germany, sees 
her as its center and guide. (Losurdo 2001: 95)
Sluga traces it back to Fichte’s Reden an die deutsche Nation (Addresses to the Ger -
man Nation) (something that can be also seen in Lübbe’s book [1963] although it 
does not include Heidegger). Losurdo shows that similar expressions are also used 
by Husserl and Jaspers. In Mosse’s study (1999), one sees how deeply this jargon 
and attitude is rooted in the German Youth Movement (Jugendbewegung) and 
the Völkisch [ethnic] Movement (völkische Bewegung)—that is, the call to return 
to the German ethnic identity (Volk) as the only possible metaphysical and polit-
ical unity—although Mosse’s focus is not on Heidegger. And yet it was Heidegger 
who disseminated this jargon and molded all of Continental philosophy with it. 
It seems plausible to expect that in the wake of World War II and Nazi bar-
barity, the most critical issue to be addressed is education. In Jargon (1964), 
Adorno points to symptoms characterizing the disease of Nazism, such as exces-
sive authoritative control and lack of distinct moral and humanistic standards. 
He then also shows that these symptoms are manifested in some of the promi-
nent German writings after the War. In Education (Adorno 1971), Adorno empha-
sizes the “therapeutic measures” to be taken as an antidote to this disease, 
although his prognosis is quite pessimistic.11 In Jargon, Adorno mostly targets 
11 Emphasis is put on education in Marcuse (1998). See Gottfried Benn (1965: 388): “Wünsche 
für Deutschland: Neue Begriffsbestimmung für Held und Ehre. Ausmerzung jeder Person, die 
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Heidegger , whose role in shaping the German pre- and post-war intellectual 
strata is not unimportant. 
The stories about Heidegger’s supposed collaboration with the Nazis started 
to circulate after the release of Victor Farías’s book Heidegger and Nazism (1989), 
which was followed by numerous articles and books on the topic. This, however, 
was not the first time the subject circulated within the public sphere. When 
Heidegger himself realized that Germany had lost the war, he authored apolo-
getic remarks, explanations, and letters12 that were followed by efforts on his 
behalf by friends and adherents such as Hannah Arendt, Ernst Nolte, and later 
Hans-Georg Gadamer. The fuss and the attention to rumors and stories create 
the impression that Heidegger was a Nazi criminal on the order of Goebbels and 
Himmler.13 But he was not, by any means. People usually refer to Heidegger’s 
Rectorial Address as evidence for the intimate relationship between his philoso-
phy and the Nazi world-view and politics. However, as Löwith describes it: 
In comparison with the numerous pamphlets and speeches published by the co-ordinated 
professors after the Nazi takeover, Heidegger’s speech is philosophically demanding—
a minor stylistic masterpiece. (Löwith 1986: 33 / 1994: 34)14 
And as Hans Blumenberg puts it: “Heidegger, the incarnation of the petit bour-
geois, was not created to be a ‘Nazi,’ but rather to pay the party’s membership 
bill” (Blumenberg 2005: 79). These two remarks support the task of seeking the 
problem in Heidegger’s philosophy and not in his personality.
Starting the critical discussion with the Rectorial Address, which has already 
been branded an expression of Nazism, would be uninteresting and unreveal-
ing, as Heidegger’s philosophy is at stake and not his personality. More challeng-
ing would be to start with two later texts which appeared in one volume in 1947: 
A Letter on Humanism of 1946 and Plato’s Doctrine of Truth of 1931–32. Both bear 
titles that point in a different direction than the Rectorial Address; both appar-
ently deal with the education and improvement of a human being.
innerhalb der nächsten hundert Jahre Preußentum oder das Reich sagt. ... Die Kinder vom 
sechsten bis sechszehnten Jahr nach Wahl der Eltern in der Schweitz, in England, Frankreich, 
Amerika, Dänemark auf Staatskosten erziehen.” 
12 See the apologetic volume edited by Heidegger’s son Hermann Heidegger (2000b).
13 Works above all by Faye (2009) and Taureck’s anthology (2007) based on yet unpublished 
manuscripts of Heidegger have shown that Heidegger’s involvement in the Nazi movement was 
much deeper and more devoted than used to be thought. These biographical works, however, 
are only marginally related to my approach, which is philosophical instead. 
14 Sluga compares and points to the parallels between Heidegger’s Rectorial Address and 
other addresses given at that time. It turns out that Heidegger’s is not exceptional in its tone 
and spirit.
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The text known as Letter on Humanism was composed as a reply to the ques-
tion posed by Jean Beaufret to Heidegger in 1946 following the atrocities of World 
War II: “Comment redonner un sens au mot ‘Humanisme’?,” that is, “how can we 
restore meaning to the word ‘humanism’?” 
Heidegger begins his reply to this question by working out what he conceives 
to be the true, and yet mostly hidden, essence of a human being. The essence of 
a human being, Heidegger posits, does not consist in achievements which can 
thenceforth be evaluated according to the profit and advantage which they bring 
to the man who accomplished them. At first sight, it may look like a Kantian 
ethics built on autonomic moral judgment which should not be influenced by any 
expectation of profit and gain. The true essence of the human being,  Heidegger 
continues, consists in carrying out (vollbringen) that which has already been 
given to him to carry out, that which is already there (Heidegger 2000a: 5). This 
can also be read as Kantian moral stipulation. The autonomous moral will is 
present before anything else. The human being is required to execute the will’s 
decrees. Heidegger continues:
But what “is” above all is Being. Thinking accompliches the relation of Being to the 
essence of man. It does not make or cause the relation. Thinking brings this relation solely 
as something handed over to it from Being. Such offering consists in the fact that in think-
ing Being becomes language. Language is the house of Being. In its home man dwells. 
(Heidegger 1992: 217 / 2000a: 5)
The true essence of man consists in his relationship to Being, in his existence 
beyond the objects and tasks with which he is concerned in his daily activities. 
This statement by Heidegger can still be read in a Kantian context, for it stipulates 
that the human being not be conceived as an instrument, as a means. However, 
at this point we can already discern the difference between Heidegger and Kant. 
Kant, first of all, wanted his moral philosophy to be practical, while Heidegger 
seems here to draw a clear line between thinking and acting: “But all working 
or effecting lies in Being and is directed toward beings. Thinking, in contrast, 
lets itself be claimed by Being so that it can say the truth of Being” ( Heidegger 
1992: 217–218 / 2000a: 5). Being is the “open domain,” the transcendence which 
enables the human being to relate to entities—be it through activity , production, 
or calculation. By contrast, “Thinking is ‘l’engagement par l’Être pour l’Être’” 
(2000a: 5). Thus, any reference to responsibility, to answerability, must evapo-
rate, must become irrelevant to the essence of the human being.
The relationship between Being and human being is constituted by Being; 
the human being dwells in this relationship. This relationship, this essence of 
the human being, Heidegger defines as language. It is, however, not the human 
being who meaningfully speaks here, because he is not the author of that rela-
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tionship, but rather, the medium in which this relationship is expressed; he does 
not “stand behind his words.” Note that in this frame of Heidegger’s philosophy, 
any attempt to mold the relationship between language, Being, and man, accord-
ing to the common pattern of man as a talking animal making use of language, 
would degrade that relationship to one between entities. Eric Voegelin’s remark 
on this matter is illuminating: “If language speaks, then the contact between 
thinking and language and between object and reality is interrupted, and these 
problems arise because one is no longer thinking in relation to reality” (Voegelin 
1999: 250).
Heidegger’s claim is vague, because it is evident that in any kind of mean-
ingful use of language—that is, which must refer to some entity—the essential 
relationship between Being and human being cannot be demonstrated. In Being 
and Time, Heidegger distinguishes between idle talk (Gerede), which does not 
expose the essential relationship of man to Being, and genuine silent—“non-ref-
erential”— talk (Rede), which does expose it. Heidegger likewise rejects scientific 
language as an option. We should rather stop regarding language and thinking 
as rational tools for calculating that are designed to achieve practical results and 
profit (Heidegger 2000a: 5), a tendency which Heidegger traces back to Plato and 
Aristotle, who already conceived thinking, θεωρία, as τέχνη in the derivative 
practical context of πρᾶξις and ποίησις (Ibid: 6–7). It is rather poetic language in 
which the relationship between thinking and Being can be reflected, although 
not in the poetic expression of every poet. It is not the bourgeois Goethe, Hei-
degger argues, but rather Hölderlin, in whose poetry Being speaks (Ibid: 31).
It is in the famous interview with Der Spiegel of 1968 that Heidegger repeats 
that it is Ancient Greek and German within which the essential relationship 
between thinking and Being can be said, echoing his claims from the Nazi 
period and his reliance on Fichte who, in his Addresses to the German Nation, 
distinguishes the German from all other people, for only the German language 
can relate to Being, can be philosophy. Philosophy and German are synonyms, 
according to Fichte. Other people can learn the German language but not speak 
it like a German man. This means that Fichte’s distinction cannot be solely 
founded on language15 (although he does not talk about race, as far as I know).
15 “Die wahre in sich selbst zu Ende gekommene und über die Erscheinung hinweg wahr-
haft zum Kerne derselben durchgedrungene Philosophie hingegen geht aus von dem einen, 
reinen, göttlichen Leben,—als Leben schlechtweg, welches auch in alle Ewigkeit und darin 
immer eines bleibt, nicht aber als von diesem oder jenem Leben; und sie sieht, wie lediglich 
in der Erscheinung dieses Leben unendlich fort sich schließe und wiederum öffne und erst 
diesem Gesetze zufolge es zu einem Sein und zu einem Etwas überhaupt komme. Ihr entsteht 
das Sein, was jene sich vorausgeben lässt. Und so ist denn diese Philosophie recht eigentlich 
nur deutsch, d.i. ursprünglich; und umgekehrt, so jemand nur ein wahrer Deutscher würde, 
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It is, however, in Heidegger’s later text more than advocacy of irrationality 
that evidences a kinship to the Nazi era. The relationship between Being and 
human being is characterized by obedience and submission, and it is consti-
tuted in apocalyptic event. Contrary to the concept of the human being in the 
technological era, in which the human being uses rational technological tools to 
manipulate objects and nature, in the original relationship between Being and 
human being, the human being is controlled, is led by Being.
Said plainly, thinking is the thinking of Being. The genitive says something twofold. 
Thinking is of Being inasmuch as thinking, propriated by Being [vom Sein ereignet],16 
belongs [gehört] to Being. At the same time thinking is of Being insofar as thinking, 
belonging [gehörend] to Being, listens [hörend] to Being. As the belonging [das Gehörende] 
to Being that listens, thinking is what it is according to its essential origin. (Heidegger 
1992: 220 / 2000a: 8) 
Rational thinking not only enables mastering nature by means of technology, it 
also enables asking meaningful questions, debating, doubting, and arguing. In 
its absence, the relationship between Being and human being becomes authori-
tative and dictatorial, one which in turn becomes the characteristic relationship 
between the philosopher and his pupils, as Löwith remarks regarding Heidegger. 
These are the terms which Heidegger uses to characterize the relationship be -
tween Being and human being: “listening” (hören) and “belonging” (gehören) to 
Being allude to “obeying” (gehörchen) and “submissiveness” (hörig sein). Hei-
degger first rejects what he calls the “dictatorship of the public realm” (Heidegger 
1992: 221 / 2000a: 9). Now we see him replace that dictatorship with the dictator-
ship of Being, urging us to solely obey the command of Being (Ibid: 9–10).
In light of the genuine relationship between Being and human being, the 
traditional concept “human being” must be rejected along with the traditional 
concept of humanism. This concept developed from the metaphysical defini-
tion of the human being as animal rationale. Heidegger uses the word “meta-
physics” in this context in a derogatory way, for metaphysics does not conceive 
the human being according to his true essence—his relationship to Being—but 
rather as a substance, as an animal endowed with the ability to calculate and 
so würde er nicht anders denn also philosophieren können.” (Fichte 1881: 170–171). Compare 
Jünger (1930a: 26): “Dennoch, und das ist unser Glaube, gehört die deutsche Sprache den Ur-
sprachen an, und als Ursprache flößt sie der zivilisatorischen Sphäre, der Welt der Gesittung, 
ein unüberwindliches Mißtrauen ein.”
16 The meaning of “ereignet” here is that thinking is not caused by Being as its effect; thinking 
rather emenates from Being as an apocalyptic event (Ereignis). Thus, it is not a matter of cau-
sality but rather of destiny. 
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reason. Metaphysics, in other words, is inhuman: “Metaphysics thinks of man 
on the basis of animalitas and does not think in the direction of his humanitas” 
(Heidegger 1992: 227 / 2000a: 15). Thus: 
In defining the humanity of man humanism not only does not ask about the relation of 
Being to the essence of man; because of its metaphysical origin humanism even impedes 
the question by neither recognizing nor understanding it. (Heidegger 1992: 226 / 2000a: 13)
The true essence of the human being consists in his relationship to Being, which 
Heidegger dubs “Ek-sistence”:
This way of Being is proper only to man. Ek-sistence so understood is not only the ground 
of the possibility of reason, ratio, but is also that in which the essence of man preserves 
the source that determines him. (Heidegger 1992: 228 / 2000a: 16)
Ek-sistence, thought in terms of ecstasis, does not coincide with existential in either form 
or content. In terms of content Ek-sistence means standing out into the truth of Being. … 
Ek-sistence identifies the determination of what man is in the destiny of truth. (Heidegger 
1992: 230 / 2000a: 18) 
But Da-sein itself occurs essentially as “thrown [geworfen].” It unfolds essentially in the 
throw of Being as the fateful sending [schickend Geschickliches]. (Heidegger 1992: 231 / 
2000a: 19)17 
In other words, the relationship between Da-sein and Being can be formulated 
only in terms of destiny and apocalyptic event, but never in terms of cause and 
effect. 
Despite the obscurity, the tenor of this passage cannot escape our atten-
tion. The human essence is derived from the destiny of Being, which must, in 
turn, imply culture, language, and tradition to which man belongs. Education, 
choice, and reason are subordinate to this definition. Being human is derived 
from history and destiny.18 Heidegger points at the etymological kinship of 
17 The German philosopher and television host Peter Sloterdijk published in Die Zeit a reply 
to Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism which he entitled “Rules for the Human Park.” While Hei-
degger’s openness or lightening of Being remains obscure, Sloterdijk suggests a clearer alter-
native according to which humanism has to improve the human being and to check his bestial 
drives and instincts in favor of culture. The openness which Sloterdijk talks about is a genetic 
one, and the humanistic task employs qualities of planning and cultivating the best “exem-
plars” out of the human race, which will rule and lead the rest to their best realization. The 
best, Sloterdijk claims, is to be achieved not only through lesson (Lektion) but also through 
selection (Selektion) (Sloterdijk 1999). 
18 “Insofern das Denken sich in seine Aufgabe bescheidet, gibt es im Augenblick des jetzigen 
Weltgeschicks dem Menschen eine Weisung in die anfängliche Dimension seines geschichtli-
chen Aufenthaltes.” (Heidegger 2000a: 44)
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delivering, destiny, occurrence, and history: schicken—Geschick—geschehen—
Geschichte (Heidegger 2002a: 27–33). Submission to destiny is a stipulation 
with which we are acquainted from the Nazi era. It reminds us, for example, of 
 Heidegger’s  Rectorial Address:
The primordial and full essence of science, whose realization is our task, provided we 
submit to the distant command of the beginning of our spiritual-historical existence, is 
only created by knowledge about the people that actively participates and by knowledge 
about the state’s destiny that always keeps itself prepared, both at one with knowledge 
about the spiritual mission. (Cited in Sluga 1993: 27)19
Heidegger himself saw in Hitler the messiah or the executor of the destiny of 
Being. Now, shortly after the end of the War, Heidegger writes to Jean Beaufret: 
What still today remains to be said could perhaps become an impetus for guiding the 
essence of man to the point where it thoughtfully attends to that dimension of the truth 
of Being which thouroughly governs it. But even this could take place only to the honor 
of Being and for the benefit of Da-sein, which man ek-sistingly sustains; not, however, 
for the sake of man, so that civilization and culture through man’s doings might be vindi-
cated. (Heidegger 1992: 233 / 2000a: 21) 
Abandoned to destiny and history and freed from responsibility, the human 
being is now the shepherd of Being, as Heidegger puts it (Heidegger 2000a: 23); 
he is now called upon to shepherd Being (Ibid: 34). However, Being does not only 
shine in the light of truth, Heidegger qualifies his statement, but also withdraws 
from it. As Heidegger puts it: “Being comes to its destiny in that It, Being, gives 
itself. But thought in terms of such destiny this says: it gives itself and refutes 
itself simultaneously” (Heidegger 1992: 239 / 2000a: 27). Morality and respon-
sibility are thus reduced to ontology, to Being, to destiny. As Adorno remarks, 
“In the name of timely, appropriate authenticity, the torturer too could give all 
kinds of ontological excuses, provided that he was a genuine torturer” (Adorno 
1997: 95).
In order to substantiate his claim that the essence of the human being is 
rather Ek-sistence, Heidegger points to the primordial meaning of the word 
“ethics.” Quoting Heraclitus, he writes: ἦθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων—“man’s resi-
dence [is] God” (Heidegger 2000a: 46). Heidegger explains: “The word [ἦθος] 
names the open region in which man dwells. The open region of his abode allows 
19 See also the following remark by Sluga regarding the Address: “Heidegger arranged it that 
way. It was he who chose to express his commitment not in the form of a treatise, a philosophi-
cal discourse, but as an “inauguration,” an act of augury and divination, a reading of omens, 
a moment of decision and destiny.” (Sluga 1993: 1)
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what pertains to man’s essence, and what in thus arriving resides in nearness to 
him, to appear” (Heidegger 1992: 256 / 2000a: 46). As Losurdo shows, Heracli-
tus symbolizes for Heidegger the “primal power of Western-Germanic historical 
existence” (Losurdo 2001: 104).
Genuine ability to distinguish between good and bad is to be attained from 
that original experience of ethics, from the ἦθος, the Ek-sistence, and not from 
education and moral formation, Heidegger claims. He comes to this conclusion 
by inquiring after the origin of our ability to affirm and negate, to ascribe to or 
deny a subject its predicate. Negation and affirmation are not attached to things 
and situations. Our judgment rather acquires the ability to affirm and negate 
from transcendence, at the Ek-sistence or ἦθος, Heidegger claims (Heidegger 
2000a: 51). As Ernst Tugendhat explains, “being” and “nothing” is the transcen-
dental precondition which enables us to affirm and negate (Tugendhat 1970). 
Heidegger says:
With healing, evil appears all the more in the clearing of Being. The essence of evil does 
not consist in the mere baseness of human action, but rather in the malice of rage. Both 
of these, however, healing and raging, can essentially occurs only in Being, insofar as 
Being itself is what is contested [das Strittige]. In it is concealed the essential provenance 
of nihilation. (Heidegger 1992: 260 / 2000a: 51)20
Being morally good and bad is not at man’s discretion. They are determined by 
destiny, in the shining forth and withdrawing of Being.21 Good and evil are, in 
other words, the outcome of historical fatalism. The authoritative and dictatorial 
tone and content of these statements stand out.
It remains to ask, granting that thinking belongs to ek-sistence, whether every “yes” and 
“no” are not themselves already dependent on Being. As these dependents, they can 
never first posit the very thing to which they themselves belong. (Heidegger 1992: 260 / 
2000a: 52) 
Approval and disapproval are subjugated to Being, and not vice versa, accord-
ing to Heidegger. Thus, good and evil too are subjugated to Being. “The healing 
20 I do not see any historical support for Anson Rabinbach’s claim that the “malice of rage” is 
“an unambiguous reference to the bad motives of the victors” (Rabinbach 2000: 103–104). But 
even assumed that there is historical support for this interpretation, Rabinbach still misses the 
whole point, for Heidegger emphatically contends time and again that motives—be it political 
or moral—are irrelevant to his discussion, because history is determined by and derived from 
the destiny of Being. Thus, human motives and moral evaluations do not even deserve to be a 
theme of serious philosophical discussion, according to Heidegger. 
21 Compare also Heidegger’s remark from the 1949 edition: “Bejahen und Verneinen, An-
erkennen und Verwerfen schon gebraucht in das Geheiß des Ereignisses—vom Geheiß des Un-
terschieds gerufen in das Entsagen.” (Heidegger 2000a: 52, footnote)
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of Being first grants ascent into grace; to raging its compulsion to malignancy” 
(Heidegger 1992: 261 / 2000a: 52).
It seems that one would look in vain for a significant change in the tone and 
content of Heidegger’s philosophy. Being is understood as a fatal event to which 
the human being is subjected.
Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, a lecture from 1930–1931, conveys the same 
message as the Letter alongside which it appeared in the same volume in 1947 
and then in 1954. In this text, Heidegger concentrates on education, which he 
wants to understand in light of his interpretation of the ancient Greek notion of 
education, παιδεία.
The term “παιδεία,” according to Heidegger, defines a complete transfor-
mation of the whole existence of the human being from being “uneducated” to 
“educated” (Heidegger 1954: 23). It does not imply formation of the human being, 
but rather trans-formation into his appropriate domain, which is the openness 
of Being (Ibid: 24). This transformation is the outcome of an apocalyptic event 
(Ibid: 25–26). Following this transformation, the human being is detached from 
his world and directed to the light of Being (Ibid: 30). In the Nazi era, it was Joseph 
Goebbels who publicly talked about an utter transformation of the human being:
The revolution that we have carried out is a total one. It has reached into all levels of 
public life and reshaped them anew from their ground. It has completely changed and 
restructured anew the relationships of man to his fellowmen, the relationships of man 
to his state, and to the questions of existence [Dasein]. (Cited in Faye 1977, Volume 2: 584)
As Jean Pierre Faye remarks, it is not Heidegger who speaks the language of 
Goebbels, but rather Goebbels who speaks Heidegger’s (Ibid). According to 
 Heidegger, the human being does not become free from unchecked drives by 
means of education, but rather his sight is freed by the light of Being (Heidegger 
1954: 31). This light is the original meaning of Plato’s ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, Heidegger 
says. Heidegger rejects any ascription of moral quality to that idea (Ibid: 37). 
Τò ἀγαθόν rather specifies the shining light which lets entities be seen (Ibid: 
38). But already in Plato we see how this open area in which entities appear—
ἀλήθεια—degenerates into the inferior state of truth as correctness—ỏρθότης—
as correspondence between representation and object, Heidegger says. Truth, as 
correspondence between representation and object, marks, for Heidegger, the 
first and crucial stage of the fall from the original experience of Being to meta-
physics. It is the birth of humanism and education and of degenerated values. 
The human being thinks in terms of correctness and adequate correspondence 
between representation and object. Better correspondence implies higher value. 
Comparing the content of the famous Rectorial Address with the Letter on 
Humanism and Plato’s Doctrine of Truth, we observe parallels. The essence of the 
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German university, Heidegger states at the very beginning of the Address, stems 
from the destiny (Schicksal) which everybody—the Führer included—ought to 
attentively obey (Heidegger 2000b: 107). It is the utmost responsibility of the 
German university to attend to that destiny (Ibid: 108). In terms of the Letter, the 
German university ought to “shepherd” Being. The goal of science, Heidegger 
says in the Address, is neither to gain knowledge nor to educate; it is rather sup-
posed to point us to Being (Ibid: 110–111). Science is not procedure, Heidegger 
claims, it is rather a fundamental event (Grundgeschehen) (Ibid: 111) which 
results in pointing the human being to the destiny of Being. This openness—as 
in Plato’s Doctrine of Truth—is the outcome of a transformation (wandeln) (Ibid). 
Freedom, as Heidegger stresses in the Address, does not consist of bohemian 
student life; it is rather attentive obedience to the destiny of Being:
This [German] people shapes its fate by placing its history into the openness of the over-
whelming power of all the world-shaping powers of human being (Dasein) and by ever 
renewing the battle for its spiritual world. (Heidegger 2003: 8 / 2000b: 113)
The difference between the Rectorial Address on the one hand, and Plato’s Doc-
trine of Truth and the Letter on Humanism on the other hand, seems cosmetic. In 
all of them, we find authoritative tone; rejection of rationality, humanism, and 
education; and a call to succumb to the destiny of Being. Hannah Arendt and 
Emmanuel Lévinas are among the most renowned pupils of Heidegger. To what 
extent did they follow the authoritative tone and call to succumb to the destiny 
of Being? 
Excursus
I. Hannah Arendt
In her Gifford lectures called The Life of the Mind, Hannah Arendt claims that 
for Heidegger the “turn” (Kehre), or “reversal,” as she prefers to call it, does not 
suggest a turn in the biography of Heidegger. It is rather a turn in his philosophy, 
although it bears on Heidegger’s biography. 
… What the reversal originally turns against is primarily the will-to-power. In Heidegger’s 
understanding, the will to rule and to dominate is a kind of original sin, of which he found 
himself guilty when he tried to come to terms with his brief past in the Nazi movement. 
(Arendt 1978, Volume 2: 173)
If Heidegger rued his support of the Nazi movement, as Arendt claims, the ques-
tion is why did he not express his regret in clear language. Being and Time, 
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 Heidegger’s magnum opus, was conceived as a study of the meaning of Being. 
Heidegger, however, published only part of the plan he had sketched. In this 
part, he deals with the various ways in which the human Dasein interprets 
Being. The turn marks the shift from the study of the human Dasein to the study 
of Being, Arendt claims. At this turning point, Arendt identifies Heidegger’s 
repentance, for it is the shift from human arrogance and will-to-power to humil-
ity in the face of the destiny of Being. “Now he desubjectivizes thinking itself, 
robs it of its Subject, man as a thinking being, and transforms it into a function 
of Being…” (Ibid: 174).
It is not clear to me why concentrating on the human Dasein must necessar-
ily be coupled with chauvinistic and racial arrogance and support of Nazism, as 
Arendt claims, while concentrating on Being and man’s submissiveness implies 
repentance. Focusing on the human Dasein does not necessarily lead to barbar-
ity, while stressing Being does not necessarily lead to humanity. It could well be 
the other way around. As Hitler says in one of his Table Talks (Tischgespräche):
The life of the individual must not be set at too high a price. If the individual were impor-
tant in the eyes of nature, nature would take care to preserve him. Amongst the millions of 
eggs a fly lays, very few are hatched out—and yet the race of flies thrives. What is impor-
tant for us, who are men, is less the sum of knowledge acquired than the maintenance of 
conditions that enable science constantly to renew itself. (Picker 2000: 142)
Seen now in the light of the non-subjective will to power, the subjective will to 
power is a self-negation. Arendt argues:
Seen from the perspective of the Will … (nothingness) is the extinction of the Will in not-
willing …. Hence … (quoting Nietzsche) our will “would rather will nothingness than 
not will”. … “To will nothingness” here means to will … the negation, the destruction, the 
laying waste. (Arendt 1978, Volume 2: 177)
As such, the distinction between the will to power and the will not to will does 
not make sense, for either way the individual will to power is swollen into the 
general will to power.22 Arendt does not explain why submission to the will to 
22 The explanation by Walter A. Kaufmann elucidates the point, and it may make us suspect 
the accuracy of Arendt’s reading of Nietzsche: 
Nietzsche, however, insists—in conformity with tradition—that what remains is the essence 
and what is changed is accidental. He considers the will to power, which remains through-
out, the “essence,” while “all ‘ends,’ ‘objectives’” and the like, are merely accidental and 
changing attributes “of the one will,” “of the will to power” (WM 675). In other words, not 
only the energy remains but also the objective, power; and those so-called objectives which 
are canceled are only accidental attributes of this more basic striving: they are, to use one of 
Nietzsche’s favorite terms, mere “foregrounds”. (Kaufmann 1974: 221–222)
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power or to Being must lead to overcoming the hubris which Heidegger expressed 
in his Rectorial Address. Likewise, she does not show why she identifies the Rec-
torial Address with hubris, for Heidegger preached obedience and submissive-
ness in the Rectorial Address exactly as in the Letter on Humanism. 
As Faye argues, in Being and Time Heidegger already uses the term Dasein 
instead of human in order to reduce the importance of the individual in favor of 
Being and the destiny of his people (Faye 2009: 15–16). As Arendt puts it, “But 
what man thinks does not arise from his own spontaneity or creativity; it is the 
obedient response to the command of Being” (Arendt 1978, Volume 2: 174). Sub-
missiveness to the call of Being and erasing the individual human being can 
also suggest submitting to authorities and annihilating other races. But even if 
it leads instead to tranquility (Gelassenheit), as Arendt claims, it cannot clear 
Heidegger. By tranquility, Heidegger does not mean pacifism and tolerance, and 
not only were the active murderers part of the disaster, but also the tranquil 
bystanders who did nothing to prevent it.
In shifting the accent from the human Dasein to Being, Arendt sees repen-
tance and reversion. As I suggested, this turn can likewise imply compliancy 
with authority and perpetration of crimes. Arendt’s complicated maneuver to 
combine morality with the destiny of Being is farfetched. It makes the impres-
sion that she wants to clear Heidegger at any expense. The kind of account that 
she applies to Heidegger will return in her thesis on the banality of evil, as we 
shall later see.
II. Emmanuel Lévinas
Emmanuel Lévinas observes moral defect where Hannah Arendt observes moral 
value. Lévinas’s attack is directed above all at Being and Time, but his point 
becomes even stronger in our context.
Lévinas holds against Heidegger that it is absurd to claim that not only 
things in the world but also my fellowmen are meaningfully understood out 
of the horizon or openness of Being. A fellowman, Lévinas argues, cannot be 
(morally) understood subsequent to ascending into Being. “Here perception is 
not projected toward a horizon—the field of my freedom, power and property—in 
order to grasp the individual upon familiar foundation” (Lévinas 1996: 7). The 
fellowman, Lévinas claims, is not first of all an object, which can be understood 
in advance by means of a concept, and then becomes an interlocutor, but he is 
both at once.
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In relation to beings in the opening of being, comprehension finds a signification for them 
on the basis of being. In this sense, it does not invoke these beings, but only names them, 
thus accomplishing a violence and a negation—a partial negation which is violence. This 
partiality is indicated by the fact that, without disappearing, those beings are in my 
power. Partial negation, which is violence, denies the independence of being: it belongs 
to me (Ibid: 9).
Now, regarding the fellowman,
I cannot negate him partially, in violence, in grasping him within the horizon of being 
in general and possessing him. The Other (Autrui) is the sole being whose negation can 
only announce itself as total: as murder. The Other (Autrui) is the sole being I can wish to 
kill (Ibid).
The problem, Lévinas specifies, consists in the precedence which Heidegger 
gives to ontology over morality, and once he gives precedence to ontology, the 
fellowman can no longer be meaningfully—that is, morally—understood. Under-
standing something in advance out of the transcendence means to subjugate it to 
one’s own concept, to annul its independence, and to turn it into one’s property. 
Heidegger’s ontology is then immoral in that it leaves no room for independent 
fellowman, in that it gives license, so to speak, to kill the fellowman. The only 
way to obviate murder, Lévinas says, is to look at the face (visage) of the fellow-
man. Looking at the human face does not allow subjugating the fellowman and 
turning him into an object. The face saves one from killing and being killed. 
Lévinas’s claim that Heidegger’s philosophy lacks moral aspect makes more 
sense than Arendt’s complicated attempt to introduce morality into Heidegger’s 
obscure mythology about the destiny of Being. However, his argument looks 
weak. One can argue against him that in place of ontology, he proposes a “face-
ology” that allows no meaningful differentiation, i.e. a general theory of face 
from which no moral judgment can be derived: the mass killer and his prey, the 
innocent and the guilty—they are all faced. Likewise, there is nothing inherent 
in the “face” that necessitates ascription to a human being and not to a work 
of art or an object. Thus we can, in principle, deny particular ethnic groups a 
human face, and we are then entitled to exterminate them. On the other hand, 
we can ascribe to Being or to an object a face. Lévinas is fair enough to admit 
this difficulty: “Can things take on face? Is not art an activity that lends faces to 
things? Does not the facade of a house regard us? The analysis so far does not 
suffice for an answer” (Ibid: 10).
The claim, according to which the hegemony of ontology does not leave 
room for ethics, makes sense. Lévinas’s alternative, however, not brings us 
closer to morality. The shift from Heidegger to Lévinas can be described as the 
shift from dogmatic ontology to dogmatic face-ology. Having a face should rather 
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be formulated as a demand, as a challenge, as a standard to which the human 
being ought to refer in his conduct: one should behave in a human way—morally, 
sympathizing, mercifully—to justify and to deserve his having a “human face.”
Chapter Two
Carl Schmitt on God, Law, and the Führer
The biographical relationship of Carl Schmitt to Nazism is well documented, as 
are his support of the Röhm-Putsch, his exchanges with Heidegger and Jünger, 
his support of discrimination against Jews, and his opposition to democracy and 
the parliamentary system. Less studied is rather the kinship between his philos-
ophy and Nazism, Heidegger, and Jünger, and their common intellectual inter-
ests and world-view. Hence, again in the case of Carl Schmitt we see a tendency 
to draw a line between the person and the thinker. Jacob Taubes tells about the 
peculiar coincidence subsequent to which he, the Jew, and Schmitt became 
acquainted (Taubes 1993: 133–134). It is my aim to point out the ideological and 
intellectual kinship between Schmitt and Nazism. The excursus below is a trans-
lation of an address given by Schmitt at the Conference of the Reichsgruppe of 
University Professors of the NSRB23 in October 1934. Smoking guns were found 
long ago. My purpose is rather to demonstrate the essential connection between 
ideology, politics, and philosophy. 
Political Theology (1922) is one of Schmitt’s most influential texts. The sugges-
tion that politics and religion are intimately related makes this title conspicuous. 
We have already seen Heidegger introduce religious terms into his philosophical 
writings. Hence, it should not surprise us that long after the Enlightenment—and 
especially after Hume showed the impossibility of miraculous divine interven-
tion in the course of history—Schmitt argues that all political terms and concep-
tions are adaptations of or secularized religious terms24 and, furthermore, com-
pares the act of the sovereign with God’s intervention in the course of history. 
Revelation is the main religious component that Schmitt has in mind when 
arguing that all political concepts are secularized religious concepts, for it 
reflects the sovereign’s unchecked intervention in the historical chain of events 
and his ability to change its course. This suggests that Schmitt has in mind a par-
23 NSRB is the National Socialist Lawyer’s (literarily: the Guards of the Law) Association (Na-
tionalsozialistischer Rechtswahrerbund).
24 “Alle prägnanten Begriffe der modernen Staatslehre sind säkularisierte theologische Be-
griffe.” 
“Nicht nur ihrer historischen Entwicklung nach, weil sie aus der Theologie auf die Staatslehre 
übertragen wurden, indem zum Beispiel der allmächtige Gott zum omnipotenten Gesetzgeber 
wurde, sondern auch in ihrer systematischen Struktur … Der Ausnahmezustand hat für die 
Jurisprudenz eine analoge Bedeutung wie das Wunder für die Theologie.” (Schmitt 1934: 49)
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ticular religion in which revelation is dominant and a particular political setting 
which is built upon sovereignty, and not a necessary relationship that exists 
between any religion and any political setting. If this suggestion is true, then it 
means that Schmitt does not talk about a necessary situation but rather about a 
desired one. The question is why does Schmitt look to religion to corroborate his 
political conception? Is it because he needs religion to justify a particular politi-
cal setting? Is it that Schmitt tries to create a bridge between certain aspects 
of the past and the present and future by projecting religion onto politics? Erik 
Peterson, Schmitt’s intellectual rival, shows in his scholarly work Monotheism 
as a Political Problem (1935) how political camps in Western history manipu-
lated religious concepts to substantiate and support political agendas, regimes, 
and rulers. As he writes at one point, “Thus, for Orosius, the Roman Empire 
and Christendom had become one, so he could say ‘ad Christianos et Romanos 
Romanus et Christianus accedo’ [I come as Roman and Christian to Romans and 
Christians]” (Peterson 1935: 92). Regarding Orosius, Peterson says, “As nobody 
else, this Spanish provincial tied together the Roman Empire and Christendom, 
most clearly in the joining of Augustus with Christ” (Ibid: 92–93).
In Schmitt, the whole state as a body politic is built up around the sovereign 
who summons the people and makes them cohere by means of a free act of reso-
lution (Entscheidung) in a state of emergency. An example of state of emergency 
and of the necessarily subsequent act of sovereignty is the so-called “Röhm-
Putsch” and the subsequent executions. Schmitt writes:
The Führer protects justice against the worst misuse, insofar as he, in a moment of danger, 
instantly creates justice by virtue of his Führership [Führertum] as the court’s highest 
judge: “In this hour I was responsible for the destiny of the German nation and hence the 
court’s highest judge of the German people.” The true Führer is always also a judge. His 
judgeship [Richtertum] emanates from his Führership. If one severs one from the other or 
even poses them one against the other, he turns the judge into either an adversary Führer 
or an instrument in the hand of the adversary Führer and seeks to unhinge the state with 
the help of justice. (Schmitt 1934: 946–947)
The “Führer-principle” [das Führersprinzip], which Schmitt introduces, means to 
allow the sovereign, the Führer, a spontaneous and unbound act that constitutes 
a law. Binding the capacity of the Führer to parliamentary procedures could only 
lead to such horrid results as the Treaty of Versailles (Ibid: 950). Genuine justice 
implies the free will of the Führer and vice versa. The spontaneous act of the 
sovereign is “divine” in that it is free and lies outside the code of laws which it 
constructs. Thus, this act can never be bad and can never be illegal, according 
to Schmitt. Schmitt writes:
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Looked at normatively, the decision emanates from nothingness [Nichts]. The legal force 
of a decision is different from the result of substantition. Ascription is not achieved with 
the aid of a norm; it happens the other way around. A point of ascription first determines 
what a norm is and what normative rightness is. (Schmitt 1985: 31–32 / 1934: 42–43) 
There is, however, an important difference between a divine act and a sovereign 
act, which Schmitt wants to overlook. A sovereign act can never be completely 
autonomous; it can never be the first initiative act, as a divine one is. It always 
takes place in the historical context against which it reacts. It always relies on 
given settings and resources. It can abolish parliamentary procedures and insti-
tutions, but it still takes place in historical and political context. Schmitt seems 
to use the ex post facto to justify or to brand legitimate particular acts. Thus 
Schmitt exempts the Führer from the need to provide explanations and justi-
fications. Schmitt’s recourse to the divine, however, is unfounded. As Derrida 
explains: 
Justice in the sense of droit (right or law) would not simply be put in the service of a social 
force or power, for example an economic, political, ideological power that would exist 
outside or before it and which it would have to accommodate or bend to when useful. Its 
very moment of foundation or institution (which in any case is never a moment inscribed 
in the homogeneous tissue of a history, since it is ripped apart with one decision), the 
operation that amounts to founding, inaugurating, justifying law (droit), making law, 
would consist of a coup de force, of a performative and therefore, interpretative, violence 
that in itself is neither just nor unjust and that no justice and no previous law with its 
founding anterior moment could guarantee or contradict or invalidate. No justificatory 
discourse could or should ensure the role of meta language in relation to the performativ-
ity of institutive language or to its dominant interpretation. (Derrida 2002: 241–242)
That said, we ought to consider whether the sovereign reacts to an emergency 
situation, or instead concocts one.25 Does the emergency situation create the sov-
ereign as the Fatherland’s savior, the right person in the right place and time? Or 
does he create it in order to consolidate his position and achieve his goal? As a 
product of the situation, he cannot really be called sovereign. Nor as initiator of 
the critical situation is he really eligible to be called sovereign, because he does 
not really produce ex nihilo, as Schmitt says. Now, what is the difference between 
an act that constructs a law and caprices of the sovereign? Is any sovereign act 
really a law-constructing one meant to build and not just destroy?
25 See Fraenkel on the Reichstag fire: “Gelegentlich wird von nationalsozialistischer Seite 
zugegeben, dass der Reichstagsbrand gelegen kam und dass die ihm folgende kommisarische 
Diktatur den erwünschten Anlass zur Beseitigung des Rechtstaates bot.” (Fraenkel 1984: 36) 
Carl Schmitt on God, Law, and the Führer   25
Ernst Fraenkel has more earthy things to say about Schmitt’s thesis than 
Derrida. In a study based instead on sociological, historical, and legal data, he 
demonstrates that Schmitt’s thesis is not about the indispensable violent act that 
constructs any law, the “illegal” act that founds a legal system. It is rather the 
ambition to subjugate the legal system to the will and caprices of the Führer 
and the Gestapo. In Nazi Germany, Fraenkel claims, there seems to be no crite-
rion—except racial and casual ones—for defining a situation as an emergency 
(Fraenkel 1984: 94–95). As Christian Graf von Krockow claims, the sovereign act 
is directed to nothing but achieving each time a particular ad hoc goal, enhanc-
ing the sovereign’s power (Krockow 1958: 64–65).
Leo Strauss argues that Schmitt’s ultimate goal is to undermine liberalism, 
which, in Schmitt’s eyes, destroys the state as body politic (Meier 1995: 92). Lib-
eralism destroys politics because it is founded on parliament and parliamentary 
procedures whose resolutions are reached through discussion and voting. The 
sovereign stands above the law; he is not bound by norms and juridical proce-
dures in executing his will (Schmitt 1934: 13). He creates a new situation through 
a free act that is never determined by any reason other than his own will. 
“Sovereignity is the highest, legally independent, underived power” (Schmitt 
1985: 17 / 1934: 26). Relying on Thomas Hobbes, Schmitt writes: “Autoritas, non 
veritas facit legem” (Schmitt 1934: 44) and thus frees the Führer from any need 
to explain and justify his act—neither before the representatives of the law, nor 
before the people.
Parliament and autonomous acts of the sovereign exclude one another. 
Furthermore, the outcome of the parliamentary resolution is opposed to the 
outcome of the autonomous act of the sovereign. The parliament strives to con-
struct global standards which are supposed to refer to opposing sides and inter-
ests by means of compromises. The sovereign’s act, on the contrary, results in a 
sharp distinction between friend and enemy. The resolute act of the sovereign―
and this is the only thing that can give it a content―is now seen to be about the 
distinction between friend and enemy.
In The Concept of the Political, Carl Schmitt discusses what he holds to be 
the most basic principle of our living together in a state. According to common 
opinion (stemming from the theories of the social contract of the 18th and 19th 
centuries), it is the state which gathers us together. But there is a still more basic 
principle, Schmitt claims, which both brings us together and sets us apart. 
Schmitt calls it the “friend-and-enemy” distinction. This distinction is exis-
tential or ontological and thus it precedes the foundation of any political body. 
The attempt to extirpate this existential distinction and to insert, in its place, a 
global political system led to the destruction of the state. 
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The era of statehood is now dying. No additional word is needed in this regard. Along with 
it the whole superstructure of all the state-concepts which the Europe-centric science of 
international and political law built in four hundred years of thought comes to an end. 
The state as the model for political unity, the state as the bearer of the most astonishing 
monopoly of all monopolies, namely the monopoly of political resoluteness, this gem of 
European form and Occidental rationalism, is dethroned. (Schmitt 1963: 10)26
Suppressing the friend-and-enemy existential principle leads to the destruction 
of the state. 
There exists no rational purpose, no norm no matter how true, no program no matter 
how exemplary, no social ideal no matter how beautiful, no legitimacy nor legality which 
could justify men in killing each other for this reason. (Schmitt 1976: 49 / 1963: 49–50) 
It is rather the friend-and-enemy existential principle that brings about the 
agglomeration of people in the political body: 
But, rationally speaking, it cannot be denied that nations continue to group themselves 
according to the friend-and-enemy antithesis, that the distinction still remains actual 
today, and that this is an ever present possibility for every people existing in the political 
sphere. (Schmitt 1976: 28 / 1963: 29)
It follows then that discord between different parties in the same state is either a 
non-political occurrence or, if it becomes a political occurrence, it will entail the 
lapse of the state into a civil war (Schmitt 1963: 32). Once the inner bodies of the 
state become political, that is to say, adversaries to one another and to the state 
(trade unions and parliamentary parties, for example), the state will crumble. 
Even neutrality, Schmitt argues, must presuppose the friend-and-enemy exis-
tential principle (Ibid: 35). Neutrality is attacked by Schmitt as non-political. His 
discussion echoes Christoph Steding’s huge volume The Reich and the Illness of 
the European Culture (1942), which is, as Franz Neumann puts it, “A wholesale 
attack upon knowledge, education, and the intellect, upon the endless ‘palaver’ 
of the democracies” (Neumann 1944: 134). Steding speaks out against neutrality 
and the lack of determinism: “One decides to make no longer real decisions, and 
one ‘keeps’ for himself the Swiss democratic theologians in order for them to 
speak about decisions, for this is the safest way to verbally sabotage deeds and 
decisions” (Steding 1942: 71).
As we have seen above, it is not clear whether the sovereign is a product of 
the situation or whether he, instead, creates it. If he creates it—and this would 
come closer to the definition “sovereign”—there is still the question regard-
ing differentiation. Without saying what the sovereign is supposed to create 
26 The whole important Foreword chapter from which this passage is taken is not included in 
the English translation of Schmitt’s The Concept of the Political.
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or toward what he is resolved (entschieden),27 this expression remains empty. 
If human existence, however, is according to Schmitt in a state of perpetual 
war, then it is understandable why he leaves this claim abstract: perpetual war 
requires perpetual sovereign decisions. As he writes in his Leviathan, echoing 
Ernst Jünger, “The experience gained from World War I (1914–1918) waged 
against Germany contains a noteworthy lesson, for only the just war is the true 
‘total’ war” (Schmitt 1996: 48 / 1982: 75).
Apparently, Schmitt does create a differentiation in this abstract claim by 
introducing the friend-and-enemy principle. The resoluteness of the sovereign 
is about the distinction between friend and enemy. This distinction stems from 
his act of resoluteness. Yet, neither is this addition sufficient to make Schmitt’s 
claim less abstract: What is the criterion applied in drawing the line between 
enemy and friend? The enemy is a political rival? Or is he the enemy of the state? 
Or is he the enemy of the race?28 Or what are the basic units presupposed in this 
distinction—hostile families, hostile tribes, hostile states, or battling military 
units? Contrary to Hobbes’s Leviathan, in which the primeval hostility—which 
is hypothetical, for Hobbes never refers to a historical time in which there was a 
state of global war—is between individuals whose interest was to end the war of 
one against the other, Schmitt talks about an actual and permanent state of war 
between nations. He writes, “The independent, peaceful states, in and of them-
selves, must stake their entire vital power against one another in order to assert 
themselves” (Schmitt 1996: 49 / 1982: 76–77).
One may still wonder whether Schmitt can really be content with an abstract 
thesis detached from any definite situation, or whether he rather hints at a 
desirable specific situation. In Schmitt’s description, there are two homoge-
nous hostile masses. It is unlikely that this clean cut between two homogenous 
masses refers to two states, for even the relationship between two hostile dicta-
torial states cannot simply be reduced to a relation between two homogenous 
masses. According to Schmitt, the existence of two hostile masses can never be 
abolished. Through the autonomous act of the sovereign, a distinction between 
two camps is created. This distinction circumscribes the domain of the sover-
eign. The sovereign can forfeit his domain either by succumbing to his enemy or 
27 See the chapter on Löwith. 
28 According to Faye, Heidegger claims against Schmitt that the friend-and-enemy is not radi-
cal enough as long as it does not refer to race. “Er [Heidegger] hält die Schmittsche Unterschei-
dung zwischen Freund und Feind nicht für ursprünglich genug. Wie Alfred Baeumler bezieht 
Heidegger das Politische auf die Selbstbehauptung eines Volkes oder einer Rasse. Auf diese 
Weise kann er behaupten, dass sein Begriff des Politischen ursprünglich und der Schmittsche 
Begriff lediglich abgeleitet ist.” (Faye 2008: 50) 
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by wholly subjugating the enemy, for in both scenarios, the distinction between 
enemy and friend gets lost: 
The political entity cannot by its very nature be universal in the sense of embracing all 
of humanity and the entire world. If the different states, religions, classes, and other 
human groupings on earth should be so unified that a conflict among them is impossible 
and even inconceivable and if civil war should forever be foreclosed in a realm which 
embraces the globe, then the distinction of friend and enemy would also cease. What 
remains is neither politics nor state, but culture, civilization, economics, morality, law, 
art, entertainment, etc.. (Schmitt 1996: 53 / 1963: 54)
Thus, Schmitt must talk about plurality: 
… The concept of the political yields pluralistic consequences, but not in the sense that, 
within one and the same political entity, instead of the decisive friend-and-enemy group-
ing, a pluralism could take it place without destroying the entity and the political itself. 
(Schmitt 1996: 45 / 1963: 54) 
As the following translation of Schmitt’s address may suggest, it is the racial 
factor to which Schmitt’s friend-and-enemy pair can neatly be applied, for in 
this example, the idea of two homogenous hostile camps can be realized after 
Schmitt has demonized one group. It is, of course, not to suggest that he could 
not pick other examples, but the following text is a concrete example of a pos-
sible realization of the friend-and-enemy principle that draws a line between 
two homogenous camps. 
Carl Schmitt
German Jurisprudence in the Battle against the Jewish Spirit— 
Concluding Remarks at the Conference of the Reichsgruppe29 of 
University Professors of the NSRB30, October 3rd and 4th, 1936
[1193] I. Our conference has yielded a large number of ideas and viewpoints. For-
tunately, it has also produced an overall picture. The result does not yet need to 
be summed up in elaborated theses and statements. For practical scholarly legal 
work—which we can already tackle in this semester—innumerable issues have 
been brought to light in the immediate tasks which lay before us. I remind you 
only of the need for cooperation between jurisprudence and economics in the 
29 (N.B.: Professional Association of the Reich.)
30 (N.B.: Nationalsozialistische Rechtswahrerbund, i.e. Association of National Socialist Pro-
tection of the Law.)
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field of commercial and civil law; and of the need for juristic-historical coop-
eration—not in the sense of the old archeological history of right, but rather in 
the sense which is demanded by Dr. Ruttke, namely, the work in the field of the 
Jewish right to which RA Schroer has already contributed a lot with his works 
on Shulchan Aruch.31 The common thread of all the lectures given here was the 
dominance of Jewish legal thought in all the fields of the law and the lack of 
relevance this legal thought has in the German sense of justice and law. Jewish 
law appears, as all the lectures have pointed out, as the salvation from chaos 
of some sorts. The peculiar polarity—between Jewish chaos on one hand and 
Jewish law on the other, anarchistic nihilism on one hand and positive norma-
tivity on the other, abrasive sensual materialism on one hand and abstract mor-
alism on the other—stands now before us so clearly and vividly that we can use 
this fact as scientifically decisive recognition of our conference also for the study 
about race psychology [Rassenseelenkunde]—as a starting point for further juris-
prudential work. Therefore, we, in our capacity as German guardians of the law 
[Rechtswahrer] and teachers of the law, have for the first time contributed to the 
important research that race science [Rassenkunde] has already done in other 
fields. Working together for these two days, we have reached an initial result 
which saves our reputation as a science, compared to the other achievements 
which Dr. Falk Ruttke rightly referred to and which can set the standards for us 
in many respects.
II. Apart from these scientific findings, a series of practical questions has 
emerged. The Reichsrechtsführer,32 Reichsminister Dr. Frank, has very clearly 
formulated demands in his speech that go into concrete details and that concern 
the technical tasks of bibliography, librarianship and citation. 
1. The necessary task of creating a bibliography is a very difficult one, for it 
is naturally necessary that we determine who is a Jew and who is not a Jew as 
precisely as possible. The smallest mistakes in this respect can be made to seem 
greater, cause perplexities, and help the enemies of Nazism achieve cheap victo-
ries. They can also cause damage in that young students might be led astray from 
the main idea because of minor inaccuracies, for they can easily be tempted, out 
of a false sense of justice—which is to be found also in our German character—
to concentrate on this minor particular case of inaccuracy [1195] instead on the 
great and just cause for which we fight.33
31 (N.B.: The Code of Jewish law.)
32 (N.B.: The chairman of the above-mentioned NSRB.)
33 At the instigation of the Reichsrechtsführer, the Reichsleiter, Dr. Frank, the ministry of Justice 
in the Reich [Reichrechtsamt] of the NSDAP has already started to compile a list of Jewish authors. 
Further announcements regarding the kind of required cooperation will be issued shortly.
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2. Only by virtue of an exact list can we continue to work in the field of tech-
nical cataloging, and through purging our libraries, we will protect our students 
from a perplexity that emerges when, on one hand, we direct them to the nec-
essary battle against the Jewish spirit, but on other hand, by the end of 1936, 
a normal library of any law faculty still looks as if the greater part of the juris-
tic literature was composed by Jewish authors. Consequently, this formidable 
impression—which emerges because Jewish works are still present in law fac-
ulties and students are actually required to make use of Jewish ideas—will be 
avoided. All juristic works composed by Jewish authors, as Reichsminister Dr. 
Frank aptly remarked, belong without bibliographical exception in a particular 
section called “Judaica.” 
3. There also exists a grave problem concerning citations. After a confer-
ence like the current one, it will no longer be possible to cite a Jewish author 
as any other author. It would be downright irresponsible to cite a Jewish author 
as a principal witness or as a kind of authority in the field. A Jewish author has 
no authority for us, not even a “purely scientific” authority. This assessment 
shall serve as the starting point in the treatment of the question regarding cita-
tions. For us, a Jewish author is, in so far as he is cited at all, a Jewish author. 
The addendum of the word and the designation “Jewish” is not cosmetic, but 
rather, essential—because the Jewish author cannot actually be prevented from 
using the German language. Otherwise, the purging of our juristic language is 
impossible. If somebody writes “Stahl-Jolson” today, he has, in a genuinely sci-
entific and precise manner, achieved more than somebody could have done by 
means of great remarks against the Jews which are given in general and abstract 
expressions in such a way that not a single Jew feels himself to be concerned in 
concreto. Only if we have solved the problem of citations in this way, do we get 
a German juristic literature not infected by the Jews. The problem of citations 
is hence not only a practical, but also an altogether fundamental one. One can 
recognize a writer by the way he is citing. Let me remind you only of the brazen 
obviousness with which the Vienna school of the Jew Kelsen had cited only its 
own members, and how different opinions were disregarded with cruelty and 
impudence incomprehensible to us Germans. The problem of citation is there-
fore not a negligible matter. The Jewish Question today has no longer negligible 
issues. Everything is interrelated in the closest and deepest manner—this has 
been true since the real battle for the world-view began.
The question regarding citation will necessitate the clarification of many 
separate questions, like the question regarding [1196] the citation of half-Jews, of 
people with Jewish relatives, etc. From the outset, I am warning against focus-
ing on such marginal and interposed questions. This is a much liked method to 
evade definite decisions. We have hundreds of cases where we are undoubtedly 
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dealing with Volljuden.34 It is an especially typical Jewish trick to avert the atten-
tion from the core of the matter to dubious, interposed and marginal questions. 
Authors, about whom there is no doubt they are Volljuden, will be in the future 
labeled as Jews in our German juridical literature. If it is for objective reasons 
necessary to cite Jewish authors, then it will be done only with the addition of 
the word “Jewish.” Mentioning the word “Jewish” will already emanate salutary 
exorcism.
4. The last practical application concerns the question of scientific work, 
especially the question of dissertations. The lectures given in the last two days 
provided much material for good dissertations. I do not consider it necessary that 
70–80% of the hundreds of dissertations—which are nowadays being written in 
Germany—will unchangingly continue to be composed in the old style of the 
BGB and the StGB35-dissertations. This, too, is a serious issue, if one considers 
how much talent and actual intellectual power are available among the German 
youth. And what does it mean if German law professors—who are responsible for 
the education and scientific training of these young Germans—call forth those 
topics that deviate from the present life of the German people? Here lies a profes-
sional task of the highest order. If one bears in mind what this conference has 
yielded, regarding subjects of dissertations in the fields of History of Justice and 
Constitutional History—also for the exploration of the Jewish spirit in its influ-
ence on the German intellectual life, in its “intersection” with the German spirit, 
as one speaker puts it very clearly—then it does not seem difficult to remind a 
young student of the influence of, for example, B. Lasker, Friedberg or Johann 
Jacoby on the development of German justice, or to motivate him to examine the 
emergence of the code of civil procedure, the code of criminal procedure and of 
other laws as far as the Jewish influence is concerned, or to direct his attention to 
the topic of “Judaism and the state under the rule of law.” There is no shortage of 
new subjects for dissertations, and it would only be the most stupid inefficiency 
if those new subjects were not utilized.
III. The most important matter, however, which has emerged in our conference 
is the clear and definite insight that Jewish views, as far as their intellectual 
content is concerned, cannot be on par with those of German or other non-Jew-
ish authors. With the uttermost clarity, we have all become aware that it is only 
a seeming difficulty if there are also Jews who have expressed nationalistic and 
patriotic views, as the famous Stahl-Jolson has done. Time and again in our con-
34 (N.B.: Somebody with at least three Jewish grandparents.)
35 (N.B.: “BGB” stands for Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [civil code] and “StGB” stands for Straf-
gesetz buch [criminal law code].)
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ference, the recognition has come through that the [1197] Jew is unproductive 
and sterile to the German intellectual character. He has nothing to tell us, may 
he ever so astutely reason or so zealously assimilate. He can indeed showcase 
his enormous talent for trade and mediation, but in fact he creates nothing. It 
is a sign of lack in instruction in the race theory, and therefore also in National 
Socialistic thought, not to see and believe that it is a deep problem that some 
Jews write and speak in a nationalistic manner and others in an internationalist 
manner, that they sometimes represent conservative, sometimes liberal, some-
times objective and sometimes even subjective theories. Even the very much 
praised critical talent of the Jew stems only from his wrong relation to every-
thing which is essential and species-specific. However, a completely different 
sort of critique is exercised when German law professors criticize and support 
one another in a real collaboration. It is also wrong to call the Jew particularly 
logical, particularly comprehending, constructive or rationalistic. His “care-free 
logical astuteness” is not really what we mean by logic, but rather a weapon 
which is pointed at us; it stems from the wrong attitude toward the issue and the 
subject. 
1. The relationship of Jewish thought to the German spirit is of the follow-
ing kind: the Jew has a parasitic, tactical and trading-like relationship to our 
intellectual work. Due to his talent for trading, he has often a sharp sense for 
the genuine; with great resourcefulness and a quick schnozzle, he knows how 
to strike at the genuine. This is his instinct as a parasite and real merchant. The 
fact that Jewish art dealers discover agenuine Rembrandt faster than German art 
historians does not prove a particular Jewish gift for painting. Likewise, in the 
juridical field, when the Jew has recognized, with great speed, good authors and 
theories for what they are, this does not prove a particular Jewish gift for legal 
thought. The Jews find out quickly where the German matters that attracts them 
are to be found. We should not consider this character trait of theirs a merit, 
which would then cause us to plague ourselves with inhibitions. It is simply 
based within the general situation of the Jew, and his parasitic, tactical and mer-
chant attitude toward German intellectual property. Even a very atrocious and 
uncanny mask-changing, like the one which makes up the general existence of 
Stahl-Jolson, could no longer mislead people. If it is time and again emphatically 
said that this man has been “intrinsically honest,” so it may be true—yet I have 
to add that I cannot look into the mind of that Jew, nor do we have any access to 
the innermost essence of the Jews. We only know of their ill-balanced relation to 
our species. If one has ever grasped this truth, he also knows what race means.
2. It is furthermore necessary to recognize how differently the Jews have 
acted in different historical periods. Heinrich Lange has emphatically pointed 
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this out in his eminently essays.36 The particularly significant turning points of 
the Jewish way of acting in the past century are the following years: 1815, 1830, 
1848, 1871, 1890—Bismarck’s resignation [1198], the beginning of the Wilhel-
minian era—1918, 1933. It is therefore inadmissible to put the case of the Jewish 
conduct from 1830 on the same level with the case of 1930. Here, again, the Jew 
Stahl-Jolson surfaces, who, today, still influences the denominational-clerical 
opposition to the National Socialistic state. It is completely wrong to posit him as 
an exemplary conservative Jew in contrast to latter Jews who unfortunately were 
different. Therein lies a dangerous misapprehension of the basic insight that 
with every change in the general situation, with every new chapter in the course 
of history—so fast that we can notice it only with the utmost attention—a change 
in Jewish conduct also occurs, a mask-change of demonic crypticness because 
of which the question concerning the inner credulity of some individual Jew is of 
no interest at all. The great talent of the Jew for adaptability has risen to immen-
sity through his history of several thousand years and on the ground of peculiar 
racial dispositions; and the virtuosity of mimicry has improved in a long exer-
cise. We can recognize it in its consequences, but we cannot understand it. And 
still, we should not overlook that this virtuosity of the Jew does exist.
3. I repeat again and again the urgent request to read every sentence in 
Adolf Hitler’s “Mein Kampf” about the Jewish question, especially his remarks 
on “Jewish Dialectics.” What has been presented at our conference by experts 
in many scientifically eminent talks is stated [in Mein Kampf] simply, in a way 
which is comprehensible to every national comrade, and exhaustive. You should 
also refer your law students again and again to those sentences of the Führer.
We should not, however, forget the German side in this question about the 
Jewish problem. In immediately applying of what Dr. Falk Ruttke said, one can, 
for example, say that the case of Karl Marx and the impact which stemmed from 
him is for us, indeed, the case of Friedrich Engels or Bruno Bauer or Ludwig 
Feuerbach or maybe even Hegel. Herein, a tragic problem is grounded. How was 
it possible that a German man from Wuppertal was captivated by the Jew Marx? 
How could it be that thousands of decent and honest national comrades surren-
dered in that way to the Jewish intellect, for many and long decades? Wherefrom 
stems that vulnerability of so many men with German blood and wherefrom 
stems the weakness and degeneration of the German kind in that moment of 
history, the lack of resistance against Judaism? The examination of these ques-
tions pertains to our scientific self-contemplation and is armament for the new 
round in the battle.
36 Compare: Deutsche-Juristen Zeitung (1935: 406 / 1936: 1129).
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We have recognized this [state] with the utmost scientific clarity in our con-
ference. Contrary to the blindness and the cluelessness of earlier times, this is a 
revolutionary recognition. Armed with it, we can enter the battle a new round of 
which has begun. We should not deceive ourselves about the difficulty of that 
battle. The speeches on the Nuremberg Party Conference leave no doubt about 
it. Judaism, as the Führer says in his book Mein Kampf, is [1199] not only adverse 
to everything which is adverse to Judaism, but also is the mortal enemy of any 
true productivity within every other Volk. Its world power does not tolerate any 
völkisch [ethnic] productivity; otherwise its particular way of existence would be 
proven wrong. Yet, the interest in the genuine productivity of other Volk and the 
haste with which the Jewish dealer of art or spirit rushes to the German artist, 
poet or scholar, in order to use him by means of annuity, are neither merits nor 
qualities which can divert our attention from what is essential. The Jew occupies 
us not because of himself. What we search and fight for is our own unadulterated 
character, the intact purity of our German people. “In that I fend off the Jew,” 
says the Führer Adolf Hitler, “I am fighting for the work of our Lord.” 
Chapter Three
Ernst Jünger on War for the sake of War
The name Ernst Jünger, no less than those of Heidegger and Schmitt, is related 
to Nazism. To the enthusiastic postwar moralists and Nazis hunters, however, 
Jünger is definitely a disappointment, for in his biography—apart from main-
taining long friendships with Schmitt and Heidegger—support will not be found 
for Nazism, but rather implied disapproval and critique, a relationship with 
Ernst Niekisch, and a close relationship with the anti-Nazi conservatives who 
tried to assassinate Hitler in 1944 (Schramm 1964: 12–13). Yet, Jünger’s work is 
indispensable for understanding the mindset that enabled the rise to power of 
the Third Reich. 
In his book on the Nazi world-view, Nicolaus Sombart describes a work 
which he calls “the protocol of ideas” (Sombart 1987: 144) that opens for us a 
view into the political and ideological mindset in Germany that led to World War 
II. This work is Jünger’s The Worker (1932). That work promotes the three most 
essential components of the Nazi mindset: first, the completion of the industrial-
technical revolution; second, the completion of the state as the highest instance; 
and third, the realization of the German vocation in that state (Sombart 1987: 
148). The Worker, Sombart says, is not a futuristic novel, but rather an analysis 
of the German mindset which had been realized by Hitler. Jünger vehemently 
rejected the suggestion that The Worker is related to the Third Reich.37
The most obvious common trait in the writings of Heidegger, Schmitt, and 
Jünger is the centrality of the act of resoluteness―in Heidegger enacted by Being 
and in Schmitt by the sovereign; and, we shall presently see, in Jünger it is the 
resoluteness to kill and be killed. As Jünger puts it: “In the sphere of death, 
everything becomes a symbol of death, and in turn, death is the nourishment 
from which life is nurtured” (Jünger 1982: 205). Already in Being and Time, Hei-
degger defined the genuine existence of the human Dasein as a state in which 
one lives resolutely toward his own termination (Sein-zum-Tode). To live genu-
inely (eigentlich) means to live entirely toward one’s own termination. Hence, 
there is no sense in asking for what sake I am dying or whether it is justified 
or unjustified, etc. One’s own termination is experienced genuinely in anxiety 
(Angst) that does not relate to death as an event of which one is afraid (as in 
37 See for example his introduction to The Worker from 1963 (Jünger 1982) as well as his letter 
from 1978 (ibid: 315). 
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terminal illness and life risk) or which one desires when suicidal. We have iden-
tified the same pattern in Schmitt. No matter what, one is entirely involved in a 
conflict. Hence, he disapproves of any parliamentary discourse. Submissiveness 
and lack of critique is good soil for Nazism to bloom in. In Jünger, it is the excru-
ciating pain and blood and war that give human existence meaning and goal. As 
Julia Encke says, “The lost war [i.e. World War I] turned into an ‘inner victory’ 
and along with it announced the birth of a ‘new human type’ who continues to 
celebrate the ‘war cult’ even when there is in reality no longer an enemy” (Encke 
2006: 9). Jünger included in the first edition of In Stahlgewittern photos taken on 
the battlefields. In one of them, he is seen standing with three other comrades 
next to the body of an enemy soldier. Jünger writes in the introduction to an 
edited volume called War and Warriors from 1930:
The inner context that is the basis of the essays collected in this volume is German nation-
alism, which is characterized in that it lost its share in the idealism of the grandparents as 
well as in the rationalism of the fathers. Instead, its approach is heroic realism: It aims to 
grasp that substance, that layer of absolute reality of which both ideas and rational con-
clusions are only expressions. Hence, this approach is at the same time symbolic insofar 
as it grasps every deed, every thought, and every feeling as the same and unchangeable 
Being whose rule it is impossible to evade. (Jünger 1930a: 5)
The Worker is probably Jünger’s best known and most read work. Heidegger ded-
icated seminars to The Worker (Heidegger: 2004). The resemblance to Schmitt 
and Heidegger stands out immediately in Jünger’s scornful critique of daily idle 
talk and chatter as a means of channeling and circulating information. It is what 
Heidegger calls “Gerede” in Being and Time, and what Schmitt identifies with 
parliamentary discourse. Like Schmitt, Jünger also speaks out against the par-
liament and the social contracts of the 19th century. He endorses what he calls 
“organic construction.”38 Their critique is directed at the bourgeois lifestyle and 
values and principles and, above all, the seeking of security and well-being. In 
their eyes, the value is not external—I live or die or fight for the sake of this or 
that ideal—but rather internal: I am toward death for the sake of being toward it 
(Heidegger), I am animus for the sake of animosity (Schmitt), and I am waging 
war for the sake of war (Jünger). 
Further, Jünger’s description of work in The Worker resembles Heidegger’s 
description in Being and Time of the Dasein in his daily activities. Likewise, 
Jünger’s attitude toward the work of art resembles Heidegger’s in Der Ursprung 
des Kunstwerks. The true meaning of the work of art is to bring to the fore the 
most original experience of Being. Primordial truth cannot be accounted for by 
38 See for example Jünger (1982: 120).
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means of giving reasons and referring to causes. It is rather imprinted or stamped 
into things and events. Hence, Jünger calls it “Gestalt.”
The first task which Jünger sees himself confronted with in talking about 
the worker is to draw a clear line between his world-view, in which the worker is 
the basic way of conceiving reality, and all other world-views, in which “worker” 
stands instead for a particular social class. Bourgeois society fears death, war, 
and conflict. It strives for security. The worker in this society can better his social 
and economic conditions and security by means of strikes and struggles. This is 
the worker of the revolutions which took place in Europe—the one who gained 
social-economic recognition and justice. His freedom, however, is only an eco-
nomic autonomy, not a real or essential one. He has, therefore, no access to the 
“planetary forces”—as Jünger calls them—of existence. The real worker, on the 
contrary, is the one who rebels against and destroys the bourgeois social and 
economic order. “The one who still believes here that this process can be main-
tained by the orders of the old style belongs to the race of defeated and is doomed 
to extermination” (Jünger 1982: 59).
The genuine worker has no external aim, such as better living standards, 
annuity, defense, territory, etc. He wages war for the sake of war. The real worker 
is a warmonger. He does not shun death, but on the contrary is always prepared 
to die as a martyr and a front-line soldier. The bourgeois is distinguished from 
the front-line soldier in that even in the heat of war, he looks desperately around 
for any opportunity to negotiate. For the real worker-soldier, on the contrary, the 
battlefield is the realm in which one must die—that is, to live in a manner fitting 
the standards of the Reich (Ibid: 40).
“Real worker” does not designate a social distinction, but rather a Gestalt 
(Ibid: 35), a particular way to live and, accordingly, to look at reality. Reality, in 
Jünger’s eyes, is an endless global struggle, and the appropriate way to comply 
with it is global war, mobilization, and armament. The worker is a warrior, and 
his work is global war. Jünger identifies his worker-warrior with the martyr. 
There are, however, suggestions in the text that the notion of “noble worker-war-
rior” applies solely to the noble German race.39
There are two questions that should be addressed in this context: the 
first concerns the relationship between the economic recession that plagued 
Germany after World War I and the economic blossoming that followed Hitler’s 
rise to power and the arms race. Does The Worker implicitly refer to the con-
nection between economic prosperity, work, and the arms race, despite Jünger’s 
39 See Jünger (1982: 38). See also: “Schon früh in diesem Jahrhundert sah man den Deutschen 
im Aufstande gegen diese Welt, und zwar vertreten durch den deutschen Frontsoldaten als den 
Träger einer echten Gestalt.” (Ibid: 38–39)
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insistence that the war which he is describing has no external goals or stan-
dards, such as prosperity and profit, but is rather war for the sake of war? Jünger 
points to this option as well: “The state of unemployment, correctly seen, is to 
be considered training of a reserve force” (Ibid: 271–272). And again, “A different 
form of wealth is concealed here, which Bourgeois thinking cannot identify. Mil-
lions of men without an occupation—this fact is power, is a fundamental asset, 
and here too we see the worker who alone possesses the key to this capital” (Ibid: 
272). This question entails a second one. Must work not imply hierarchy, distribu-
tion of roles, and assignments which are derived from the goals to be achieved? 
This also leads to a class hierarchy. Otherwise, work would be an incomprehen-
sible notion. Jünger, however, denies this world-view: “The Führer is recognized 
in that he is the first servant, the first soldier, and the first worker” (Ibid: 15), he 
says, in a way that is reminiscent of Heidegger’s Rectorial Address. What, then, 
is the work that Jünger has in mind when he talks about the “worker?” Jünger 
writes to Carl Schmitt (who asked the same question):
Our concern is not to assess the worker according to merely economic, moral, or human 
worth as Marxism does, but rather to recognize his activity as a form in which the law of 
the race is expressed. (Kiesel 1999: 34–35)
Because of the title The Worker, it is necessary to distinguish Jünger’s ideas from 
the Marxist world-view. Jünger argues here that there is a race whose end, τέλοϛ, 
is to work or whose potential is best realized in working. As in other investiga-
tions regarding the end, we are going in circles when we try to answer it; we 
cannot say which race it is whose end is working without assuming what should 
be proved. Jünger is not bothered by logical fallacies, because he does not admit 
the supreme validity of reason. We should then look at the entire picture that 
Jünger portrays. 
Jünger rejects the traditional role of reason because reason creates hier-
archies and explains everything by means of cause and effect. Through these 
means, reason promises security and comfort and thus creates a bourgeois 
society (Jünger 1982: 49–50).40 Under the reign of reason, war should be avoided 
as an irrational incident (Ibid: 51–52). Superior to reason and the hierarchies 
40 Reason and its dominance are destroyed in one apocalyptic blow. “Ebenso nimmt der gläu-
bige Mensch an einem erweiterten Kreise des sinnvollen Lebensteils. Durch Unglück und Ge-
fahr bezieht ihn das Schicksal ebenso wie durch das Wunder unmittelbar in ein mächtigeres 
Walten ein, und der Sinn dieses Zugriffes wird in der Tragödie anerkannt. Die Götter lieben es, 
sich in den Elementen zu offenbaren, in glühenden Gestirnen, in Donner und Blitz, im bren-
nenden Busche, den die Flamme nicht versehrt. Zeus bebt auf dem höchsten Throne vor Lust, 
während der Erdkreis unter der Schlacht der Götter und Menschen erdröhnt, weil er hier den 
ganzen Umfang seiner Macht gewaltig bestätigt sieht.” (Jünger 1982: 50)
Ernst Jünger on War for the sake of War   39
that it introduces into nature (cause and effect) and into society (classes) is the 
Gestalt. The Gestalt, Jünger says, is imprinted41 into things and events and is the 
prism through which they are now seen. 
There is no gradual path from reason to Gestalt, but rather an instantaneous 
transformation. Suddenly, reality is seen in the light of destiny and worship and 
no longer of causality. “How could an eye that is trained in observation avoid the 
insight that destiny and worship are active behind the veil of cause and effect 
that moves beneath the struggles of the day” (Ibid: 48). Subsequently, freedom 
and destiny become one (Ibid: 59–60). Man becomes free through sacrificing 
himself for the sake of global order (Ibid: 74); supreme force dissolves man from 
the historical chain and sets him free (Ibid: 84). Time now implies apocalypse 
(Ibid: 170). “The deep cut which threatens life in our time divides not only two 
generations, not only two centuries, but it [also] announces the end of thousands 
years of [bourgeois] historical continuity” (Ibid: 205).
Seen through the Gestalt, the individual vanishes in the collective, the race 
of the worker. Jünger speaks about cultivating this race (Aufzucht) (Ibid: 294) 
and enumerates the desired physical traits of that race. He claims that it has 
nothing to do with any biological race (Ibid: 149). However, it is revealed in many 
passages that he means the German race. 
The face has also changed—as it appears to the observer—under the steel helmet or the 
cap. It has lost its diversity and hence individuality in its range of expression, as can be 
seen in photos of assemblies or groups while it has acquired sharp features and special 
characteristics. It has become more metallic and on its surface galvanized; the bone struc-
ture stands out, and the features are blank and tense. The gaze is calm and fixed, trained 
to inspect objects that move at a high velocity. This is the face of a race that is beginning 
to develop from complying with the special demands of the new landscape which man 
represents, not as a person or individual, but rather as a species (Ibid: 112–113).
Speaking of this, Walter Benjamin sarcastically remarks that “these trail blazers 
of the Wehrmacht could almost give one the impression that the uniform repre-
sents their highest end, most desired by all their heartstrings, and that the cir-
cumstances under which one dons the uniform are of little importance by com-
parison” (Benjamin 1979: 121). Klaus Vondung shows that Jünger was not content 
with Nazism. But the model of the new man that he portrays in The Worker cor-
responds precisely to the Nazi model of the new man (Vondung 1988: 390). It 
is likewise no longer the individual that comes to the fore in the work of art 
(Jünger 1982: 217) and in the media (Ibid: 276–277), but rather the species. Seen 
through the Gestalt, the individual gets lost, and what remains is the species of 
41 Jünger uses the terms “Prägung” and “Stempel.”
40   Chapter Three
the worker-soldier who wears the uniform (Ibid: 125). The individual person has 
vanished into the species long before his body can be killed at the battlefield. 
It is thus obvious why Jünger does not think that it is a disaster to be killed in 
a war, for it is not the individual person, but rather the species that both exists 
and perishes (Ibid: 148), depending on the outcome of the war. Hitler presents in 
Mein Kampf his version of the same idea:
Now the basic disposition out of which such an activity grows we call idealism, to dis-
tinguish it from egoism. By this we understand only the individual’s ability to sacrifice 
himself for the community, for his fellow citizens. But as true idealism is nothing but 
subjecting the individual’s interest and life to the community, and as this again repre-
sents the presumptions for any kind of creative organizing forms, therefore in its very 
heart it corresponds to the ultimate will of Nature. Idealism alone leads men to voluntary 
acknowledgment of the privilege of force and strength and thus makes them become a 
dust particle of that order which forms and shapes the entire universe. (Hitler 1941: 410; 
cited in von Krockow 1958: 51)
Seen through the Gestalt, the strategies and tactics of war must accordingly 
change, Jünger claims.
Thus emerged the concept of an “extermination zone” created by steel, gas, fire, or other 
means, and by political and economic impact. In those zones, there is de facto no longer 
any difference between combatant and non-combatant. (Jünger 1982: 149)
The evidence that Jünger did not support Nazism and was not anti-Semitic is 
well-founded and can be supported. In March 2009, Tobias Wimbauer claimed 
in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung that Jünger helped Paul Celan find a pub-
lisher and thus survive financial difficulties (Wimbauer 2009). Yet, in Jünger’s 
world-view as unfolded in The Worker, mass killing, torture, death camps, and 
sadism are natural and legitimate. He also praises “nationalism as the first 
attempt to confront brutal reality with brutality” (Cited in Morat 2007: 81).
The use of technology is legitimate insofar as it is subjected to the movement 
of total mobilization. “Technology is the mobilization of the world through the 
Gestalt of the worker” (Jünger 1982: 156). The first phase of this mobilization is 
necessarily destructive. During war, technology functions while other human 
activities fail; hence it is superior. “The perfection of the technical instruments 
of power is seen in an insurmountable state of formidableness and the capability 
of complete extermination” (Ibid: 200). Seen through the Gestalt, the weapon, 
the instrument of killing, is part of the human body:
The pincers of the scorpion, the trunk of the elephant, and the shell of the mussel do not 
replace any artificial instrument. We likewise have the instruments which are appropri-
ate for us, not only in the near or distant future, but at any instant. They will be obedient 
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tools for destruction insofar as the spirit plans to destroy, and they will construct insofar 
as the spirit is determined to build up magnificent buildings (Ibid: 202).
Jünger has not yet provided answers to all our questions. First, we tried to find 
out how work can be understood without an external goal. Jünger identifies 
work with war. But this cannot be the answer, for the war he describes has no 
external goal; it is fighting and killing for the sake of fighting and killing. At one 
point, Jünger suggests that war should be seen as a work of art which is created 
for the sake of itself. That is the reason, he claims, that the Germans decided 
not to destroy beautiful Paris (Jünger 2002: 217). Second, global war and mass 
killing can be achieved only by means of advanced technology. Hence Jünger 
marks off technology as the most essential trait of the worker-warrior. At the 
same time, Jünger rejects rationality and reason and praises irrationality and 
apocalyptic experience of reality. “… The elementary … is the unreasonable and 
hence the immoral altogether” (Jünger 1982: 49). In addition, Jünger regrets the 
small degree of illiteracy and the wide distribution of education: “The less edu-
cation in the usual sense the rank [of leadership] has attained, the better it will 
be. Unfortunately, the epoch of general education has deprived us of a capable 
reserve of illiterates …” (Ibid: 213) The question then is, How can advanced tech-
nology thrive on a basis of illiteracy and irrationality? It would be more reason-
able to talk about irrational use of technology. This could account for the Nazis’ 
mass killing. This may be suggested when he writes, “A movement of participa-
tion in war, a social-revolutionary party, and in this manner an army transforms 
into an aristocracy that owns the decisive spiritual and technical means” (Ibid: 
272). Elsewhere, Jünger speaks against private property, which must be part of 
the global mobilization by the state (Ibid: 297). As Hannah Vogt puts it, “As in 
a distorted picture, one believes one can recognize [in The Worker] American 
Capitalism, Russian Communism, European Fascism, and Japanese Imperial-
ism” (cited in von Krockow 1958: 54).
Jünger’s 1943 essay Peace suggests a turn in his world-view. Jünger writes:
Therefore whoever emerges from the struggle as victor bears a heavy responsibility. The 
logic of pure violence must come to an end so that the higher logic of alliance may be 
revealed. The world war will reach its conclusion only when it is crowned with universal 
peace and thus gives meaning to the sacrifice. That demands an ascent to other, higher 
pronciples, to ascent from the fire to the light. (Jünger 1948: 41–42 / 2002: 210) 
Jünger’s world-view of elementary powers and destiny does not seem to have 
changed. The claim about legitimate victims in the light of peace must imply in 
this context theodicy, for the Nazis did not fight for the sake of that peace or of 
other justifiable goals. The Germans were forced to accept that peace agreement 
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as they were forced to after their defeat in World War I. Can we really think of the 
millions of innocent victims of the death camps—who adhered to no side in the 
war—as meaningful or useful (sinnvoll) victims, as Jünger suggests? It seems, 
on the contrary, that precondition for peace and stability should be conceiving 
and admitting them as illegitimate victims of barbarity and race fanaticism. The 
praise of the war now purportedly seen in the light of peace goes on:
Then in every people and in every army there were deeds of wonder and to spare, and 
long-established fame in arms acquired its meed of new laurels. In this battle of giants 
each opponent could be proud of the other; and to the extent that time tempers enmity the 
secret respect and even the secret love between conqueror and conquered will grow. The 
one gains meaning from the other. (Jünger 1948: 212 / 2002: 196–197) 
This encomium honors peace no more than war. According to Jünger, this peace 
is the due outcome of a justified war in which the millions of innocents who were 
tortured to death and brutally murdered by the Gestapo and the Wehrmacht 
either play no role or are part of the ideal picture that Jünger is painting. 
Jünger’s teaching in The Worker remains abstract despite his reference to a 
particular race and series of historical events. As we have seen, it is so abstract 
that it seems impossible even to distinguish, to draw a clear line between, war 
and peace. As Benjamin remarks:
But Jünger’s mysticism of war and pacifism’s clichéd ideal of peace have little to criticize 
each other for. Even the most consumptive pacifism has one thing over its epileptically 
frothing brother for the moment; a certain contact with reality, at least, some conception 
of the next war. (Benjamin 1979: 121)
It is not clear what Jünger’s alternative to the bourgeois hierarchy is within this 
belligerent world view in which everybody and everything is engaged in the 
dynamic of killing and fighting with no apparent external purpose. 
The following text sheds light on Jünger’s attitude toward liberalism, 
fascism, democracy, and the Jews. It can serve as a concrete example in which 
Jünger’s abstract teaching can be realized. The Jew is identified with liberalism 
and the bourgeoisie, which Germany should fight against in order to realize its 
Gestalt. It by no means suggests that this is the only concrete example which 
Jünger could have used to illustrate his teaching.
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Ernst Jünger 
On Nationalism and the Jewish Question 
[843] If one considers the two movements of national aspirations in our time—on 
the one hand the traditionally tinged one, in which civic, legitimistic, reaction-
ary, and economic tones merge or diverge in various ways—and on the other 
hand, the revolutionary one—one finds that anti-Semitism is the cornerstone of 
correlations. While its joy of war-ornamentation is in one case more or less dis-
missive, it is in the other case overt. This may be unpleasant for the Jew and also, 
potentially, dangerous for him.
The anti-Semitism of forces tied by kinship is, in its essence, the late and 
weak offspring of the feudal world. In the same manner as one likes to maintain 
a façade in front of burnt buildings from which the creative elements have long 
ago vanished, one considers it to be a cosmetic error to see the Jew in repre-
sentative positions. This, however, does not prevent making use of the Jew and 
finding him often in real working places. In the course of the 19th century, he 
occupies more and more many of these positions and quite early exerts his influ-
ence—for instance in the manner of Professor Stahl—on the constitutional foun-
dation of the legitimate powers, or furthermore—this is not unimportant—on the 
mending maintenance of that foundation and on conservative thought. In the 
course of the Wilhelminisches Reich,42 in which the official access to the hierar-
chy remains difficult or closed for him, when one scratches the surface one still 
encounters him everywhere in the highest and most important spheres. Almost 
nothing has changed, as everybody knows, after the coup d’état. 
Wherever one explores today the active forces in terms of moderate and 
legitimate reaction or of wide national civic restoration, it will not be long 
until one runs into the unavoidable type of the Jewish advocate—the speaking, 
writing, consulting or bargaining attorney—who uses men and powers, regard-
less to which movement they belong, with an unbiased manner that is charac-
teristic of his race. This is clearly the case today—in order to be able to take a 
stand in this sense against liberalism, namely, to combat it with its own means 
and with its own vocabulary—resentment is much more essential than it was 
hundred years ago. The keyboard that can produce all gamut of tricks, from the 
idealistic burst of indignation to the anxious yells of the threatened culture—
that is to say, above all the reflective tones—needs performers with extensive 
training in resentment that has become a part of them. Hence, the expert will not 
be surprised by the odd blossom of the well-cultivated conservative prose that 
42 (N.B.: Germany under Emperor Wilhelm, 1871–1918.)
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nowadays flows more frequently from the Jewish pens. One encounters sharp 
pleas of defence for culture, witty mocking of the civilization enterprise, aris-
tocratic snobbism, the Catholic farce, pseudo-morphologic interest in histori-
cal processes, inconspicuously deliberated soundness; it would be altogether 
mischevious to mention names. For this is too nice to be angry at—is one not 
delighted by the beautiful advertisement for the reputable cigarette merchant 
Overstolz who keeps accounts at his little Biedermeier-comptoir with dignified 
strictness? Here, the merchandise reaches such a degree of an “as if attitude” 
that it is almost impolite to moreover notice it any longer. In any case the Jew, 
who really has talent, who really has the ability to scent, currently argues con-
servatively. There are hidden here [844] positions and intricate possibilities for 
mental attitude which has already been fought over with great astuteness. The 
Jew cannot complain about the attention he receives from the forces that repre-
sent today’s conservative ideas, and the question is whether or not he benefits 
from the anti-Semitic shiny surface of those forces. For he needs a basic mood for 
his rhetoric, which always has ethical structure because it cannot have a heroic 
one, a basic mood which can be described as the opposite of the pathos of the 
distance. Hence, he relies on persecution, on anti-Semitism; as likewise, accord-
ing to the right remark, the Ghetto is a Jewish invention. Muted conservative atti-
tude, which is broken in its root, can, however, provide this scope most cheaply, 
most painlessly and most invisibly, in so far as it can melt him into a fine con-
servative line, which is, in addition, very flexible regarding “efficiency,” “spirit” 
and, of course, money. Hence, neither the British Empire nor the Habsburg mon-
archy had ever, in modern times, a shortage of Jewish paladins. 
Of course, today there exists in the political language, besides the word 
“conservative” only one other word which is just as frequent and just as little 
convincingly used, namely, the word “revolutionary.” Both our so-called con-
servatives and our so-called revolutionaries lack originality to the same extent. 
What marks the originality of the conservative is that it must be very old, and 
of the revolutionary, that it must be very young. The conservatives of today are, 
however, almost without exception a hundred years old, and the revolutionar-
ies are even older. In other words, the influence of liberalism is wider than one 
generally believes, and almost every debate takes place within its vicinity. The 
vocabulary of our great-grandfathers has revived in a spooky way, and with a 
dull repertoire of political terms—which one does not attempt to rebaptize and 
at which the naïve joy of discovery delights among contemporaries—spread out 
from all the platforms of the public opinion. 
Here lies the lack of consistency that is part and parcel of the anti-Semitic 
nature of national movements which define themselves as revolutionary. Even 
if one overlooks those sects which create their world-view out of negation, one 
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will be amazed by the lack of confident instinct from which the blow against the 
Jew often comes, often with great effort; but it is always too flat to be effective. 
The reason for this is that one tries to determine and destroy the influence of the 
Jew on German life in accordance with the methods of real individualistic think-
ing. Favored are the images of traditional medicine in which a neutralization of 
a swarm of single-cell attacking bacteria plays an important role. Against this, 
demagogically seen, nothing could be done—and demagogy plays an important 
role among the arts, if one suspects that behind that lies a priesthood which is 
superior to its profane doctrine. Thus, the praise of honesty is the highest thing 
that the critique has to grant. 
The Jew, however, is not the father, but rather, child of liberalism, as he can 
play no creative role, neither positively nor negatively, as far as German life is 
concerned. In order to be able to become dangerous, infectious, corrosive, it was 
necessary for him to first have a status that enabled him to be in his new figure, 
the figure of the civilized Jew. That status was created by liberalism, by the grand 
declaration of the independence of the spirit, and it likewise will be destroyed 
again by nothing but the [845] complete bankruptcy of liberalism. Any attack 
on the civilization-Jew [Zivilisationsjude] launched from the liberal sphere has 
failed, for exactly there, where it could succeed, its effect would simply be equal 
to external disinfection. And the liberal sphere reaches, as we said, much further 
than one commonly believes. Hence, it is not a coincidence that Italian Fascism 
is on good terms with the civilization-Jew, for fascism is no doubt nothing but 
the latter phase of liberalism, a simplified and abridged procedure, as it were, a 
brutal shorthand of the liberalist constitution which has become too hypocriti-
cal, too empty, and above all, too verbose. But for Germany, neither fascism nor 
bolshevism is proper; they incite, but will not satisfy, and one can expect from 
that land that it be capable of a distinct and stricter solution. 
What justifies German hope is the will to Gestalt, the beginnings—scattered 
and yet strong—of the morphological thinking which stands opposed to liberal-
ism, as water is to fire. It is a new sight of the inner Gestalt, of the character of 
the things that, still hesitating, trains in observing, and strives to penetrate into 
the depth, not through abstraction, but rather through originality. Although this 
posture, this new German posture as such, does not have to occupy itself with 
the civilization-Jew; it will encounter him with certainty in each of its steps as 
an opponent who immediately feels endangered by it—for the end of this will 
is the Gestalt of the German Reich as a power which lies on its original roots. 
Wherein the German borders lie, what German literature, German history, 
German science, German psychology really are, what the war, work, dream, and 
art mean to us—that this and much more is seen and recognized and becomes 
effective—this is the only danger which threatens the civilization-Jew. For all 
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this confirms the first German principle, which the Jew always strives to deny—
namely, the principle that there is a fatherland which is called Germany. One of 
the obvious consequences stemming from that principle is that there are Jews. 
The finest and most skillful efficacy of the civilization-Jew is seen in the uninter-
rupted proving that there is no Jew; in any serious Jewish theory one can sense 
this statement. The recognition and realization of the distinct German Gestalt 
separates visibly and clearly the Jewish Gestalt like clear und motionless water 
renders the oil visible as a distinct layer. At the moment, however, in which 
the Jew gets unmistakably seen as a distinct force obeying its distinct rules, he 
ceases to be virulent and thus dangerous to the German people. The most effec-
tive weapon against him, the master of all the masks, is to notice him. 
The civilization-Jew still sticks en masse to liberalism, to which he owes 
everything. Admittedly, his dialectic—that endless feuilleton prattle of civiliza-
tion—has become so dilute that it starts to disgust even harmless minds. As one 
of the penultimate efforts to maintain the old position, one can, with certainty, 
foretell the participation of the Jew in the legitimatalist restoration. To the same 
extent, however, in which the German will acquires sharpness and Gestalt, also 
the faintest illusion of the Jew to be German in Germany will become unrealiz-
able, and he will find himself standing before his last alternative which is, in 
Germany, either to be a Jew or not to be at all. 
Chapter Four
Karl Löwith on Sense of Humor and 
Departure from the German Masters
Karl Löwith will be dealt with here in terms of his critique of German philoso-
phy, especially Heidegger’s. Löwith’s critique unfolds as a memoir. He points 
to the relationship between mainstream German philosophy and Nazism. As a 
non-Jew of Jewish descent who fought for Germany in World War I, was severely 
wounded, and spent time in an Italian jail, and had been decorated, Löwith’s 
resentment can be understood, particularly after he had to flee Germany and 
give up his academic career in 1933.43 His critique, however, cannot be traced 
back exclusively to his resentment. It also contains accounts of how he was fas-
cinated by and attracted to German philosophy, especially Heidegger’s. 
His autobiography, My Life in Germany before and after 1933 (1986); a mono-
graph on Heidegger, Heidegger—Thinker in a Destitute Time (1960); and an 
extended essay on Carl Schmitt and Heidegger, “Der okkasionelle Dezisionis-
mus von C. Schmitt” (1984), make up an intellectual testament of German phi-
losophy before, during, and after World War II. It is an attempt to point at the 
links and parallels between Nazi ideology and politics and German philosophy 
as regards their idiomatic jargon, world-view, and ideas.44 He composed his 
autobiography, My Life in Germany before and after 1933 (1939), long before the 
greatest Nazi crimes had been committed and become known. Regarding the 
completely assimilated Jews who were part of the George circle and could never 
think of themselves as non-German, he writes:
The universal fate of both the German and the Jewish intelligentsia was mirrored in the 
destinies of the circle around George. Its members had formed an elite in German intellec-
tual life, and the Jews belonging to it had proved by their appreciation, participation and 
work that they were capable of becoming Germanized without reservation. But inspite of 
this, the Jews were neither able to escape their Jewish fate, nor could the others escape the 
assimilation of their ideas in 1933. They prepared the path of National Socialism, which 
later they themselves did not follow. (Löwith 1994: 25 / 1986: 24) 
43 Compare Löwith (1986: 13): “Ich würde heute nicht zögern, im Notfall auch militärische 
oder politische Dienste auf Seiten von Deutschlands Feinden zu leisten, weil dieses Deutsch-
land der Feind aller Menschlichkeit ist und weil es entschlossen verneint, was an unserem 
Dasein lebenswert ist. Keine Not und kein Tod der nun in dem Krieg verwickelten Deutschen 
wird mich mitleidend machen mit den Folgen eines Systems, das prinzipiell mitleidlos ist und 
ein einziger Fußtritt auf die Achtung des Menschen.” 
44 See for example his description of the George circle and the Nazi ideology (Löwith 1986: 19).
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The opposition to Arendt’s suggestion in Eichmann in Jerusalem that the 
Jews were responsible for their extermination is seen clearly in this passage, for 
“the Jews” were nothing but a product of the Nazi politics of discrimination. 
The first trait Löwith identifies in the German philosophy of his time is the 
stipulation “To understand time on the basis of time.”45 This is to say that only 
the present perspective is true. It is a call to fill empty transcendental structures 
with content. One is only obligated to the present situation, to the naked exis-
tence (faktisches Dasein) (Löwith 1960: 29) which is embodied by the Third Reich 
as the destiny of the German people.
The Germans will never be able to understand why their methods are loathed. In 1916 
there was still one philosopher, Max Scheler, who, in the midst of war, was taking pains 
to explain to the Germans the ‘origins of the hatred toward Germans,’ whereas the present 
Reich philosophers think along exactly the same lines as their leadership, because the 
philosophy of ‘life’ and ‘existence’ itself has made any philosophy of law impossible. If 
the law is merely an expedient for people, it is indeed absurd to speak of the law at all. 
(Löwith 1994: 107 / 1986: 102) 
Löwith then does not hesitate to conclude that Nazism is a particularly German 
phenomenon:
The objection of well-meaning foreigners that Hitler is not Germany is both right and 
wrong—the former if one evaluates what is German by Hitler’s own claim to embody the 
German Volk; and the latter because this Volk does not consist of Chinese but has chosen 
a Führer of its own accord, and submits for the present to a leadership that would not be 
tolerated of its kings, chancellors, emperors and leaders from Frederick the Great to Hitler, 
had been in a serious conflict with its character. (Löwith 1994: 140 / 1986: 133) 
“To understand time on the basis of time” means to set the transient as prin-
ciple, to give the temporal the status of an ontological and moral principle. It is 
a paradox which is inherent in existentialism and Lebensphilosophie. However, 
it cannot alone account for Nazism, which is founded on belief in the superiority 
of the German people, culture, and race. 
The first important event on which Löwith reports in his autobiography is 
his capture and incarceration in the Italian jail:
Despite all the suffering, my war imprisonment in Italy awakened my everlasting love for 
this country and its people. Even today, after eighteen years of fascist rule, people in Rome 
and in the tiniest village are much more human [mensch] than those in the North. They 
have the gift of an indestructable sense of personal freedom, as well as an appreciation of 
human weakness which the German is seeking to eradicate. (Löwith 1994: 8 / 1986: 8)
45 Löwith (1960: 50): “… die Zeit aus der Zeit zu verstehen…”
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In other words, the horrors of the war and of the Fascist regime did not 
necessarily lead to barbarity and cruelty as they did in Germany. The second 
important event described in his autobiography is his encounter with Martin 
Heidegger. “He became my actual tutor to whom I owe my intellectual develop-
ment” (Löwith 1994: 28 / 1986: 27). Löwith also indicates his unsuccessful efforts 
to get closer to Heidegger and his subsequent disappointment (Löwith 1986: 44, 
58). The description of his encounter with Heidegger is followed by a critical dis-
cussion of Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Löwith mocks the primary “existential” in Being and Time, resoluteness 
(Entschlossenheit)—namely, the Dasein’s resoluteness in living according to its 
most authentic possibility, which remains meaningless until it gains hold of 
reality.46 In being-resolute, the human Dasein, in light of its own finite existence 
and death, shuddered with Angst, is called on by his conscience in a moment of 
insight (Augenblick) (Heidegger 2002: §74) to choose its authentic possibility of 
being. Löwith mocks the abstraction of resoluteness from any context: “One of 
the students invented the pertinent joke: ‘I’m resolved, only toward what I don’t 
know’” (Löwith 1994: 30 / 1986: 29). The extreme possibility of being, Löwith 
goes on to explain, Heidegger identifies with the obligation “to be” in accor-
dance with one’s predetermined factual fate (Faktizität) (Löwith 1986: 31). Here, 
Löwith points to the link between abstract philosophy and concrete political 
situation—to be resolute, to choose one’s own most extreme possibility of being, 
becomes one with the vocation of the German people (not only in Heidegger but 
also in Carl Schmitt, Ibid: 30), as appears clearly in Heidegger’s Rectorial 
Address.47
The rebellion against the ‘spirit’ had its advocates in very different camps: in that of 
Klages and Baeumler, and that of Heidegger and Schmitt; and perhaps one had to live 
outside Germany to appreciate such local differences as variations on one and the same 
theme. (Löwith 1994: 33 / 1986: 32)
Löwith admits that although the similarity between Heidegger’s jargon and 
tone and Nazi propaganda is striking (Löwith 1986: 36–37), he could not foresee 
46 Heidegger (2002: 299): “In der Entschlossenheit geht es dem Dasein um sein eigenstes Sein-
können, das als geworfenes nur auf bestimmte faktische Möglichkeiten sich entwerfen kann. 
Der Entschluss entzieht sich nicht der ‘Wirklichkeit,’ sondern entdeckt erst das faktisch Mögli-
che, so zwar, dass er es dergestalt, wie es als eigenstes Seinkönnen im Man möglich ist, ergreift.” 
47 Löwith (1986: 33): “Man kann darum diese Rede weder bloß politisch noch rein philoso-
phisch beurteilen. Als politische Rede wäre sie ebenso schwach wie als philosophische Ab-
handlung. Sie versetzt Heideggers Philosophie der geschichtlichen Existenz in das deutsche 
Geschehen hinein, so dass der formale Umriss der existenziellen Kategorien einen entschei-
denden Inhalt bekam.” See also Bourdieu (1991). 
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the emergence of Nazism and Heidegger’s adherence to it from his writings and 
speeches. In his Rectorial Address, Löwith continues, Heidegger specifies the 
duties of the rector, who is the spiritual leader of both the academic staff and the 
students. But even the Führer in his turn is led by the spiritual command of his 
people. It remains unclear, Löwith explains, wherein this historical command 
consists and in what way it makes itself known. “The commander is eventually 
the ‘destiny’ which one should want” (Löwith 1986: 34).48 
Even today, Hitler’s daring decision to risk a war for the sake of Danzig serves a good 
illustration of Heidegger’s philosophical concept of ‘courage for fear’ before nothingness 
(“Mut zur Angst” vor dem Nichts)—a paradox which captures the entire German situation 
in a nutshell. (Löwith 1994: 42 / 1986: 40)
In 1936, Löwith and his wife spent time with Heidegger’s family in Rome. Hei-
degger did not remove, even for a second, the party badge from his arm. To 
Löwith’s remark that Heidegger’s support of Nazism lies at the heart of his phi-
losophy, Heidegger replies that, “His concept of ‘historicity’ (Geschichtlichkeit) 
formed the basis of his political ‘engagement’. He also left no doubt about his 
belief in Hitler” (Löwith 1994: 60 / 1986: 57). Löwith next asks Heidegger about 
his relationship to Julius Streicher. Heidegger sees a huge gap between Hitler and 
Streicher, Löwith says. And yet, Heidegger claims, one has to look at the concept, 
at the essence, and not at the particular individual. However, Löwith sums up: 
“In truth, the programme of that ‘pornography’ [i.e. Der Stürmer] was fulfilled in 
every last detail and became German reality in November 1938; and nobody can 
deny that Streicher and Hitler were in total agreement on this matter” (Löwith 
1994: 61 / 1986: 58).
Löwith hints that the motivation for writing a monograph on Heidegger, 
Heidegger—Thinker in a Destitue Time, was to distance himself from his mentor. 
“One repays a teacher poorly if one always remains only a pupil” (Löwith 1995: 33 / 
1960: 5). The outcome, however, seems to be more than a distancing. It is a 
harsh critique of Heidegger’s philosophy, his abuse of language, and Germano-
centrism. Löwith points at the emptiness of Heidegger’s arguments and his dis-
torted reading of Nietzsche. He concludes by questioning why Heidegger still 
attracts so much admiration and esteem, implying that Heidegger’s work is not 
philosophy at all.
Heidegger’s main argumentative strategy is to point to apparently necessary 
etymological links between words. Löwith shows that the links in this etymolog-
ical game do not really demonstrate any necessary relationship between words. 
These links, according to Heidegger, exist only in German and ancient Greek, 
48 My own translation. This important point by Löwith is missing in the English translation.
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which means that they are the only philosophical languages. In order to show 
the emptiness of Heidegger’s arguments, Löwith demonstrates that the links 
Heidegger attempts to forge between words are arbitrary. The following passage 
makes no sense in English—and, as Löwith tries to show, not in German either—
because it is structured around German morphology. Hence it is presented in 
German. The key words are underlined to draw attention to the morphological 
similarity. English translation of the passage is provided in the footnote.
Das Denken verbindet sich mit Danken; die ratio mit dem bloßen Rechnen und die Richtig-
keit mit bloßer Berechenbarkeit; die Geschichte mit dem Geschick und dieses mit der 
Schicklichkeit; die Entschlossenheit mit der Erschlossenheit; das “es gibt” (Sein) mit dem 
Geschenk des Sichgebens; die Liebe als “mögen” mit dem vermögen als dem eigentlichen 
“Mög-lichen,” aus dem das Sein das Denken vermag, so dass am Ende dieser Ableitungen 
das Sein als das “Vermögend-Mögende” das “Mög-liche” ist! (Heidegger 1953: 14)49 
Löwith’s critique seems to be indirectly leveled against Heidegger’s moral stan-
dards: 
If one wanted to ask Heidegger whether this makes the matter clearer, he would give us 
the answer: “No, nothing is clear; but everything is significant!” Of course neither the 
subject matter nor the word makes it clear why, for example, correctness [Richtigkeit] 
could not be brought into an essential meaning-connection with justice [Gerechtigkeit] 
rather than with reckoning [Berechnung], and why Wahrheit could not be brought into 
such a connection with the English word “truth” (= “trust”) or with “trow” (loyality 
[Treue], to trust [trauen, vertrauen], to believe) rather than with the Greek word a-letheia 
(un-concealedness) or the Old German “war”. (Löwith 1995: 41 / 1953: 15) 
We can say that the intimacy that Heidegger creates between language and 
thought does not allow any reflection or critical dealing with what is said, for 
truth is identified with language correctly understood or with understanding 
language as Heidegger does. Language thus gets the status of divine revelation 
of truth. As Löwith writes regarding Heidegger: 
49 Thinking is connected with thanking; ratio with mere calculation and correctness with 
mere calculability; history [Geschichte] with destining [Geschick] and the latter with propriety 
[Schicklichkeit]; resoluteness [Entschlossenheit] with the disclosedness [Erschlossenheit]; the 
“there is” [es gibt] (Being) with the gift of the self-giving [Sichgeben]; love as “wanting” [mögen] 
with being capable [vermögen] as that which is authentically “possible” [“Mögliches”], on the 
basis of which Being is capable of thinking, so that at the end of these derivations Being, as 
“that which is capable and which wants” [das Vermögend-Mögende] is “that which is possible” 
[das Mög-liche] As-that-which-regions [Gegnet], the region [Gegend] becomes the concealed 
essence of truth, and the thinking of the truth of Being is “releasement toward that-which-
regions” because the essence of thinking rests in the “regioning” [Vergegnis] of releasement! 
(Löwith 1995: 40–41). I corrected the German words in brackets that were in the wrong case. 
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In order to be able to satisfy fully the claim of Being, his apodictic linguistic thinking 
must in fact be an inspired language of revelation and a thinking that follows the dictate 
of Being. (Löwith 1995: 39 / 1953: 13)
Heidegger could reply to Löwith that he is purging the language of detrimen-
tal elements, as almost every philosopher before him did, in order to pave the 
way for philosophical thinking. Yet, one can still wonder about the necessary 
connection which Heidegger—like Fichte—sees between philosophy and the 
German language: that philosophy can meaningfully function only in German 
(and partly in ancient Greek). According to them, the German language becomes 
the sole valid standard of truth. 
As we have seen, Hannah Arendt conceives Heidegger’s “turn” (Kehre) as an 
expression of remorse. Löwith conceives this turn as fictitious. Usually, the turn 
refers to the shift in Heidegger’s focus from the temporal human Dasein in Being 
and Time—who mostly understands Being through the entities that he encoun-
ters in his projects—to Being as such in the latter writings. As we saw, after the 
turn, the human Dasein is reduced to be the shepherd of Being. Löwith’s main 
question to Heidegger in this respect reads: 
Indeed in the understanding of Being and of Being-in-itself an understanding Dasein is 
presupposed, but of course this presupposition does not posit the Being and the Being-
in-itself that are understood. Hence, we are thrown back on the question whether it is 
essential to Being-in-itself that an understanding and perceiving Dasein be there and be 
cleared or not. (Löwith 1995: 52 / 1953: 26)
Being-understood must imply understanding, but not the content that is sup-
posed to be understood. Does it then necessarily follow that Being-as-such must 
be understood by the human Dasein? Löwith replies: 
According to the essay “On the Question of Being,” the essence of Being, how it essences 
and presences, is already in itself the relation to the human essence and is nothing in an 
for itself, just as for the same token the human being is not a Dasein posited for itself but 
rather is founded upon its dwelling in the turning-toward and turning-away of Being [Zu- 
und Abwenden]. (Löwith 1995: 53 / 1953: 27) 
Both Heidegger’s thesis and Löwith’s critique must presuppose that “Being” has 
one meaning, that the manifold uses of “to be” have one primordial reference. 
This is doubtful. If we assume, however, that they do have one primordial refer-
ence, then Löwith’s critique is still obscure. If the understanding of the human 
Dasein is identical with Being, Löwith’s critique turns out to be empty. On the 
other hand, if they are not identical, then understanding Being does not entail 
that Being be properly understood, but it also does not entail that it be misunder-
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stood. It can also sometimes be understood and sometimes misunderstood, but 
as long as we do not have the means of distinguishing between understanding 
and not understanding in this respect, Löwith’s critique is empty. 
According to Heidegger, Being should not be understood as an entity. 
… It gets characterized as the “entirely other dimension” and as “the Other pure and 
simple.” Hence even the thinking of the Being in beings can seek “no stopping-point,” but 
instead it expends itself for the truth of Being in the sacrifice which is a “departure from 
beings”. (Löwith 1995: 67 / 1953: 40–41) 
But on the other hand, Being “confers” existence on entities. At this point, Löwith 
becomes strict with Heidegger. He asks, How is it possible that Being “confers” 
existence on entities if it is not part of the realm of entities? Likewise, how should 
our thought “help” and “rescue” Being, as Heidegger puts it? How could it “take 
care” of it and “initiate” a new destiny-of-Being if it owes its existence to the 
grace and protection of the caring Being? (Löwith 1953: 43). Heidegger would 
reply to Löwith that Being is not the source of entities, but rather its un-source—
Abgrund—abyss. It lets entities shine forth, but it does not create them. And yet, 
the distinction between letting entities shine forth and creating them cannot be 
demonstrated—Being would then turn into an entity—but rather dogmatically 
accepted as the destiny of Being.
The destiny of Being implies historical determinism, Löwith claims. For Hei-
degger, Hitler realizes that destiny of Being (as Napoleon does for Hegel) (Löwith 
1953: 45–46). Löwith wonders about Heidegger’s thesis that Being’s history is 
identical with Occidental history. Likewise, how can this history be wholly com-
prehended in one apocalyptical moment? 
The question arises: can world-history, as humans in the West from the Persian Wars up 
to the last World War have in thousand ways experienced and endured it, and have con-
templated it, reported on it, and thought it through philosophy—can world-history be rec-
ognized once again in the self-willed project of history on the basis of “Being toward the 
end,” which is always one’s own? (Löwith 1995: 74 / 1953: 48) 
One has to be resolute (entschlossen) regarding that historical moment, as Hei-
degger says. But, Löwith asks, How is one supposed to know that the real great 
historical moment has arrived, and not what Heidegger calls the vulgar (vulgär) 
one? And how can Heidegger account for falling prey to that vulgar history 
embodied by Hitler and Nazism? 
In consequence of this character, that which happens historically does not 
get misinterpreted on the basis of personal mistakes in judgement, for which the 
individual would be responsible, but instead gets misinterpreted “necessarily,” 
in consequence of a destining Being (Löwith 1995: 76–77 / 1953: 51).
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Löwith’s strategy, with respect to Heidegger, is to let him talk and entan-
gle himself in his own words and claims. Löwith believes that he has exposed 
Heidegger’s emptiness. Löwith also implicitly entertains the suspicion that Hei-
degger’s teaching is not philosophy at all (Löwith 1953: 109). He is now going to 
tackle the question of why Heidegger still enjoys so great a reputation and so 
much attention. The concluding chapter of his monograph is called “On the Criti-
cal Appraisal of Heidegger’s Influence.” Löwith carries out this evaluation by 
comparing Heidegger with Stefan George. He concludes that the German people 
have a special penchant for pathos and leadership (Führung) and dislike of sober 
skepticism, intellectual easiness, and common sense (Ibid: 109). Heidegger also 
owes his popularity to his 
Negative relationship to the rationality of “representational” (vorstellend) and “produc-
tive” (herstellend) science, which objectifies things into objects, and on the other hand his 
positive relationship to poetry, particularly to Hölderlin …. (Löwith 1995: 133 / 1953: 111) 
He also owes it, Löwith says, to the vague religious motives in his writings. 
Although Heidegger has distanced himself from religion, he appeals by means 
of his dogmatic vagueness to those who are no longer devout Christians but yet 
would like to be religious (Löwith 1953: 111).
Löwith’s weakness surfaces when he talks about the German people in 
general, thus himself approaching Heidegger and others who couple philosophy 
with German. Lastly, Löwith identifies the Germans’ greatest flaw as a lack of 
humor. For Löwith, who was born German and grew up German, fought as a 
German in World War I and was severely wounded and sat in an Italian jail, it 
was a hard blow to be stigmatized as a Jew and subsequently be forced to flee 
Germany and then Europe. When he comes to talk about sense of humor in his 
autobiography, he refers to the Jews.50
The Jews’ special gift of assimilating with others, and even understanding what counts 
against them (the best and most biting jokes about Jews have always been invented by 
Jews), is based on a self-transperancy and self-criticism that are peculiar to the Jew. Jews 
know very clearly who they are. And for that reason the German and the Jew never see eye 
to eye on this question: German Jews are always more likely to understand what is German 
than modern pseudo-Germans can grasp what is Jewish, no matter how many institutes 
for ‘Research into the Jewish question’ they may found. (Löwith 1994: 103 / 1986: 98) 
50 Compare Kracauer (2004: 24): “The Germans arise from their traditional ideology, which 
tends to discredit the notion of luck in favor of that of fate. The Germans have developed a na-
tive humor that holds wit and irony in contempt and has no place for happy-go-lucky figures. 
Theirs is an emotional humor which tries to reconcile mankind to its tragic plight and to make 
one not only laugh at the oddities of life but also realize, through that laughter, how fateful it is. 
Such dispositions were of course incompatible with the attitudes underlying the performances 
of a Buster Keaton or Harold Lloyd.” 
Chapter Five
Hannah Arendt on Banality
Hannah Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem—A Report on the Banality of Evil is 
the book that made her a popular subject of discussion since its appearance in 
1963. The book is a report on the trial of Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem. It con-
tains, however, much more than a dry report. It tells the life story of Eichmann 
before, during, and after the war, as well as his role in the annihilation of the 
European Jewries; it portrays his negotiations with representatives of the Jewish 
communities in Europe and the Zionist emissaries; it describes the alleged col-
laboration of the Jewish functionaries with the Nazis, and it refers to the court, 
the judges, the public attending the trial, and the state of Israel. The book also 
criticizes the process, the kidnapping of Eichmann, the judges’ and the prosecu-
tion’s inability to grasp the philosophical meaning behind the Holocaust, and 
the state of Israel and its institutions. The book incited furor among many Jews 
in Israel and abroad, for it accuses the Jewish functionaries of being in collabora-
tion with the Nazi, without which the annihilation of the European Jewry would 
be impossible,51 according to Arendt. Her provocative remarks on the state of 
Israel—she compares the rabbinic marital rules in Israel with the Nuremberg 
Laws (Arendt 1965: 5), and the deportation of Eichmann from Argentina resem-
bles the deportation of the Jews from Europe (Ibid: 54)—also caused a negative 
reaction. As Deborah Lipstadt writes:
In her letters from the trial, she voiced a personal disdain for Israel that bordered on 
anti-Semitism and racism. In a letter to her husband, she complained that “honest and 
clean people were at a premium.” She described to her teacher and friend Karl Jaspers 
the “peies (side curl) and caftan Jews, who make life impossible for all reasonable people 
here.” She was full of praise for the judges, but even that contained a note of German 
Jewish disdain for  Ostjuden, Eastern European Jews. The judges were “the best of 
Germany Jewry,” whereas Hausner was “a typical Galician Jew…. one of those people who 
don’t know any language.” (Since he presented his case in multiple languages, she may 
have meant that his German was not up to her standard.) He spoke “without periods or 
51 “‘There can be no doubt that without the cooperation of the victims, it would hardly have 
been possible for a few thousand people, most of whom, moreover, worked in offices, to liq-
uidate many hundreds of thousands of other people…. Over the whole way to their deaths the 
Polish Jews got to see hardly more than a handful of Germans.’ Thus R. Pendorf in the publi-
cation mentioned above. To an even greater extent this applies to those Jews who were trans-
ported to Poland to find their deaths there.” (Arendt 1965: 252)
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commas … like a diligent schoolboy who wants to show off everything he knows.… [He has 
a] ghetto mentality.” She had shown her contempt for East European émigrés and their 
concerns as early as 1944, when she denigrated the European émigré press in the United 
States for “worrying their heads off over the pettiest boundary disputes in a Europe 
thousands and thousands of miles away—such as whether Teschen belongs to Poland 
or Czechoslovakia, or Vilna to Lithuania instead of to Poland.” As Tony Judt observed, 
“No ‘Ost-Jud’ would have missed the significance of these disputes.”
However, it was Middle Eastern, often called Oriental, Jews who elicited her most acerbic 
comments. “The country’s interest in the trial has been artificially whetted. An oriental 
mob that would hang around any place where something is going on is hanging around 
in front of the courthouse.” (In another letter, she again used the term “oriental mob.” 
It was clearly not a slip.) She felt as if she were in “Istanbul or some other half-Asiatic 
country.” She showed particular contempt for the Israeli police, many of whom were of 
Middle Eastern origin. “Everything is organized by a police force that gives me the creeps, 
speaks only Hebrew and looks Arabic. Some downright brutal types among them. They 
would obey any order.” (Lipstadt 2011: 152–153)
The most outrageous, however, was her assessment that Eichmann was only 
a cog in the machine—that he was neither anti-Semitic nor sadistic, but rather 
a devout Zionist. He read “Theodor Herzl’s Der Judenstaat, the famous Zionist 
classic, which converted Eichmann promptly and forever to Zionism” (Arendt 
1965: 40). His deeds were not motivated by evil intentions, and hence Arendt 
dubs the evilness of his deeds “banal.” 
The disapproval and critique of Arendt are, however, surpassed and dimin-
ished by other declarations of admiration and support. Walter Laqueur describes 
it as the “Arendt Cult” (Laqueur 1998). Later studies showed that Arendt was 
wrong as far as her description of the events is concerned.52 A very recent book 
on Eichmann by Bettina Stangneth shows that he was by no means a desk mur-
derer, as Arendt describes him (Stangneth 2011). Joachim Schwelien, who ana-
lyzes Eichmann’s jargon of violence, writes: 
Eichmann does not suspect that exactly where he is―stubbornly or cannily-shrewdly, 
lying or covering and cloaking―trying to turn the truth of the events and of his deeds into 
its opposite, he actually lets the whole truth surface. Not that what he is saying is of impor-
tance for posterity, but how he says it, for as pure language mirrors truth in thought, in the 
jargon of violence, dark inhumanity is reflected relentlessly even where it is supposed to 
remain hidden. (Schwelien 1961: 6)
Lipstadt shows that Arendt’s use of Raoul Hilberg’s work verges on plagiarism. 
Hans Mommsen writes in the foreword to the German translation of Eichmann 
52 See Lipstadt (2011), Syrkin (1963) and Ezorsky (1963).
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in Jerusalem that despite the mistakes and flaws in her analysis and reports,53 
she manages to accurately fathom the essence of a totalitarian regime: terror, 
submissive bureaucracy, technocracy, and consolidation achieved by isolating 
a scapegoat (Mommsen 1986: 12). The question we should pose to Mommsen is, 
How could Arendt fathom the essence of totalitarianism if her historical inves-
tigation was indeed so flawed? To say general things about the nature of totali-
tarian regimes cannot tell us much about the distinctiveness of a given regime 
or its philosophy, and there was a huge difference between the four totalitarian 
powers that fought in World War II. Hence, Michael Burleigh writes: “Arendt also 
vehemently rejected notions of a separate German historical path to modernity, 
and favored a radical rupture with the course of European civilization, almost 
as if Hitler and Stalin were temporary visitors from Mars” (Berleigh 2000: 17).54 
Meticulous research, such as George Mosse’s The Crisis of German Ideology 
(1999), which leads us through the work and youth movement, the new pagan-
ism, and the development of a distinct intellectual background during the rise of 
the Third Reich, would not leave us with the impression of a leap or “rupture,” as 
Burleigh calls it. If one sees gradual development, as Mosse does, it also makes 
sense to talk about education as a means of changing detrimental dispositions. 
As Gottfried Benn provocatively puts it:
53 “Als Darstellung der blossen Abläufe, die zu Auschwitz führten, das die Gesamtheit der 
gegen Juden gerichteten Massnahmen des Völkermords symbolisiert, ist Hannah Arendts In-
terpretation lückenhaft, manchesmal nicht widerspruchsfrei und quellenkritisch nicht hin-
reichend abgesichert.” (Mommsen 1986: 11). See also Wolin (2001: 113): “As Michael Marrus 
has aptly observed, as the Eichmann polemic unfolded, ‘It became apparent how thin was the 
factual base on which [Arendt] had made her judgments.’ He concludes his assessment with 
the following sober caveat: ‘The Jewish negotiations with the Nazis… were, in retrospect, pa-
thetic efforts to snatch Jews from the ovens of Auschwitz as the Third Reich was beginning its 
death agony. Yet it should be mentioned that, however pathetic, these efforts seemed sensible 
to some reasonable men caught in a desperate situation.’” 
54 Benhabib compares Arendt’s historical attitude with Heidegger’s, Husserl’s, and Benjamin’s: 
“Let us recall that in treating tradition and the past, Arendt herself exercised two methodolo-
gies: the phenomenological methodology of Heidegger and Husserl, which sought to recover 
the ‘originary’ meaning of terms and conditions of phenomena; and a fragmentary methodol-
ogy, inspired by Walter Benjamin, according to which one treats the past by acting either as a 
collector or as a pearl diver, digging down for those treasures that lie now disjoined and dis-
connected,” (Benhabib 2000: 172–17)3. Benhabib correctly sees Arendt’s fragmentary concept 
of history in its relation to Benjamin. She is, however, far from accurate in placing Husserl and 
Heidegger in this context: both Husserl and Heidegger were completely against method insofar 
as phenomenology is concerned. It is the lack of method that brings them in the end to mysti-
cism. Furthermore, she does not see the similarity between Arendt and Heidegger in how his-
tory is seen by Heidegger, and sometimes by Arendt as well, as it is derived from the destiny of 
Being. 
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Wishes for Germany: new definitions for hero and honor. To wipe out any person who 
speaks in the course of the next hundred years of “Prussia” or “Reich.”… To educate chil-
dren from age six to sixteen—following the decision of their parents—in Switzerland, 
England, France, America, and Denmark on account of the state. (Benn 1959: 388)
Arendt does not see this need; for her there is no continuity, as we shall pres-
ently show. Eichmann, according to Arendt, was by no means a Jew-hater, either 
before or after the war. Instead it happened to him to become a cog in the Nazi 
killing machine, and then it happened to him again to become a normal person. 
The banality of evil—the ability to kill innocent people with no bad motivations 
or criminal inclinations—is the outcome of a totalitarian regime, Arendt claims. 
But what caused people to become banal evildoers and then later to stop assum-
ing this role? What impelled people to turn on this machine? Historical studies 
must talk about continuity and discontinuity of processes. Philosophy and reli-
gion can talk about leaps. Philosophy, however, must somehow refer to reality, 
especially a philosophy that is as intimately related to reality as Arendt’s. And 
yet, in dealing with Arendt, we are conducting philosophy by means of critical 
thinking rather than historical investigation, which has already demonstrated 
the flaws in Arendt’s writings. 
Hannah Arendt was sent by the New Yorker to cover the Eichmann trial. Her 
reports were later released in a volume named Eichmann in Jerusalem—A Report 
on the Banality of Evil. The keyword “evil” in the title is conspicuous in relation 
to a report from a court, and not only because it is bombastic. Courts investi-
gate criminal motivation, while evil is rather a subject of theology or philosophy. 
Arendt says that the case which the court in Jerusalem had to deal with was 
unprecedented in the course of human history. She defines her role by examin-
ing to what extent the court succeeded in adequately dealing with this case.55 
Yet allusion to theology is unusual. The peculiarity of the case required pecu-
liar attention. Hence, Arendt was outraged by the prosecutor Hausner’s opening 
address: 
For it was history that … stood in the center of the trial. “It is not an individual that is in the 
dock at this historic trial, and not the Nazi regime alone, but anti-Semitism throughout 
history.” This was the tone set by Mr. Hausner, who began his opening address … with 
Pharaoh in Egypt and Haman’s decree “to destroy, to slay, and to cause them to perish.” … 
55 “And the question of individual guilt or innocence, the act of meting out justice to both the 
defendant and the victim, are the only things at stake in a criminal court. The Eichmann trial 
was no exception, even though the court here was confronted with a crime it could not find in 
the law books and with a criminal whose like was unknown in any court, at least prior to the 
Nuremberg Trials. The present report deals with nothing but the extent to which the court in 
Jerusalem succeeded in fulfilling the demands of justice.” (Arendt 1965: 298)
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It was bad history and cheap rhetoric; worse, it was clearly at cross-purposes with putting 
Eichmann on trial, suggesting that perhaps he was only an innocent executor of some mys-
teriously foreordained destiny or … even of anti-Semitism, which perhaps was necessary 
to blaze the trail of “the-bloodstained road traveled by this people” to fulfill its destiny. 
(Arendt 1965: 19)
Hausner’s address may sound too theatrical and not entirely relevant. Yet, if 
we overlook this aspect of his speech, we see him point at the relation between 
Eichmann and the long-practiced anti-Semitism that inspired the Nazis. As the 
books by Claudia Koonz and Daniel Goldhagen show, the Nazi conscience was 
conditioned by norms and customs whose shaping can be explained by this long 
history. For example:
The recollections of a former Hitler youth member, Alfons Heck, illustrate how such 
knowledge formed moral thinking. In 1940, when Alfons watched the Gestapo take away 
his best friend, Heinz, and all Jews in his village, he did not say to himself, “How ter-
rible they are arresting Jews.” Having absorbed knowledge about the “Jewish menace,” he 
said, “What a misfortune Heinz is Jewish.” As an adult he recalled, “I accepted deporta-
tion as just.” (Koonz 2003: 5) 
Yet, this by no means suggests that Eichmann can be reduced to the executor 
of a historical plan to annihilate the Jews. But this is what Arendt sees in Haus-
ner’s address. And if it were true, she claims, Eichmann would be discharged 
from any responsibility (Arendt 1965: 297–298). Arendt, however, sees in the 
Holocaust something completely new that cannot be considered the outcome of 
traditional anti-Semitism. Arendt tries to bind her theory of innovation to the 
Nuremberg trial that the Allies conducted against the Nazis. She writes: 
However, it was by no means this sort of well-known offense that had prompted the Allies 
to declare, in the words of Churchill, that “punishment of war criminals [was] one of the 
principal war aims” but, on the contrary, reports of unheard-of atrocities, the blotting out 
of whole peoples, the “clearance” of whole regions of their native population, that is, not 
only crimes that “no conception of military necessity could sustain” but crimes that were 
in fact independent of the war and that announced a policy of systematic murder to be 
continued in time of peace. (Ibid: 257, emphasis added)
This appears overstated, because if we accept the assumption that the Jews were 
at no point part of the War, then the distinction between war and peace is irrel-
evant here. If, however, we assume that the Jews were part of the War, then again 
this assessment turns out to be meaningless. The Nazis were in a war with world 
Jewry that justified their annihilation. This assumption is also supported subse-
quently, for example, by the historian Ernst Nolte56 and the psychologist Peter 
56 See in Santner (1990: 78).
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Robert Hofstätter (1963), who claim that the annihilation of the Jews by the Nazis 
followed Chaim Weizmann’s declaration of war against Germany. 
To the question posed by Judge Landau to Eichmann as to whether he had a 
conscience, Arendt replies: 
Yes, he had a conscience, and his conscience functioned in the expected way for about 
four weeks, whereupon it began to function the other way around. (Arendt 1965: 95)
According to Arendt, Eichmann’s conscience functioned normally and then sud-
denly failed. Eichmann was not alone, but rather one of millions. Arendt says: 
Conscience as such had apparently got lost in Germany, and this to a point where people 
hardly remembered it and had ceased to realize that the surprising “new set of German 
values” was not shared by the outside world. (Ibid: 103)
Arendt does not discuss factors that may condition conscience, such as differ-
ences between races.57 In the Western part of the world, a normal man would 
have a bad conscience if he accidentally ran down a child on the street but 
hardly any remorse if he ran down only a cat or dog, or if he supported euthana-
sia. This is also true as far as human races are concerned. Rudolf Höss felt pity 
for the gentlemen who needed to carry out the dirty job of annihilating the Jews, 
but not for the murdered ones.58 Arendt must back away from this possibility in 
order to defend her theory that Eichmann could do what he did only as a small 
cog in the huge totalitarian machine. Eichmann, according to Arendt, adopted 
Kant’s moral categorical imperative, although he replaced his own will with the 
will of the Führer: 
57 See the discussion in Finkielkraut (1999: 5).
58 “Nun hatten wir das Gas und auch den Vorgang entdeckt. Mir graute immer vor den Er-
schießungen, wenn ich an die Massen, an die Frauen und Kinder dachte. Ich hatte schon 
genug von den Geiselexekutionen, von den Gruppen-Erschießungen, die vom RFSS oder RSHA 
befohlen. Nun war ich doch beruhigt, daß uns allen diese Blutbäder erspart bleiben sollten, 
daß auch die Opfer bis zum letzten Moment geschont werden konnten. Gerade dieses machte 
mir am meisten Sorge, wenn ich an die Schilderungen Eichmanns von dem Niedermähen der 
Juden mit MG und MP durch die Einsatz-Kommandos dachte. Grauenhafte Szenen sollen sich 
dabei abgespielt haben: das Weglaufen von Angeschossenen, das Töten der Verwundeten, vor 
allem der Frauen und Kinder. Die häufigen Selbstmorde in den Reihen der Einsatz-Komman-
dos, die das Im-Blut-waten nicht mehr ertragen konnten. Einige sind auch verrückt geworden. 
Die meisten Angehörigen dieser Einsatz-Kommandos haben sich mittels Alkohol über diese 
schaurige Arbeit hinweggeholfen. Nach Höfles Schilderungen haben auch die Männer der 
Globocnik’schen Vernichtungsstellen unheimliche Mengen von Alkohol verbraucht.” (Broszat 
1987: 127)
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Act as if the principle of your actions were the same as that of the legislator or of the law 
of the land—or, in Hans Frank’s formulation of “the categorical imperative in the Third 
Reich” which Eichmann might have known: “Act in such a way that the Führer, if he knew 
your action, would approve it” (Ibid: 136).
But as Marie Syrkin shows, Arendt not only evades but also distorts historical 
facts in order to defend her theory on the totalitarian machine with the little cogs 
obeying orders. 
When German defeat became imminent, Eichmann received orders to stop the deporta-
tion of Hungarian Jews to the death camps. Instead of obeying, he speeded up the trans-
ports. Hilberg, Miss Arendt’s chief source, writes of this passage, “Eichmann could not 
rest until all the Hungarian Jews were in their graves.” Miss Arendt has no difficulty in 
explaining Eichmann’s enthusiasm: “For the uncomfortable truth of the matter is that not 
Eichmann’s fanaticism but his very conscience had prompted him to adopt his uncompro-
mising attitude during the last year of the war.” Suddenly everyman, the conscientious 
cog, appears to have become a zealot: yet Miss Arendt views the uncontested evidence of 
his enterprise as further proof of his supine loyalty to Hitler; the Führer’s words are law 
and superseded all written instructions by others, be it Horthy or Himmler.
Dr. Robinson has pointed out the astonishing negligence with which Miss Arendt has 
examined the relevant documents in order to reach this conclusion. In a communication 
(quoted also by Hilberg) from Ribbentrop to Veesenmayer, the Nazi plenipotentiary in 
Hungary, the German Foreign Minister warns: “The Führer expects that the measures 
against the Budapest Jews will now be taken without any further delay by the Hungar-
ian government, with those exceptions which were allowed to the Hungarian govern-
ment by the German government.”…The exceptions involved permission for about 7000 
Jewish families to leave Hungary, apparently via Rumania (Trial Doc. T1214-par. 5.) In a 
telegraphic report that Veesenmayer sent to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin (T1215-par. 2), 
Eichmann is shown as questioning Hitler’s concession and appealing to Himmler to get a 
new decision from the Führer. Now, of this damaging report Miss Arendt writes: “When 
Himmler’s order to stop the evacuation of Hungarian Jews arrived in Budapest, Eichmann 
threatened, according to a telegram that Veesenmayer sent to Himmler, “to seek a new 
decision from the Führer.” But notice that Miss Arendt has here switched the roles of 
Hitler and Himmler. The document leaves no doubt that it is Hitler, not Himmler, who had 
given the order to stop the deportation. Consequently, Miss Arendt’s elaborate structure 
(for Eichmann, the little bureaucrat, Hitler’s word is sacred) crashes. The evidence shows 
Eichmann as seeking to contravene Hitler himself. (Syrkin 1963: 347–348)
Arendt does not refer to these factors and does not hesitate to distort historical 
facts in order to maintain her theoretical structure. According to Arendt, Eich-
mann could do what he did only as a small cog in the big totalitarian machine, 
which released him from a bad conscience. But what incited this machine to 
start working? And what brought it to a halt? Can the claim that people lost their 
consciences and then retrieved them be entirely convincing? Or rather, were 
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their consciences so conditioned that it enabled them to turn on, and then off, 
the annihilation machine? 
Arendt’s motivation, however, seems to be philosophical, not historical. She 
wants first of all to undermine Hausner’s picture, in which Eichmann embodies 
the τέλος or the acme of a long history of Jew-hatred and killing. It is necessary 
to do that, according to Arendt, because we can meaningfully put on trial only 
free agents. Hence, in her description, all of a sudden, Eichmann, along with the 
German people, lost his conscience and became a mass killer. In the same way, 
he also probably retrieved his conscience and became a normal person. Arendt 
refers to leaps in another context as well, as she is asked by Günter Gaus how she 
felt as she returned to Germany after the war: 
Whatever took place in 1933 with respect to what took place later was insignificant.… 
[With such feelings] I came [to Germany]. And today, as everything, let us simply say, has 
embarked on a stable track, the distances have become bigger than they were before, as 
they were then in that shock. (Gaus 1964)
Also Eichmann had a sudden transformation, according to Arendt: 
I heard from an acquaintance who had just returned from a trip to Germany that a certain 
feeling of guilt had seized some sections of German youth… and the fact of this guilt 
complex was for me as much of a landmark as, let us say, the landing of the first man-
bearing rocket on the moon. It became an essential point of my inner life, around which 
many thoughts crystallized. This was why I did not escape… when I knew the search com-
mando was closing in on me…. After these conversations about the guilt feeling among 
young people in Germany, which made such a deep impression on me, I felt I no longer 
had the right to disappear. (Arendt 1965: 242)
Sudden transformation sounds odd in a historical study. It also cannot serve as 
a way of portraying Eichmann as a free agent, for a member of an anti-Semitic 
society is also a free agent to the extent that he can choose to kill or not kill Jews. 
Instead, he ceases to be a free agent when he is suddenly transformed into a 
cog in a killing machine, as in Arendt’s description, and then transformed back 
into normality;59 it happens to him to become a mass murderer and then again 
59 See Wolin (2001: 98): “In the writing of history we seek to ‘understand.’ She [Arendt] thus 
characterized anti-Semitism and imperialism as ‘elements’ that, at a certain point, ultimately 
‘crystallized’ in modern totalitarian practice. Yet what it was that catalyzed this mysterious 
process of ‘crystallization’ remained murky in her account.” As George Kateb accurately points 
out, writing on Arendt’s concept of “Freedom,” Arendt’s notion of a principle “comes to one 
from outside and inspires ‘from without.’” Quoted in Kalyvas (2004: 325). De Vila claims that 
Arendt’s alternative to authoritarian submission to the metaphysical first principle of action is 
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become a normal man. An alternative example is Voegelin (1999), who calls on 
the Germans to come to terms with the present instead of the past; “Vergangen-
heitsbewältigung” (“coming to terms with the past”) is a term used in Germany 
to deal with their Nazi past as if, according to Voegelin, it did not continue into 
the present, as if there were no continuity between what happened before the 
war and what happened after it, or as if the Nazi past were not a chapter in 
German history. Arendt, however, must introduce rupture and discontinuity in 
her theory in order to maintain its well-roundedness and to present the Holo-
caust as something completely new. The Holocaust, according to Arendt, was 
not a cumulative outcome of a long history of Jew-hatred, but rather something 
completely unanticipated.
It was when the Nazi regime declared that the German people not only were unwilling to 
have the Jews in Germany but wish to make the entire Jewish people disappear from the 
face of the earth that the new crime, namely the crime against humanity—in the sense 
of crime “against the human status,” or against the very nature of mankind—appeared. 
Expulsion and genocide, though both are international offenses, must remain distinct; 
the former is an offense against fellow-nations, whereas the latter is an attack upon 
human diversity as such, that is, upon a characteristic of the “human status” without 
which, the very words “mankind” and “humanity” would be devoid of meaning. (Arendt 
1965: 267–268)
It was completely new in the sense that, for the first time in human history, 
an attempt had been made to eradicate an entire race from the earth. It means 
that the Jewish genocide was not a crime committed against the Jewish people, 
but rather against humanity as such (Ibid: 255). Eichmann is then, according to 
Arendt, hostis humani generis and not hostis Judaeorum (Ibid: 260).
Arendt’s use of the term “crime against humanity” deviates from its use when 
it was devised in the Nuremberg Trials. Crimes against humanity, according to 
her, are committed against the “human status.” This was something completely 
novel, Arendt argues, and hence we should not conceive the annihilation of 
European Jewry as part of a long history of Jew-hatred and killing. Arendt writes:
It was a crime against humanity, perpetrated upon the body of the Jewish people, and 
that only the choice of victims, not the nature of the crime, could be derived from the long 
history of Jew-hatred and anti-Semitism. (Ibid: 269)
action out of nothingness or abyss. This is indeed Heideggerian teaching, and Arendt herself 
uses it to excuse Heidegger’s support of German Nazism, as we have seen. Villa, however, does 
not examine the alternative to submission to metaphysical principle; that is, submission to an 
authoritarian system as one can no longer rely on himself and his will and on moral principles. 
(Villa 1996: 117)
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Now, this claim reflects not historical truth, but Arendt’s philosophical 
scheme. Because we cannot separate the Holocaust from anti-Semitism—the 
Final Solution invented to solve the Jewish Problem—likewise we cannot claim, 
as Arendt does, that the Germans and the Jews are inessential to this story. It 
was the Jewish Problem that called up the Final Solution and the introduction 
of a more efficient means to carry it out (Zyklon B instead of shooting and gas 
wagons), and not vice versa. In other words, it could also be anti-Semitism com-
bined with technological capabilities—after all, men control the machines and 
not the other way around—which led to the annihilation of European Jewry. The 
Holocaust is in many respects peculiar, but this does not entail that the choice of 
victims was inessential, as Arendt claims. Eichmann’s report to Himmler from 
1944 in which he describes the success of his undertaking leaves no doubt: “I will 
jump into my grave laughing because the fact that I have the death of five million 
Jews on my conscience gives me extraordinary satisfaction” (Syrkin 1963: 347). 
The introduction of the term “crime against humanity” does not by any means 
point to the birth of a new reality, as Arendt claims. It can also be a new for-
mulation referring to an old reality that now draws attention or appears differ-
ently than before because of its new dimension (mass killing), consequences, 
and outcome of a conflict. Robinson shows how Arendt relied on the juridical 
processes in the Nuremberg Trials in order to corroborate her thesis about the 
novelty of the Holocaust, and to how great an extent she misunderstood it and 
misused the terms used in the Nuremberg Trials (Robinson 1965: 69). He writes:
Certainly the destruction of European Jewry was unique in its continental scope, in its 
psychological pressures, in its technical methods, in its masses of active perpetrators 
(members of one of the most educated peoples of the world), in its involvement of the 
three pillars of the Nazi regime (State, Army, Party), in its connection with pseudoscien-
tific racial theories in general and Judaistic pseudoscience in particular, and in its abso-
lute (six millions) and relative (the high percentage of the victims in relation to European 
Jewry―namely, two-thirds―and to world Jewry―namely, one-third) figures of victims. It 
was also unique in the revulsion of the non-Nazi world, in the universal realization of its 
inherent criminal character under existing law and the responsibility of individuals for 
these crimes, and in the determination of the world community to take measures for the 
prevention of its repetition by affirmation of the Nuremberg Principles, by adoption of the 
Genocide Convention, and by outlawing war in the United Nations Charter. But could it 
be really claimed―as Miss Arendt does―that history knows of no previous cases at all of 
genocide, and genocide of the Jews in particular? (Ibid: 71–72)
Like Heidegger in Being and Time but also like other 20th-century thinkers, 
such as José Ortega y Gasset, who was also influenced by Heidegger, Arendt 
talks about the mass-man who lives without distinction from others and with 
no ability to think and judge authentically. His existence is reduced to the con-
sumption and selling of goods (Arendt 1945–1946a: 656). 
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What we have called the “bourgeois” [Spießer] is the modern man of the masses [Massen-
mensch], not in his exalted moments of collective excitement, but in the security (today 
one should say the insecurity) of his own private domain (Baehr 2000: 153–154 / Arendt 
1945–1946b: 342–343).60
Against this background of the mass-person, and not of anti-Semitism, is where 
Arendt wants to see Eichmann. Hence she writes:
The mob man, however, the end-result of the “bourgeois,” is an international phenom-
enon; and we would do well not to submit him to too many temptations in the blind faith 
that only German mob man is capable of such frightful deeds. (Baehr 2000: 153 / Arendt 
1945–1946b: 342) 
Her last statement on Eichmann reads:
In the face of death, he had found the cliché used in funeral oratory. Under the gallows, 
his memory played him the last trick; he was “elated” and he forgot that this was his own 
funeral. It was as though in those last minutes, he was summing up the lesson that this 
long course in human wickedness had taught us—the lesson of the fearsome, word-and-
thought-defying banality of evil. (Arendt 1965: 252)
Is the “banality of evil” the lesson we learn from Eichmann’s case, or is it what 
we learn from Arendt’s theory of the mob and the Spießer? The Spießer, Arendt 
claims, is an international phenomenon of banality, of being part of a huge 
machine and acting without intention. Eichmann, as Arendt portrays him, is a 
typical example of this machine. The problem with this theory is that Arendt 
needs to brush aside too many facts in order to maintain it. And then, what 
about the people who sacrificed their lives in order to save Jews? Were they also 
banal—the Danes and the Bulgarians and many others? Why not talk about the 
banality of the sacrifice or the banality of non-collaboration with the Nazis, or 
the banality of being a mensch? A wiser alternative would be to demonstrate that 
neither “evil” nor “good” is banal, or at least not in every case. 
60 Canovan (1978) explores the discrepancy between the two central attitudes in Arendt’s 
work—democracy on the one hand and elitism and snobbism on the other. 
Chapter Six
Hans-Georg Gadamer on the 
Phenomenological Disinfection of Language
Hans-Georg Gadamer is Heidegger’s most renowned disciple in Germany.61 In 
one respect, he is always seen as Heidegger’s successor. Conversely, he is also 
seen as the one who returned humanism to philosophical discussion and thus 
revolted against Heidegger, who as we have seen banned humanism as the off-
spring of a degraded metaphysical concept of the human being. Gadamer pin-
points the loss of humanism in the Enlightenment, when the natural sciences 
became the sole legitimate procedure for attaining truth, while the humanities 
lost any claim on truth. Φρόνησις (prudence, circumspection) and τέχνη (skill) 
completely lost their claim on truth and their role in attaining reliable knowl-
edge, Gadamer claims. The accuracy of natural sciences became the only valid 
criterion for truth. Hence the humanities fell to a very low level on the scale of 
knowledge and truth. The humanities continued to live by adopting the quanti-
fying and abstracting methods of the natural sciences in which the distinctive-
ness of the individual is lost, Gadamer says. This also occurred in hermeneutics, 
the procedure which is supposed to open our horizons to others and to distant 
peoples whose culture and language are not immediately accessible to us. This 
problem lies in applying method, which means quantifying the particular his-
torical existence of the human being and leveling it according to the standard 
of the natural sciences. The counter-attitude would be to restore the important 
position of φρόνησις and τέχνη as legitimate procedures for attaining knowledge 
and truth. Hence, education or personal cultivation (Bildung) and the develop-
ment of common sense become important. The rehabilitation and reconstruc-
tion of taste and common sense by means of education implies, according to 
Gadamer, the destruction of the “Cartesian” ambition to trace our historical 
existence back to an unhistorical point of view (Hegel, Schleiermacher, Dilthey, 
Droysen, Ranke) or to submit our historical situation to inductive procedures 
(Hume, Mill, Helmholtz).62
The question is whether Gadamer addresses the problem of Nazism when 
he writes on education and cultivation. Gadamer begins the restoration of pru-
dence and common sense by describing our experience of art. This experience 
61 On Gadamer’s relationship to Nazism see Orozco (1995), Wolin (2004: 89–128).
62 For a concise summary see: Gadamer (2001). 
Hans-Georg Gadamer on the Phenomenological Disinfection of Language   67
is not methodic and systematic, for it cannot be abstracted and subsumed under 
a general scheme. Education, tact, and taste condition our experience of art and 
enable our access to it.
Because φρόνησις is also the way we initially understand and interpret our 
own lives and existence, Gadamer’s choice of art turns out to be his strategy 
for exposing the most basic understanding of the human being. Hermeneutics, 
then, is no longer a method of interpreting, but rather our most basic way of exis-
tence, of behaving toward our own existence. In describing the ways in which 
the human being interprets and relates to his existence, Gadamer relies more 
than anything else on terms taken from Husserl’s phenomenology. These phe-
nomenological terms provide Gadamer with a better alternative than the quan-
tifying method for describing the ways in which the human being understands 
and interprets his finite existence. 
Phenomenology attracts Gadamer because it inhibits or brackets reality 
and thus enables us to become aware of detrimental uses of language which 
might lead to disastrous consequences. Gadamer’s hermeneutics has received 
due attention. The decisive role that phenomenology plays in his philosophy, 
however, is almost completely overlooked.63
Gadamer claims that the basic motive of Husserl’s phenomenology is a moral 
one—that is, how to become a real philosopher or an unbiased thinker, which 
is to achieve full responsibility for one’s deeds and statements by supplying 
full justifications (Gadamer 1972: 194). Gadamer seems to agree with this moral 
ideal. He believes, however, that this process should be completed in accordance 
with his concept of common sense (Ibid: 201).
For Gadamer, temporal finitude entails limited historical perspectives that 
are, in principle, relative and always liable to change with the change of history. 
Hence, he never seriously examines the possibility of non-relative perspectives. 
He never really asks why finite existence must imply a relative perspective at all. 
According to him, finite existence means dependency on traditional and cul-
tural norms of interpreting and understanding reality. These perspectives are 
imposed on man; he did not choose them and can never entirely shed them. 
Contrary to rational philosophy, which identifies tradition with prejudices and 
unchecked presumptions and hence sees in it an obstacle to achieving the truth, 
Gadamer conceives tradition positively as the most basic mode of truth, bound 
up with the most basic fact of our finitude. Finitude implies perspectivism, 
which in turn implies submission to tradition and authority, which Gadamer 
calls us to obey. 
63 See Segev (2007), Sokolowsky (1997), and Theunissen (2001). 
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Phenomenology inhibits or brackets reality in order to avoid falling prey 
to prejudice and unchecked presumptions and in order to turn attention to the 
acts that constitute meaning. Gadamer gives a hermeneutical twist to this phe-
nomenological procedure. Recognizing that my perspectives are limited, I allow 
new and different perspectives to enter my horizon, to both change and enhance 
it. The result is what Gadamer calls “fusion of horizons” (Horizontverschmel-
zung), which enables us to abandon detrimental perspectives and adopt others. 
This procedure is not as radical as Husserl’s phenomenological ἐποχή because 
it does not do away with reality as a whole, for we can never entirely cast off 
our historical situation with all its prejudices, but only a part of it. The fusion 
of horizons along with the adoption of fruitful presuppositions and dismissal 
of unfruitful ones takes place in what Gadamer calls “experience” (Erfahrung). 
This is Gadamer’s version of the phenomenological ἐποχή; the prejudices regard-
ing reality are not inhibited all at once, but part by part. Experience is the basic 
structure of our understanding. Gadamer borrowed “experience” from Hegel’s 
Phenomenology of Spirit. However, he stresses, contrary to Hegel, that experi-
ence does not lead to absolute transparency, but to further experience, and so 
on. Hence, understanding is never fully achieved.
Conducting meaningful dialogue, Gadamer claims, illustrates how the 
fusion of horizons is achieved. The goal and the criterion of the dialogue is the 
thing-itself (die Sache selbst), Gadamer stresses, and not the victory of one per-
spective over another. Convictions and prejudices are made legitimate or dis-
carded according to their agreement or achieved consensus (Verständigung or 
Einverständnis) with the thing-itself. Gadamer emphasizes time and again that 
this consensus is neither about my convictions and opinions nor about yours. Nor 
is it by any means a representation of traditional conservatism. The consensus is 
rather about the thing-itself; that is, about ideal meaning, which, though being 
constituted in the flux of tradition, is still beyond the tradition and therefore 
cannot be “distorted” by it. 
One may ask whether the thing-itself destroys historical perspectives or, 
conversely, is destroyed by them. We cannot exclude the possibility of eternal 
essences which appear in the temporal flux or are constituted in it, as Husserl 
argues. Yet we have seen that, according to Gadamer, we submit first of all to the 
authority of tradition. We now may ask Gadamer, What guarantees that in con-
ducting dialogue, we do not yield to the more eloquent, authoritative, superior, 
or elderly interlocutor? By what means is recognition of the thing-itself—which 
according to Gadamer is supposed to be the outcome of the dialogue—effective 
in preventing submission and yielding to authority? If it is something that we 
must accept as valid, as we would a geometric shape or mathematical sentence, 
then there is no point in conducting dialogue; and if it is not, then we are always 
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prone to falling prey to authority or giving up our perspective out of fear or inter-
est. This was the concern of Jürgen Habermas, who suggested psychoanalysis 
to overcome biased perspectives and enable fair dialogue. The problem is, as 
Georgia Warnke claims (Warnke 1987: 115), that false ideology does not lie simply 
in the debris of prejudices and unjustified convictions, but that it is rather sunk 
deeper in a silt of “polluted” language (Habermas 1970: 99). Habermas’s concern 
is real but his alternative is not convincing, for psychoanalysis enforced by the 
doctor over the patient may not always lead to release from biased perspectives. 
In principle, it can lead to the opposite. Gadamer can reply to Habermas that the 
phenomenological hermeneutics which he utilizes is still much more radical and 
effective than psychoanalysis for checking prejudices. 
Gadamer himself expresses concerns about the threat of historical relativism, 
of the loss of personal and national responsibility, and consequently of irratio-
nal yielding to historical fate. Gadamer puts it provocatively: some people might 
suggest, having in mind the atrocities perpetrated in World War II, that the great 
philosophy of Germany (from Leibniz to Hegel) had become the fetish of the spirit, 
an escape from the demands and needs of social reality into irrationality (Gadamer 
1967: 21–22). He also mentions the Lubbe Case of 1933 and its consequences as an 
example of the wrong and unchecked use and application of juridical language 
(Gadamer 1993: 74).
Contrary to Habermas, who is worried about an unchecked and submissive 
attitude toward tradition and authority, Richard Rorty praises Gadamer for over-
coming the traditional view of truth as the mirror of nature and for replacing it 
with the fusion of horizons. Rorty, however, is not entirely correct in assessing 
Gadamer, for Gadamer does not reject truth in the sense of mirroring, as emerges 
from his long discussion of the portrait and the photo in Truth and Method 
(Gadamer 1990: 139). Following Husserl’s phenomenology, Gadamer thinks that 
mirroring and correspondence are founded on and secondary to a more original 
experience of truth in our act of constituting and intending meaning, as we shall 
later see. 
Both Habermas and Rorty overlook the phenomenological procedure that 
Gadamer uses in dealing with the process of understanding. This process can 
never achieve full transparency because we are situated in a historical situa-
tion. If they had been aware of the phenomenological background of Gadamer’s 
procedure, their assessment of Gadamer would have been completely different. 
Gadamer begins his treatment of our historical conception by criticizing 
what he holds to be the false conception of our historical existence. The flaw 
in this conception of history, Gadamer says, lies in treating history as if it could 
be conceived and dealt with as a subject of natural science; that is, as if we 
could remain indifferent to and untouched by it, free from our traditional preju-
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dices and perspectives that characterize our finite existence. Gadamer rejects 
the application of Cartesian method and principles to history and humanities 
(Gadamer 2001: 10). According to Gadamer in Truth and Method and The Problem 
of Historical Consciousness, when applied to history the “Cartesian ideal” has 
two main harmful consequences. First, it is the determination to trace history 
back to one ahistorical principle or scheme. This ambition is related first to 
Hegel64 and then to Dilthey, Droysen (Ibid: 20), Ranke (Gadamer 1990: 207), and 
Schleiermacher (Gadamer 2001: 25). It leads us to ignore our historical situation, 
which is made up of incessant interplay between the known and the unknown, 
of endless encounters with the new and reformulations of the old. Second, it 
leads to inductive generalization, as in Hume, Mill, and Helmholz. This attitude 
is wrong, according to Gadamer, because it irons out any distinctiveness (Beson-
derheit) and uniqueness (Einzigartigkeit) by subsuming it under general laws 
that are already present (Ibid: 12).
As previously stated, Gadamer calls our encounter with the distinctiveness 
and uniqueness of our historical existence “experience” (Erfahrung). Experience 
means encounter our historically confined context through confrontation with 
new and foreign perspectives, thus resulting in a new and fresh reformulation 
of our historical perspectives on the thing-itself. Such an encounter imports 
and incorporates new and productive insights into our world-view and lets us 
rid ourselves of false and unproductive assumptions. This experience can take 
place only in the manner of a fair dialogue; that is, only if we let foreign or other 
perspectives appear valid and appear to have something new to tell us can we 
bring about productive reformulation and enrichment of our historical context.65
The “other” can only be a human expression—be it text, tradition, gesture, 
work of art, etc. Hence the “other” must be acknowledged as non-instrumen-
tal (we should let it stand as valid, as true), but it is still a phenomenological 
means. In encountering new perspectives, Gadamer claims, we can get rid of 
our unproductive and false perspectives that shadow the thing-itself. It is not 
the truth of my or your private matter that we strive to achieve an understanding 
of, but instead the thing-itself, Gadamer claims. The precondition for successful 
encounters with the “other” and through it with my own historical existence is 
64 “Aber bedeutet die geschichtliche Seinsweise unseres Bewußtseins nicht eine unüber-
windliche Grenze? Hegel löste das Problem durch die Aufhebung der Geschichte im absoluten 
Wissen.” (Gadamer 2001: 18) 
65 “Nur an anderen lernen wir uns selbst wahrhaft kennen. Darin liegt nun, dass geschicht-
liche Erkenntnis nicht notwendig zur Auflösung der Tradition führen muss, in der wir stehen. 
Sie kann sie auch bereichern, verändern, bestätigen, kurz, zur eigenen Identitätsfindung bei-
tragen.” (Ibid: 4)
Hans-Georg Gadamer on the Phenomenological Disinfection of Language   71
that we let the opposite opinion or perspective appear valid and true and even 
turn out to supersede our own.66 
The question is whether the dynamic of conducting dialogue and exchang-
ing opinions alone is sufficient to guard against immoral and dangerous conse-
quences. Can the thing-itself serve as a moral guarantee? Is there any contradic-
tion in claiming along with Gadamer that the Wannsee Conference took place as 
a fair dialogue and the Final Solution was the essence, the thing-itself, which 
was crystallized by means of the fair dialogue at that conference?
Because we are historically situated and conditioned, Gadamer claims, the 
process of understanding must always start with certain prejudices and axioms. 
As we come to understand and interpret something, we project some general 
meaning onto it that we bring with us. Hence the process of understanding is a 
circular one, but it is not a vicious circle; we interpret in light of the meaning-
ful whole that we projected beforehand, Gadamer says. The particulars of the 
text are understood in light of the projected whole (Vollkomenheit), but in turn, 
they always reveal something new. They compel us, therefore, to reformulate 
and refine the projected whole. Gadamer calls this process “the hermeneutical 
circle.” It is the phenomenological procedure of inhibiting and bracketing (sus-
pendieren, Einklammerung) (Ibid: 52) our prejudices and axioms and clearing 
(Bereinigung) (Ibid: 49) our sight in order to be able to direct it to the thing-itself. 
As we can see, Gadamer describes understanding in a manner akin to Husserl’s 
phenomenology. He continues in this direction. At this point, he turns to the 
experience of art. He justifies this step in the following passage: 
So even Husserl’s perceptive remark that in the realm of the aesthetic, the eidetic reduc-
tion is spontaneously fulfilled insofar as the “position” or positing of actuality is sus-
pended, only represents half the story. Here Husserl speaks of “neutrality modification.” 
If I now point to the window and say, “Look at the house over there,” then anyone who 
follows my directions will see the house over there as the fulfillment of what I said, simply 
by looking in the right direction. On the other hand, if a poet describes a house in his 
66 “Jede Begegnung mit dem anderen bedeutet daher ‘Aussetzung’ der eigenen Vorurteile, ob 
es sich dabei um einen anderen Menschen handelt, an dem man sich kennen und begrenzen 
lernt, oder um die Begegnung mit einem Werk der Kunst (‘Da is keine Stelle, die dich nicht 
sieht. Du musst dein Leben ändern’) oder mit einem Text: es ist immer noch etwas mehr ver-
langt, als das andere zu ‘verstehen,’ das heißt, als die immanente Kohärenz zu suchen und 
anzuerkennen, die in dem Anspruch des Anderen liegt. Es handelt sich nicht nur darum, dass 
man den anderen ‘versteht’―es liegt immer auch eine weitergehende Zumutung darin. Wie 
eine unendliche Idee ist darin eine ‘transzendente’ Kohärenzforderung impliziert, die im Ideal 
der Wahrheit liegt. Man sucht das Richtige: das gilt für den interpretierten Autor so gut wie für 
den Interpreten. Das aber verlangt, dem anderen potentiell recht zu geben, ihn oder es gegen 
mich gelten zu lassen.” Ibid: 5.
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own words or evokes the idea of a house, we do not look in the direction of any particular 
house, but each of us constructs his own image of a house in such a way that it stands 
there for him as “the house.” In all of this, an eidetic reduction is at work insofar as the 
house is a universal that is given through his words as a spontaneous “intentional ful-
fillment.” The word is true in the sense that it discloses, producing this self-fulfillment. 
The poetic word suspends the positive and the posited [das Gesetzte] as that which might 
serve to verify whether our statement corresponds with what lies outside it. 
The realization that occurs by means of the word eliminates any comparison with what-
ever else might be present and raises what is said above the particularity of what is usually 
called “reality.” It is quite incontestable that we do not look beyond the word to the world 
of confirmation. On the contrary, we construct the world of the poem from within the 
poem itself. (Gadamer 1998: 112 / 1993: 76–77) 
Gadamer’s example of this phenomenological procedure is the staircase on 
which Smerdyakov fell in Dostoyevsky’s The Brothers Karamazov (Gadamer 
1993: 75 and Gadamer 1979: 35–36). Whoever reads the book, Gadamer says, 
“creates in his mind” the same staircase. It would be futile to look for verifica-
tion either in reality, namely, to ask whether this staircase really corresponds 
to some real staircase, or to consider whether the same staircase exists in the 
minds of different readers and the author. The poetic word does not need verifi-
cation in reality. It brings forth the meaning without any reference to reality; it is 
autonomous (Gadamer 1977: 75). Because we can intend the very same meaning 
without leading it back either to some objective qualities or texture or to a spe-
cific psychological condition, we can translate and enjoy reading the novel in 
other languages, Gadamer argues (Ibid: 76).
This claim is not unambiguous. It is clear that reading and understanding 
The Brothers Karamazov presupposes, in addition to the ability to read and com-
prehend, a particular background. Hence, readers from a culture that does not 
use staircases in its architecture (a community of Bedouins living in the desert, 
for example) probably could not understand the meaning of Smerdyakov’s 
falling down the staircase as we do. Furthermore, it is not clear whether the so-
called “eidetic variation” would work with every type of art, for example, with 
political art, social realism, hermetic poetry, etc. 
Gadamer expands the scope of his phenomenological research by introduc-
ing three modes of using language: 
Pledge (Zusage): 
Now it is not only the poetic word that is “autonomous” in the sense that we subordinate 
ourselves to it and concentrate all our efforts upon it “as a text.” I think there are two other 
such kinds of text. Clearly, the religious text is one of these. What is the meaning of the 
Lutheran translation mentioned earlier: “It stands written?” In Luther’s usage, this often 
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applies to a particular kind of speech that I should like to call “pledge.” We can always 
call upon something that has been pledged—as in the case of a promise that someone has 
made to us. (Gadamer 1998: 109 / 1977: 74) 
Proclamation (Ansage):
Another privileged form of text that may be found in the modern state seems to me to be 
the legal text. The law is in a sense binding by virtue of its being written down, and it has 
a specific character of its own. I should like to call this kind of saying a “proclamation”. 
(Gadamer 1998: 109 / 1977: 74) 
Statement (Aussage):
These two forms of saying, the pledge and the proclamation, should serve as a backdrop 
for our discussion of the poetic text, which correspondingly I should like to call “state-
ment.”
It is a saying that says so completely what it is that we do not need to add anything beyond 
what is said in order to accept it in its reality as language. The word of the poet is autono-
mous in the sense that it is self-fulfilling. (Gadamer 1998: 110 / 1993: 74–75) 
Gadamer mentions the Lubbe Case of 1933 and its consequences as an example 
of the wrong and unchecked use and application of juridical language (Gadamer 
1993: 74). This remark is odd, for under Nazi rule, as we saw in our discussion of 
Carl Schmitt, the law could be changed according to momentary need. Gadamer 
could say instead that phenomenological analysis as he conducted it could avoid 
unchecked uses of language that led to many catastrophes, including the execu-
tion of Marinus van der Lubbe. He would, however, need to explain how people 
such as Heidegger and himself who, despite mastering the phenomenological 
method, still supported Nazism. 
Gadamer now focuses on the acts that constitute meaning (the thing-itself) 
while dealing with the experience of art. At this stage, Gadamer introduces 
the suspension of physical-temporal reality. On the way to this goal, Gadamer 
destroys what he holds to be two false attitudes toward the experience of art. The 
first attitude, Gadamer claims, severs it from its historical context and leads it 
back to the subject, namely, either the artist or the perceiver (Kant and Schiller) 
(Gadamer 1990: 87). In this attitude, the meaning of the work of art is explained 
as stemming from either the artist or the perceiver. The second attitude traces 
the meaning of the experience of art to the object—to the material components 
that make up the original object or text (Ibid: 91). Gadamer classifies these two 
attitudes under the rubric “aesthetic difference” (ästhetische Unterscheidung). 
This “aesthetic difference” presupposes a perceiver and object detached from 
historical and traditional context as well as from one another. Both attitudes 
fail to explain the identity (and not “continuity,” as Gadamer puts it inaptly in 
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Truth and Method67) of an artwork as the same work of art in innumerable perfor-
mances, duplicates, recordings, perspectives, etc. 
Gadamer believes he solves the problem of identity by bringing together his 
theory of application (Anwenden), φρόνησις, and phenomenology. He brings 
them together by working out the components that make up a “game” (Spiel). 
Gadamer claims that the “practical” side of a game consists in its application 
and how it is played. The playing of a particular game requires a human subject, 
an object such as a ball or cards, and finally an allotted space and time in which 
the game takes place. But the essence of the game, Gadamer emphasizes, is 
neither the playing subject who loses his mundane identity within the game, 
nor the game as a complex paradigm of rules, nor the object that the players 
use throughout the game (Ibid: 108). On the contrary, their existence consists 
in abruptly ceasing to be static components and turning into an element in 
the actual dynamic of the game. This sudden turn in the dynamic of the game 
Gadamer calls “transformation into arrangement” (Verwandlung ins Gebilde) 
(Ibid: 116). By “transformation” Gadamer means that no gradual change takes 
place on an unchangeable substrate, but rather a sudden rupture which causes 
reality as we know it from daily life to vanish and turn into a completely different 
arrangement. The game has a “medial sense” (i.e. the middle voice), as Gadamer 
emphasizes: 
Hence the mode of being of play is not such that, for the game to be played, there must 
be a subject who is behaving playfully. Rather, the primordial sense of playing is the 
medial one. Thus we say that something is “playing” (spielt) somewhere or at some time, 
that something is going on (im Spiele ist) or that something is happening (sich abspielt). 
(Gadamer 2006: 105 / 1990: 109)
There is neither a passive subject and an active object nor an active subject and 
a passive object, but rather an all-encompassing “happening.” Gadamer con-
tends that the game enables him to look into the emergence of meaning as such, 
without the need of tracing it back either to the consciousness of the subject or to 
the materiality of the object. “We are inquiring into the mode of being of play as 
such,” Gadamer argues (Gadamer 2006: 103 / 1990: 108). 
This suggests a general characteristic of the nature of play that is reflected in playing: 
all playing is a being-played. The attraction of a game, the fascination it exerts, consists 
precisely in the fact that the game masters the players. Even in the case of games in which 
one tries to perform tasks that one has set oneself, there is a risk that they will not “work,” 
“succeed,” or “succeed again,” which is the attraction of the game. Whoever “tries” is in 
fact the one who is tried. The real subject of the game (this is shown in precisely those 
67 See Gadamer (1990: 138).
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experiences in which there is only a single player) is not the player but instead the game 
itself. What holds the player in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there is the 
game itself. (Gadamer 2006: 106 / 1990: 112) 
In order to account for the identity of the game—which can be explained neither 
by referring to the player nor by referring to the rules or the object (ball, cards, 
etc.)—Gadamer introduces another component which he borrows from Husserl’s 
Lectures on the Phenomenology of Inner Time-Consciousness (Husserl 2000: 486–
490): meaningful arrangement (Gebilde). The arrangement is something that 
comes to stand in the endless disarranged stream of temporal consciousness. 
The arrangement constitutes itself in this temporal stream. It achieves autono-
mous status to which everyone has access, exactly as in the case of the math-
ematical sentence 2×2=4. It is similar to the ἔργον, Gadamer says, the completed 
piece of work that lies beyond the process in which power (δύναμις) turns into 
its realization (ἐνέργεια) (Gadamer 1990: 116). As free agents, Gadamer explains, 
we have the ability to conjure something up, to put something forth, to present 
it to ourselves free from determining causal order. We can likewise act without 
purpose of gain, profit, or advantage (zweckfrei) (Gadamer 1979: 30). This ability 
makes the game possible. We set tasks and goals whose achievement constitutes 
the dynamic of the game. In this manner, Gadamer says, we constitute the iden-
tical and repeatable meaning of the game. 
Gadamer’s term for the act of intentionally relating to these goals and tasks 
and of constituting the game as meaningful is “displaying” (Darstellen). We 
intentionally determine meaning by displaying something. This display consti-
tutes the meaning of the game and shifts the attention of the players and the 
perceivers to the meaning of what is being played and performed. This causes 
the player and the perceiver to share and to be led by the same meaning. In per-
forming Oedipus Rex, for example, the performer intends to display the meaning 
of the play and cause the perceiver to direct his attention to the meaning rather 
than to the performer’s individual personality and technical abilities, Gadamer 
says.
Gadamer now goes on to explain how the meaning, the Gebilde, is consti-
tuted and intended. To this end, Gadamer uses the game and the display, in 
which a dynamic amalgam of all the components is established. What is left 
after all components have been swallowed up in the dynamic of the game as it is 
being played (das Gespielte) (Gadamer 1990: 117) is pure meaning. 
The problem with this thesis is that this unity is fully realized only in bac-
chanalian feasts. It is true that when we concentrate on a musical performance 
or on reading a book, we are detached, to a certain extent, from our daily exis-
tence. But it is also true that a good craftsman is detached from daily distrac-
tions while he is working, as Gadamer himself seems to recognize (Ibid: 129). 
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Thus when we are focused on one thing, we are paying little attention to any-
thing else. And still, both the subjective elements and the objective ones (the 
material) are indispensible in judging the merit of the work: Did the artist create 
his piece with inspiration? Did the audience correctly understand him? Did the 
artist choose the right material?
In the experience of art, the daily routine and flow of time are suspended 
and we become concentrated on one long temporal stretch which, for Gadamer, 
is the phenomenological time experience.68 This is the time experience of a 
festival when we do not count the minutes and are not worried about a task to 
be performed in the future. We are simply there, totally immersed in one long-
spanning present (Ibid: 128).69 In this experience of time, we gain access to the 
thing-itself. Gadamer thinks that by means of this last phenomenological reduc-
tion, he regains the identity of meaning that has been lost in the hectic daily life 
as well as in wrong philosophical attitudes. 
We have been following Gadamer in his long journey, for he promised us 
rehabilitation of humanity, dialogue, responsibility, and suspension of premises 
that might lead to disastrous consequences. As we have seen, the hermeneutical 
experience is supposed to create a distance between us and our premises and 
prejudices and rid us of the detrimental ones while keeping the productive ones. 
When we look carefully at the last stage of the journey, we see that Gadamer 
himself has not distanced himself from premises that he shares with the Hel-
lenic-German philosophy of the Third Reich, but rather reaffirms them. 
Gadamer claims that in the experience of art, we recognize and regain the 
truth and value of our finite existence. His thesis begins with the perceiver. 
He says that not every perceiver—not someone who goes to the theater for fun 
(der Neugierde)—can experience the truth and value of finite existence, but 
only someone who is genuinely devoted to art (Gadamer 1990: 131). Gadamer 
uses the example of Greek tragedy to demonstrate how the “authentic” per-
ceiver becomes acquainted with the truth of existence. The disasters befalling 
Oedipus evoke in the devoted perceiver genuine emotions of fear (Φόβος) and 
pity (ἔλεος). Overwhelmed by these tragic emotions, he suddenly, in a moment 
of revelation, catches a glimpse of his finite existence. Akin to Heidegger’s thesis 
on existing-toward-one’s-own-death (Sein-zum-Tode), this insight into one’s own 
68 “Was sich da vor ihm abspielt, ist für einen Jeden so herausgehoben aus den fortgehen-
den Weltlinien und so zu einem selbständigen Sinnkreis zusammengeschlossen, dass sich für 
niemanden ein Hinausgehen auf irgeneine andere Zukunft und Wirklichkeit motiviert. Der 
Aufnehmende ist in eine absolute Distanz verwiesen, die ihm jede praktische, zweckvolle An-
teilnahme verwehrt.” (Gadamer 1990: 133)
69 See Segev (2003). 
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finitude is the most basic experience upon which everything else is founded. 
Gadamer writes: 
So we must repeat the question: what does the spectator affirm here? Obviously it is the 
disproportionate, terrible immensity of the consequences that flow from a guilty deed 
that is the real claim made on the spectator. The tragic affirmation is the fulfillment of 
this claim. It has the character of a genuine communion. What is experienced in such an 
excess of tragic suffering is something truly common. The spectator recognizes himself 
and his own finiteness in the face of the power of fate. (Gadamer 2006: 128 / 1990: 137) 
The experience of finitude must be different from case to case. I do not see how 
we can meaningfully generalize it. Gadamer, however, sees it as positive to the 
extent that it is combined with heroism and courage in meeting destiny and 
death. As in Ernst Jünger, it is the courage to bear destiny regardless of any moral 
questions.70 It is a call—although in Gadamer, an indirect one—to reject moral 
aspects as bourgeois standards and values which get destroyed by fear (φόβος) 
and pity (ἔλεος), and death is then seen as the highest value of our existence. 
Gadamer promises to rehabilitate humanity. He ends up aestheticising exis-
tence. His huge hermeneutic project leads to the experience of death. He prom-
ises to show us how we are expected to rid ourselves of detrimental premises, 
but turns out to be uncritically bound to the same premises as the philosophers 
of the Third Reich. 
70 See Jünger (1982: 50): “Ebenso nimmt der gläubige Mensch an einem erweiterten Kreise 
des sinnvollen Lebens teil. Durch Unglück und Gefahr bezieht ihn das Schicksal ebenso wie 
durch das Wunder unmittelbar in ein mächtigeres Walten ein, und der Sinn dieses Zugriffes 
wird in der Tragödie anerkannt. Die Götter lieben es, sich in den Elementen zu offenbaren, in 
glühenden Gestirnen, in Donner und Blitz, im brennenden Busche, den die Flamme nicht ver-
sehrt. Zeus bebt auf dem höchsten Throne vor Lust, während der Erdkreis unter der Schlacht 
der Götter und Menschen erdröhnt, weil er hier den ganzen Umfang seiner Macht gewaltig 
bestätigt sieht.” 
Chapter Seven
Jean Améry on Phenomenology in the  
Death Camp
It seems that there can be no greater contrast to Gadamer than Jean Améry. 
While Gadamer uncritically takes over Heidegger’s and Husserl’s terms and uses 
them without reflecting on any moral implications, Jean Améry applies them 
to his experiences in the death camps. The result shocks. It emerges as a des-
perate attempt to reach the heart and mind of the people who, as we have just 
seen in Gadamer, twenty years after Auschwitz, still identify death as the most 
noble pinnacle of existence. Améry claims that only one who went through the 
Nazi inferno can understand and convey its meaning to the people who were 
not there. Améry calls his critical dealing with his experience “phenomenology” 
(Améry 2005b: 258). He entitles the material, the personal experience, to which 
he applies his critical lens “le vécu” (Améry 2005a: 13) and “situation vécue” 
(Ibid: 189): that is, life as it is experienced, or what Husserl calls Erlebnis. Thus, 
lacking that experience, one can talk about the banality of evil only insofar as 
one sees Eichmann in the glass cage at the court in Jerusalem (Améry 1970: 38). 
This attitude raises the question we shall later treat about the prospect of writing 
meaningfully about the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis for people who were 
not there. Améry himself is skeptical, especially when it comes to the intellectu-
als’ ability to understand. He writes bitterly: 
In my incessant effort to explore the basic condition of being a victim, in conflict with the 
necessity to be a Jew and the impossibility of being one, I believe to have recognized that 
the most extreme expectations and demands directed at us are of a physical and social 
nature. That such knowledge has made me unfit for profound and lofty speculation, I know. 
It is my hope that it has better equipped me to recognize reality. (Améry 1986: 101 / 1970: 119)
Améry expresses mistrust in the intellectuals who failed to stand up for moral-
ity. His affinity to Julien Benda’s Trahison des clercs (1928) (Benda 1978), to whose 
German translation he wrote the introduction, is apparent.
Améry expresses his attitude toward the superficiality of culture as seen 
from the perspective of the death camp with the following remark: 
A comrade who had once been asked about his profession had foolishly told the truth 
that he was a Germanist and that had provoked a murderous outburst of rage from an 
SS man. In those same days, across the ocean in the USA, Thomas Mann, I believe, said, 
“Wherever I am is German culture.” The German-Jewish Auschwitz prisoner could not 
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have made such a bold assertion, even if by chance he had been a Thomas Mann. (Améry 
1986: 8 / 1970: 18) 
This remark is complex. It is a critique of the intellectuals outside the death camp 
for whom business was as usual, despite the horrors that were taking place. At 
the same time, Améry must presume the presence of some literate intellectual 
strata, for otherwise his critique could never be heard. The pain and suffering at 
the beginning of Beyond Guilt and Atonement are those of the intellectual in the 
death camp. Unlike professionals who immerse themselves in their work routine 
because of their skills (Améry 1970: 12) and hence also in society, the intellectual 
can hardly integrate.71 He used to look at the world through logic and reason, but 
they have suddenly collapsed (Ibid: 20). At the same time, his critique is mainly 
directed against the hollowness of the intellectuals. 
As we have seen in our previous discussion, especially in Gadamer, Hei-
degger, and Jünger, death is the ultimate possibility of human-existence; the 
human is hence supposed to face it heroically. This philosophy must change in 
the death camp, as Amery shows: 
The first result was always the total collapse of the esthetic view of death. What I am 
saying is familiar. The intellectual, and especially the intellectual of German education 
and culture, bears this esthetic view of death within him. It was his legacy from the distant 
past, at the very latest from the time of German romanticism. It can be more or less charac-
terized by the names Novalis, Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Thomas Mann. For death in its 
literary, philosophic or musical form there was no place in Auschwitz; no bridge led from 
death in Auschwitz to Death in Venice. Every poetic evocation of death became intoler-
able, whether it was Hesse’s “Dear Brother Death …” or that of Rilke, who sang: “Oh Lord, 
give each his own death.’” The esthetic view of death had revealed itself to the intellectual 
as part of an esthetic mode of life; where the latter had been all but forgotten, the former 
was nothing but an elegant trifle. In the camp no Tristan music accompanied death, only 
the roaring of the SS and the Kapos. (Améry 1986: 16–17 / 1970: 28) 
For the prisoner in the death camp, Améry says, there was no poetic death (Tod), 
but only brutish dying (sterben).72 The intellectual, Améry goes on, was just as 
occupied as the non-intellectual with the concrete, physical aspects of dying:
71 “Der Intellektuelle suchte, zumindest im Anfang noch, ständing nach der Möglichkeit so-
zialer Kundgebung des Geistes. In einem Gespräch mit dem Bettnachbarn etwa, der umständ-
lich vom Küchenzettel seiner Frau erzählte, wollte er gerne die Feststellung einschmuggeln, 
daß er selbst daheim viel gelesen habe. Wenn er aber hierauf zum dreißigsten Mal die Antwort 
erhielt: ‘Scheiße, Mensch!’, ließ er es bleiben.” (Améry 1970: 17)
72 Compare Adorno (1997: 117): “Was da in höherer als bloß empirischer Gewißheit sich an-
kündigt, reinigt ihn [i.e. den Tod] so falsch von Elend und Gestank des animalischen Krepie-
rens wie nur ein Wagnerscher Liebes- oder Erlösungstod, ähnlich dem Einbau des Todes in die 
Hygiene, den Heidegger den Uneigentlichen ankreidet.”
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Then, however, the entire problem was reduced to a number of concrete considerations. 
For example, there was once a conversation in the camp about an SS man who had slit 
open a prisoner’s belly and filled it with sand. It is obvious that in view of such possibili-
ties one was hardly concerned with whether or that one had to die, but only with how it 
would happen. Inmates carried on conversations about how long it probably takes for the 
gas in the gas chamber to do its job. One speculated on the painfulness of death by phenol 
injections. (Améry 1986: 17 / 1970: 28–29) 
Contrary to Heidegger, who conceives death as the highest possibility of the 
human being for realizing his genuine existence if he relates to it resolutely and 
authentically, in the death camp the experience of dying reduces the human 
being to an indistinct brute entity lacking distinctive characteristics. Thus 
Améry writes regarding Heidegger: 
Occasionally, perhaps that disquieting magus from Alemannic regions came to mind who 
said that beings appear to us only in the light of Being, but that man forgot Being by fixing 
on beings. Well now, Being. But in the camp it was more convincingly apparent than on 
the outside that beings and the light of Being gets you nowhere. You could be hungry, be 
tired, be sick. To say that one purely and simply is, made no sense. And existence as such, 
to top it off, became definitively a totally abstract and thus empty concept. (Améry 1986: 
18–19 / 1970: 30) 
“To-be-in-the-world” (in-der-Welt-sein) is a term which Heidegger uses in Being 
and Time to describe the basic ways in which the human Dasein exposes the 
entities in their Being in his daily life. The human Dasein finds himself in famil-
iar surroundings in which he relates to the entities not as bare-objects, but rather 
as tools to accomplish tasks. Tools and work are the mode in which the human 
Dasein encounters entities in his daily activities in a mode of occupation and not 
of scientific observation. “World” denotes the projected organized complex of 
working, collaborating to accomplish tasks, and using tools, which the human 
Dasein finds himself encountering in his daily life. “World” does not refer to an 
object or a sum of objects. It is rather the basic mode in which entities encoun-
tered in daily life are familiar and trustworthy. Hence Heidegger says that the 
world is Existential, namely, a mode of existence. Trust and familiarity character-
ize this mode of existence, and they allow the human Dasein to immerse himself 
in his tasks and accomplish them intuitively, without reflection or meditation. If 
“world” is existential, then it should be the daily mode of existence, regardless 
of place and time. Améry makes a caricature of this suggestion:
I don’t know if the person who is beaten by the police loses human dignity. Yet I am certain 
that with the very first blow that descends on him he loses something we will perhaps 
temporarily call “trust in the world.” Trust in the world includes all sorts of things: the 
irrational and logically unjustifiable belief in absolute causality perhaps, or the likewise 
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blind belief in the validity of the inductive inference. But more important as an element 
of trust in the world, and in our context what is solely relevant, is the certainty that by 
reason of written or unwritten social contracts the other person will spare me, more pre-
cisely stated, that he will respect my physical and with it also my metaphysical being. 
The boundaries of my body are also the boundaries of my self. My skin surface shields me 
against the external world. If I am to have trust, I must feel on it only what I want to feel. 
At the first blow, however, this trust in the world breaks down. The other person, opposite 
whom I exist physically in the world and with whom I can exist only as long as he does not 
touch my skin surface as border, forces his own corporeality on me with the first blow. He 
is on me and thereby destroys me. It is like a rape, a sexual act without the consent of one 
of the partners. (Améry 1986: 28 / 1970 40–41)
To-be-in-the-world turns out to be not existential, but rather a description of a 
normal way of life in times of peace. In times of war, human existence loses the 
characteristics of familiarity, trust, and collegiality. Améry writes regarding the 
torturer:
He had to torture, destroy, in order to be great in bearing the suffering of others. He had to 
be capable of handling torture instruments, so that Himmler would assure him his certifi-
cate of maturity in History; later generations would admire him for having obliterated his 
feelings of mercy. (Améry 1986: 30 / 1970: 43) 
The human Dasein, Améry says, is tortured to death by his fellow man. The tor-
turer tortures his fellow man in order to enhance his own personality, to become 
a semi-God (1970: 49). The one who is tortured loses forever his trust in the world. 
Whoever has succumbed to torture can no longer feel at  home in the world. The shame of 
destruction cannot be erased. Trust in the world, which already collapsed in part at the first 
blow, but in the end, under torture, fully, will not be regained. That one’s fellow man was 
experienced as the anti-man remains in the tortured person as accumulated horror. It blocks 
the view into a world in which the principle of hope rules. (Améry 1986: 40 / 1970: 54)
Being at home with one’s own language and culture is an important component 
in German philosophy. Heimat or homeland in English surfaces in the literature 
each time the effort is made to point out what makes up the essence of German; 
and this long before the appearance of Nazism, as for example in Richard 
 Wagner’s text What is German? (Wagner 1883: 51–73). Améry claims that 
Therefore, once again very clearly: there is no “new home.” Home is the land of one’s 
childhood and youth. Whoever has lost it remains lost himself, even if he has learned not 
to stumble about in the foreign country as if he were drunk, but rather to tread the ground 
with some fearlessness. (Améry 1986: 48 / 1970: 63)
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Hence, homesickness (Heimweh) turns out to be self-destruction, longing for the 
lost self (Améry 1970: 66). Likewise, the native language becomes hostile exactly 
as the Heimat does (Ibid: 68). Once one is deported and banned from one’s father-
land, one will understand that homeland cannot be a mode of existence―in the 
sense of language and familiarity―without an actual fatherland (Ibid: 70). In 
addition, if you are a Jew, you find that you have never really had one (Ibid: 65).
The experience of one’s finitude implies an experience of time, according 
to Heidegger and Gadamer. Time can be experienced inauthentically as an infi-
nite span, or authentically as the temporally finite meaning of one’s existence. 
This is the Ereigniss, καιρός, or the “fulfilled time” (erfüllte Zeit) as Gadamer 
calls it. It is a messianic intervention in the infinite temporal span which lets 
one experience one’s existence as finite. This is the apex of Heidegger’s Being 
and Time and of Gadamer’s hermeneutical experience.73 The theme time is also 
the apex of Améry’s discussion, which is dedicated to resentment. Améry claims 
that resentment implies a traumatic past which prevents one from proceeding 
to the future (Améry 1970: 84). The traumatized person is chained to his past 
with resentment. His temporal sense is distorted (ver-rückt) because he wants 
the impossible; that is, he wants the traumatic past to be revoked. Améry focuses 
here on the moral aspects involved in the experience of time. 
What happened, happened. This sentence is just as true as it is hostile to morals and 
intellect. The moral power to resist contains the protest, the revolt against reality, which 
is rational only as long it is moral. The moral person demands annulment of time―in the 
particular case under question, by nailing the criminal to his deed. (Améry 1986: 72 / 
1970: 87–88)
It is hostily to morality because the human being must revolt against the elaps-
ing time and remember who was his torturer. The tortured and dishonored 
person can reclaim his basic human dignity only by revolt against the temporal 
chain, against historic destiny (Améry 1970: 106). This argument must be per-
sonal and impulsive, for morality, unlike revenge, cannot be based on personal 
recollection, and justice cannot be dependent on the victim’s memory; we want 
the perpetrator to be properly punished, even if the victim can no longer remem-
ber what happened or is no longer alive or cognitively sound. 
This issue should lead to a general evaluation of Améry’s main claim―that 
the survivor is the only legitimate messenger of the meaning behind the terror 
and horrors perpetrated by the Nazis―which Giorgio Agamben (2003) and Primo 
Levi (1990), who write on the experience of prisoners in the death camp, also 
present. In general, it is a question to what extent and to what degree we can 
73 See Segev 2003. 
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share our experience with other people, as demonstrated in the practical case of 
the doctor who needs to reconstruct in his mind the pain of his pateint in order 
to undsrstand him. We may lack the appropriate framework for meaningfully 
posing and answering this question. As for the Holocaust, if Améry is right and 
only the survivor can understand the horror of the death camp―and in some 
cases, maybe the attentive reader as well―then we are all potential cold-blooded 
torturers who consume books and films on the death camps as thrillers, which 
can also produce catharsis. Another question is whether any survivor can give 
testimony, or only one who was in Auschwitz; and then, whether it can be anyone 
who was in Auschwitz, or only one who was there at a given time and place and 
played a given role (i.e., can a Jewish survivor who cooperated with the Nazis 
provide reliable testimony, or not?). 
Detlev Claussen expresses this difficulty in Grenzen der Aufklärung when 
he speaks about the “Holocaust” concept as an artifact, which is the attempt to 
give it meaning and form, as the movie Schindler’s List does. Any transmitter is 
an abstracted artifact which can be transcended insofar as we are gripped by the 
anxiety that Auschwitz introduced to the world, Claussen claims (Claussen 1997: 
Introduction). The artifact or symbol is indispensable for transmitting meaning. 
But the artifact must at the same time be destroyed in order for the meaning 
of the report to come across. This is a precondition for properly understand-
ing Améry’s and Levi’s reports from the death camp. Thus Améry describes the 
unclear parameters separating safety and danger, culture and barbarity:
A slight pressure by the tool-wielding hand is enough to tum the other―along with his 
head, in which are perhaps stored Kant and Hegel, and all nine symphonies, and the 
World as Will and Representation―into a shrilly squealing piglet at slaughter. (Améry 
1986: 35 / 1970: 49) 
Chapter Eight
Jan Assmann on Moses and Violence
Jan Assmann is a contemporary thinker and Egyptologist who defines his goal 
as healing society from anti-Semitism, a mission to which he feels obligated as 
a German who grew up in the aftermath of World War II. Assmann writes about 
his main work, Moses the Egyptian:
The present text reflects my situation as a German Egyptologist writing fifty years after 
the catastrophe which Freud saw approaching, knowing the full extent of that genocide 
which was still unthinkable in Freud’s time, and having turned to ancient Egypt thirty 
years ago with questions that are all too easily forgotten as soon as one enters the aca-
demic discipline. 
In this book I try to remember and recover the questions, not to answer them. I attempt a 
mnemohistory of religious antagonism insofar as this antagonism is founded on the sym-
bolic confrontation of Israel and Egypt. In this respect, I hope to contribute to a historical 
analysis of anti-Semitism. (Assmann 1998: 6)
Assmann thinks that the source of the sickness lies in the cultural conflict 
between Israel and Egypt, between Israel and the foreigner or the “other.” 
The strategy which he utilizes to uncover this source he calls “mnemohistory,” 
namely, history of memory or recollection. The source of Jew-hatred lies hidden 
in the consciousness of the anti-Semite, and it needs to be uncovered as the first 
step in the healing process. The hidden source of Jew-hatred, Assmann argues, 
is what he calls the Mosaic Distinction. This distinction implies true and false 
and good and evil in religion. It came into the world with the introduction of 
monotheism, which is seen in the eyes of the monotheist to be true, in contrast 
to polytheism, which is considered to be false. This is the source of the religious 
violence which has continued to our time and which led to the mass murder 
of Jews at the hands of the Nazis during World War II, according to Assmann. 
The monotheistic-polytheistic contrast, Assmann claims, was first introduced 
by Akhenaton in Ancient Egypt, but its final formulation, the Mosaic Distinc-
tion, was made by Moses on Mount Sinai. He believes that Akhenaton was a kind 
of deist who based his monotheism on experience. Moses, on the other hand, 
based monotheism on a revelation following which only the message that was 
revealed to the chosen people is true. The rest is heathen, false, pagan, heretic, 
and idolatrous. 
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Monotheistic religions structure the relationship between the old and the new in terms 
not of evolution but of revolution, and reject all older and other religions as “paganism” 
or “idolatry.” Monotheism always appears as a counter-religion. There is no natural or 
evolutionary way leading from the error of idolatry to the truth of monotheism. The truth 
can come only from outside, by way of revelation (Ibid: 7).74
The Mosaic Distinction is the source of religious violence in general and of Jew-
hatred and anti-Semitism in particular, according to Assmann. Uncovering the 
source of religious violence will achieve healing first by pointing at the source 
of the problem, and second by tracing Mosaic monotheism (which is based on 
revelation) back to Akhenaton’s monotheism (which is based on experience) and 
farther to polytheism. 
Making Moses an Egyptian amounts to abolishing this defining opposition. Tracing 
Moses and his message back to Egypt means leaving the realm of “revealed” or “posi-
tive” religion and entering the realm of lumen naturale: experience, reason, tradition, and 
wisdom. 
…The counter-religious antagonism was always constructed in terms of unity and plural-
ity: Moses and the One against Egypt and the Many. The discourse on Moses the Egyptian 
aimed at dismantling this barrier. It traced the idea of unity back to Egypt (Ibid: 168).
By “reason” and “experience,” Assmann means a kind of deism (Ibid: 184, 210). 
His claim is odd; for the person to whom God has been revealed, there is no 
difference between revelation and experience: that which is revealed is expe-
rienced in a way surpassing any other experience. Furthermore, religion, as a 
body that incorporates belief in a single or multiple deities, precepts, taboos, 
and rituals, cannot be founded solely on experience, as Wittgenstein clearly 
demonstrated in his critique of Frazer (Wittgenstein 1993: 115). Neither mono-
theism nor polytheism—nor even attributing design to nature—can be founded 
solely on experience and observation.
Regarding the strategy by which Assmann wants to achieve this goal, mne-
mohistory, he writes:
The aim of mnemohistorical study is not to ascertain the possible truth of traditions such 
as the traditions about Moses, but to study these traditions as phenomena of collective 
memory. (Assmann 1998: 9)
74 Later on in the text, Assmann will distinguish between “primary religions” and “second-
ary religions.” The “secondary religions” are the monotheistic ones that cause revolution and 
lead to atrocities and persecutions: “Wherever secondary religions occur, they always seem to 
have been established by foundational acts such as revolution and revelation. Such positive 
acts often have their negative complements in rejection and persecution. ‘Positive’ religions 
imply negated tradition.” (Assmann 1998: 169)
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Mnemohistory analyzes the importance that a present ascribes to the past. The task of 
historical positivism consists in separating the historical from the mythical elements in 
memory and distinguishing the elements that retain the past from those which shape the 
present. In contrast, the task of mnemohistory consists in analyzing the mythical ele-
ments in tradition and discovering their hidden agenda (Ibid: 10).
Later on in the text, Assmann takes a stand against historical positivism, which 
he regards as a bad method for approaching history.75 Assmann also writes that
Mnemohistory is concerned not with the past as such, but only with the past as it is 
remembered … It concentrates exclusively on those aspects of significance and relevance 
which are the product of memory … (Ibid: 9). 
This strategy is akin to psychoanalysis in that the consciousness of the neurotic 
person is analyzed in order to release him from his sufferings. The perspective 
of the person regarding real and remembered events ought to change; he ought 
to learn how to cope with reality. This method, however, cannot be trouble-free 
when used in historical research. First of all, it is improbable that historical 
research is indifferent to events. If it is not indifferent to events and yet uses trau-
matized consciousness to reconstruct them, the outcome might be a distorted 
picture of the events. Either way, it seems that Assmann cannot effectively heal 
anti-Semitism by that means. He can sympathize with a traumatized person and 
shed light on his traumas. This can lead to more tolerance toward Jews, but it can 
also release suppressed hatred and aggression. On the other hand, if Assmann 
wants to reconstruct historical events from the traumas of the anti-Semite, he 
can even wind up justifying anti-Semitism. In order to avoid that, he would have 
to explore and reconstruct events from many perspectives, not only from that of 
the anti-Semite. Likewise, the conviction of a criminal cannot be solely based 
on the traumas of his victim. The police need more evidence to substantiate the 
charge.
Assmann begins his inquiry with ancient Egypt because the first monothe-
istic revolution took place there. Polytheism, according to Assmann, is tolerant 
by nature, for it allows the gods and idols of one tribe or nation to be translated 
and transformed into the inventory of gods or idols of other nations. Monothe-
ism, on the other hand, discards that principle of translation. Hence, Assmann 
calls it “counter-religion” because it rejects any other religion or worship as false 
and bad. 
75 See for example Assmann (1998: 22).
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THE MONOTHEISTIC revolution of Akhenaten was not only the first, but also the most 
radical and violent eruption of a counter-religion in the history of humankind. The 
temples were closed, the images of the gods were destroyed, their names were erased, 
and their cults were discontinued (Ibid: 25).
A vivid memory of the revolution carried out by Akhenaton disappeared from the 
immediate consciousness and continued to subconsciousely exist as a trauma 
(Ibid: 28). This revolution created what Assmann calls the “religious enemy” 
(Ibid: 29). Thus it formed the nature of the encounter with other people. 
The Egyptian phantasm of the religious enemy first became associated with the Asiatics 
in general and then with the Jews in particular. It anticipated many traits of Western anti-
Semitism that can now be traced back to an original impulse. This impulse had nothing 
to do with the Jews, but very much to do with the experience of a counter-religion and of 
a plague (Ibid: 30).
So, the revolution made by Akhenaton has, as Assmann puts it, “Nothing to do 
with the Jews.” The urgent question, however—why it led to the persecution and 
annihilation of the Jews and not of other people—Assmann chooses to skip. This 
explanation is further deficient because it is not clear whether religion prompts 
the onset of war or else serves as an additional justification for conducting it—a 
possibility that we encountered in our discussion of Carl Schmitt. If it is true 
that it can serve as an additional justification, then a polytheistic world-view 
can serve as justification no less than a monotheistic world-view. This alterna-
tive account seems stronger than Assmann’s, for we do not invent a concept or 
a viewpoint and then select cases to range under it. Akhenaton did not invent 
a counter-religion and then search for the best candidate to ascribe it to. Con-
cepts develop and change along with reality and along with struggles. Later 
they can be applied directly or indirectly to other occurrences. The alternative to 
Assmann’s account is also supported by the story, which Freud analyzes—and 
to which Assmann refers as well (Ibid: 36)—of the beginning of Judaism as an 
aggressive act of a pagan society against lepers who were expelled from Egypt 
and then united and returned as Yahweh’s worshipers. Furthermore, conflicts 
must imply politics; otherwise they would be meaningless. We have already 
encountered two examples—one in Carl Schmitt and the other in Erik Peterson—
of how religion and politics are intimately interrelated. In Schmitt, politics is a 
secularized religion, and in Peterson, politics uses religion as a means of justifi-
cation. We can now add Donoso Cortés, according to whom they are interchange-
able as far as repression is concerned. 
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… In the ancient world, when religious repression was lowest, because it did not exist, 
political repression was at its highest because it became tyrannical. Very well, then, with 
Jesus Christ, when religious oppression is born, political repression completely disap-
pears. (Cortés 2000: 53)
Assmann must have referred to the political factor in order to render his theory 
on religious conflicts meaningful, but he ignores it. Assuming that Assmann’s 
theory is true and that religious violence was born with Akhenaton’s revolu-
tion, how could the trauma of this revolution lead to anti-Semitism? Assmann 
replies:  
The Amarna experience shaped the Hyksos tradition and created the semantic frame 
of the “religious enemy” which was afterward filled by the Assyrians, the Persians, the 
Greeks, and finally the Jews. (Assmann 1998: 41)
It is still not clear why “the Jews” finally became the subject of religious hatred. 
Why did this abhorrence stop at the Jews and not continue to other people? 
According to Assmann, this revolution led to the loss of what he calls the “prin-
ciple of translation.”
In Mesopotamia, the practice of translating divine names goes back to the third millen-
nium B.C. In the second millennium, this practice was extended to many different lan-
guages and civilizations of the Near East. The cultures, languages, and customs may have 
been as different as ever: the religions always had a common ground. Thus they func-
tioned as a means of intercultural translatability. … The different peoples worshipped dif-
ferent gods, but nobody contested the reality of foreign gods and the legitimacy of foreign 
forms of worship. The distinction I am speaking of [i.e. the Mosaic] simply did not exist in 
the world of polytheistic religions (Ibid: 3).
Polytheism is religiously tolerant, according to Assmann, because one religious 
sect can translate or incorporate different set of gods, religious customs, etc., 
into its own. Polytheistic society lacked the distinction between true and false, 
between pagan and monotheist, which is a distinction that lies at the heart of 
religious tensions and wars.76
The Mosaic Distinction between true and false in religion finds its expression in the story 
of Exodus. This means that it is symbolized by the constellation of opposition of Israel and 
Egypt. Books 2–5 of the Pentateuch unfold the distinction in a narrative and in a norma-
76 It is obvious that any language, religious ones included, and any norm must imply the dis-
tinction between true and false. Assmann does not refer to the scholars who dealt thoroughly 
with this distinction in the religious field such as Wittgenstein, D. Z. Phillips, Rush Rees, Mal-
colm Norman, Peter Winch, and others. For a discussion of that distinction and different strat-
egies for approaching it see Segev (2008).
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tive form. Narratively, the distinction is represented by the story of Israel’s Exodus out of 
Egypt. Egypt thereby came to symbolize the rejected, the religiously wrong, the “pagan.” 
As a consequence, Egypt’s most conspicuous practice, the worship of images, came to 
be regarded as the greatest sin. Normatively, the distinction is expressed in a law code 
which conforms with the narrative in giving the prohibition of “idolatry” first priority 
(Ibid: 3–4). 
The Mosaic Distinction is obviously seen in the Commandments: “Thou shalt 
have no other gods before me” and “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven 
image” (Ibid: 4). Thus monotheism, according to Assmann, rejects translatabil-
ity. Monotheism is founded instead on what Assmann calls “normative inver-
sion.” Assmann writes: 
... If the Law prohibits activity x there must have existed an idolatrous community practic-
ing x (Ibid: 58).
... The reason of the Law shines forth only when it is seen against the background of the 
discarded tradition called idololatria, idolatry (Ibid: 59).
The principle of normative inversion or the construction of cultural otherness is obviously 
working retroactively too (Ibid: 67).
It seems, however, that the “normative inversion” cannot serve as a principle 
applying to all of the Ten Commandments. Assmann refers only to the com-
mandments regarding Yahweh as one single God. There are, however, also the 
commandments: “You shall not murder,” “You shall not steal,” “You shall not bear 
false witness against your neighbor,” and “Honor your father and your mother,” 
to which Assmann does not refer. It would be absurd to claim that they also 
take their meaning and significance from the principle of normative inversion. 
Should the Decalogue have meaning, the Ten Commandments must be neces-
sarily related to one another. Hence, the prohibitions of killing, stealing, giving 
false witness, and dishonoring one’s parents are inseparable from the com-
mandments regarding the worshiping of one single God from which they receive 
their absolute validity. 
The introduction of monotheism by no means implies abolition of what 
Assmann calls the principle of translatability. New terms, however, require dif-
ferent translating procedures. In the monotheistic context, we talk about con-
version and reversion. As we shall see, the Jews anchored tolerance to their reli-
gion by means of the Noachide Laws, and the Christians similarly anchored it to 
theirs by means of compassion and mercy. The New Testament is conceived by 
Christians as the realization of the Old Testament’s prophecy about the revela-
tion of the Messiah. Jesus is a descendent of David’s family. Islam conceives its 
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two elder siblings as divine revelation. It seems that untranslatability begins 
rather with blood and race theory—the Germanic new paganism—such as the 
Nazi race politics that disregards any sort of conversion.77 
Unlike the twentieth-century moral philosophers who saw cultural relativism as an argu-
ment for tolerance, Nazi theorists drew the opposite conclusion. Assuming that cultural 
diversity breeds antagonism, they asserted the superiority of their own communitarian 
values above all others. (Koonz 2003: 1) 
As we have seen, according to Assmann, the source of anti-Semitism and Jew-
hatred that achieved its apex in the annihilation of European Jewry by the Nazis 
is the “Mosaic Distinction.” The distinction “between true and false in religion 
finds its expression in the story of Exodus. This means that it is symbolized by 
the constellation of the opposition of Israel and Egypt” (Assmann 1998: 3–4). 
Assmann never mentions that along with the Decalogue and the 613 precepts 
called Mitzvoth that were handed down to the Jews, there were also the Noachide 
Laws that regulate attitudes toward and the status of non-Jews in the state and 
society, some of them with particular reference to Egypt. For example:
Leviticus 24, 22: There shall be one standard for you; it shall be for the stranger as well as 
the native, for I am the LORD your God.
Leviticus 19, 33–34: When a stranger resides with you in your land, you shall not do him 
wrong. The stranger who resides with you shall be to you as the native among you, and 
you shall love him as yourself, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt; I am the LORD 
your God.
Jeremiah 7, 6: Suppose you do not oppress foreigners, orphans, and widows, or kill 
anyone in this place. And suppose you do not follow other gods that lead you to your own 
destruction. 
Leviticus 19, 34: You shall not wrong a stranger or oppress him, for you were strangers in 
the land of Egypt. 
Assmann’s disregard of the Noachide Laws in this context can mean either crude 
ignorance or intentional dishonesty for the sake of supporting his theory. No 
genocide and persecution would be possible if people would abide by these laws. 
Contrary to Assmann, Finkielkraut paints a completely different picture, in which 
with the introduction of monotheism racial and ethnic factors were supposed to 
stop playing any role, for all men became equal before the one single God. 
77 See Neumann (1944: 127). “Anti-Semitism in Germany is an expression of the rejection of 
Christianity and all it stands for.” 
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... This God of the Bible declares: “The sentence you pass shall be the same whether it be 
on native or on stranger; for I am Yahweh your God.” The one God reveals to men the unity 
of humankind. An incredible message, an astounding revelation, which led Emmanuel 
Lévinas to say, “Monotheism is not an arithmetic of the divine. It is, perhaps, a gift from 
on high that makes it possible to see man’s similarity to man beneath the continuing 
diversity of individual historical traditions.” (Finkielkraut 2000: 7)
According to this picture, the annihilation of the Jews on racial grounds at the 
hand of the Nazis cannot follow from belief in a universal God, who is one and 
the same for all men, but rather from belief in the racial superiority of one people 
over the rest. 
In The Mosaic Distinction, or the Price of Monotheism, Assmann argues that 
for Christians and Muslims, the horrors stemming from the Mosaic Distinc-
tion must be overcome by missionary conversion. The truth they believe in is 
a single truth relating to one single God, and they are called upon to distribute 
and implement it either by missionary conversion and assimilation, or violently, 
by means of persecution, crusade, inquisition, jihad, etc. Judaism, on the other 
hand, Assmann claims, is a culture of difference. The difference is a matter of 
fact, and the non-Jewish peoples (goyīm) may believe in whatever gods they 
please.78 He writes:
Judaism is a culture of difference. For Judaism, it is utterly self evident that monotheism 
draws a border and that the Jews are responsible for policing this border. Assimilation is 
no less abhorrent to Judaism than discrimination is to Christianity. For Jewish readers, 
the category of the Mosaic distinction is therefore not a problem, but something that goes 
without saying. In Judaism, the universalism inherent to monotheism is deferred until a 
messianic end-time; in the world as we know it, the Jews are the guardians of a truth that 
concerns everyone, but that has been entrusted to them for the time being as to a kind of 
spiritual avant-garde. For Christians, of course, this end-time dawned some two thou-
sand years ago, putting an end to the need for such distinctions. That is why Christian 
theology has blinded itself to the exclusionary force of monotheism. Judaism is a religion 
of self-exclusion. Through its divine election, Israel isolates itself (or is isolated by god) 
from the circle of peoples. The law erects a high wall around the chosen people, a cordon 
sanitaire that prevents any contamination by, or assimilation of, the ideas and customs of 
the environment. (Assmann 2010: 17 / 2003: 11) 
Assmann disregards the important distinction between cultural and religious 
assimilation. Since Jews lived for two millennia dispersed on the earth among 
all kinds of people, they must have complied with and obeyed the laws of all 
sorts of non-Jewish regimes. Jews served in non-Jewish armies and were loyal 
citizens abiding by the laws of polytheistic, Christian, and Muslim societies. To 
78 “Die ‘Völker’ (gojîm) mögen verehren, wen und wie immer sie mögen.” (Assmann 2003: 11)
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the question of how the Jews brought upon themselves hatred and finally the 
annihilation of mostly assimilated, converted, and secular Jews at the hand of 
the Nazis, Assmann replies: 
The other peoples are envious of the chosen people who received the Torah on Sinai. 
Today, this argument meets with the objection that it amounts to holding the victims 
responsible for their fate. But what else is martyrdom, if not the responsibility of victims 
for their fate? To be sure, the Jews murdered by the Nazis were not asked whether they 
professed faith in Judaism. But this should not blind us to the nature of faith, nor prevent 
us from seeing how inseparably this category is bound up with the Mosaic distinction. 
(Assmann 2010: 21 / 2003: 15)
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